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Abstract 
    The thesis consists of three main chapters. Chapter 2 studies the effects of 
Employment Protection Legislations (EPL) on labour market outcomes in the 
Mortensen Pissarides (1994) job search and matching model with an informal sector. 
The model predicts that rising costs of laying off workers unambiguously decrease the 
labour market’s tightness and a firm’s reservation productivity. Both job creation and 
job destruction are eschewed. In addition, given a Cobb–Douglas-form job matching 
function, there is a U-shaped relationship between layoff costs and the size of the 
informal sector and an inverse U-shaped relationship between layoff costs and the 
wage rate in the formal and informal sectors.  
Chapter 3 empirically examines the effect of 2008 China’s Labour Contract Law 
(CLCL) on the formal–informal divide in the China’s urban labour market. We use a 
range of indicators measure the regional enforcement of EPL and regional judiciary 
orientation. Panel data discrete choice models are employed to predict individuals’ 
probabilities of being in each employment status. The results provides weak evidence 
for an association between the regional enforcement of EPL and worker’s employment 
decisions.  
Chapter 4 explores the wage gap between urban workers and rural-to-urban 
migrants with a non-parametric matching approach proposed by Nopo (2008). Results 
show that the share of the unexplained wage gap to the mean wage gap between urban 
workers and rural migrants decreases significantly from nearly 50% to 29.7% if we 
compare only comparable individuals.  
ii 
 
Contents 
 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... i 
List of Figures .......................................................................................................................... iv 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................ v 
Acknowledgement ................................................................................................................. vii 
Declaration ............................................................................................................................ viii 
Chapter 1: Introduction to the thesis ...................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Background of Chinese labour laws reform ................................................................... 4 
1.3 Background of household registration system and rural urban migration ................... 9 
1.4 Overview of the thesis ................................................................................................. 13 
1.4.1 Chapter 2 ............................................................................................................... 13 
1.4.2 Chapter 3 ............................................................................................................... 15 
1.4.3 Chapter 4 ............................................................................................................... 17 
Chapter 2: The effect of employment protection legislations on labour market outcomes in 
a model with an informal sector ............................................................................................ 19 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 19 
2.2 Literature review .......................................................................................................... 21 
2.3 The model .................................................................................................................... 26 
2.3.1 The formal sector .................................................................................................. 27 
2.3.2 The informal sector and formal-informal linkage ................................................. 28 
2.3.3 Utility functions ..................................................................................................... 29 
2.3.4 Wage bargaining and equilibrium conditions ....................................................... 30 
2.3.5 Definition and uniqueness of the equilibrium ...................................................... 34 
2.3.6 Comparative statics ............................................................................................... 34 
2.3.7 Introduction of capital to the model ..................................................................... 39 
2.4 Model calibration ......................................................................................................... 41 
2.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 47 
Chapter 3: EPL and employment decisions in China’s urban labour market ......................... 48 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 48 
3.2 Related literature ......................................................................................................... 51 
3.3 EPL in China .................................................................................................................. 56 
3.3.1 Evolution of EPL in China ...................................................................................... 56 
3.3.2 The EPL enforcement and the judiciary orientation ............................................. 60 
iii 
 
3.4 Empirical methods ....................................................................................................... 64 
3.5 Data .............................................................................................................................. 67 
3.5.1 The China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) .................................................... 67 
3.5.2 EPL and macro indicators ...................................................................................... 76 
3.6 Results .......................................................................................................................... 82 
3.7 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 96 
Chapter 4: The wage gap between rural migrants and urban workers in China: a matching 
approach ................................................................................................................................ 98 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 98 
4.2 Literature review ........................................................................................................ 102 
4.2.1 Theories and empirical strategies used in existing literature ............................. 103 
4.2.2 Chinese empirical studies ................................................................................... 110 
4.3 Data ............................................................................................................................ 116 
4.4 Empirical strategy ...................................................................................................... 121 
4.4.1 The model setup ................................................................................................. 121 
4.4.2 The matching process ......................................................................................... 124 
4.5 Results ........................................................................................................................ 126 
4.5.1 Decomposition results ........................................................................................ 126 
4.5.2 Distribution of the unexplained wage gap .......................................................... 131 
4.6 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 142 
Chapter 5: Conclusion to the thesis ..................................................................................... 144 
5.1 Summary of the findings ............................................................................................ 144 
5.2 Discussion of the findings, contributions and limitations .......................................... 147 
5.3 Challenges for future research................................................................................... 149 
Appendix A ........................................................................................................................... 151 
Reference ............................................................................................................................. 153 
 
  
iv 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1: Wage ratio between rural migrants and urban workers……………….…3 
Figure 2.1: Effects of firing costs on labour market tightness 𝜃………………..…....43 
Figure 2.2: Effects of firing costs on job finding rate 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)…………………..….…43 
Figure 2.3: Effects of firing costs on job separation rate 𝜆𝐺(𝑅)…………..............…44 
Figure 2.4: Effects of firing costs on average wage in formal sector 𝑤𝑓………….....44 
Figure 2.5: Effects of firing costs on average wage in formal sector 𝑤𝑖…………..…45 
Figure 2.6: Effects of firing costs on size of the informal sector 𝐿𝑖………………......45 
Figure 2.7: Effects of firing costs on size of the formal sector 𝐿𝑓………………...…46 
Figure 2.8: Effects of firing costs on size of unemployed 𝐿𝑢………………….….…46 
Figure 3.1: Total number of cases accepted by labour arbitration and mediation 
                   agencies………………………………………………………..….…… 60 
Figure 3.2: Share of labour disputes resolved in each year…………………………. 63 
Figure 3.3: Share of labour disputes cases won by employees……………….......… 63 
Figure 4.1a: Absolute wage gap before and after the matching…………………….129 
Figure 4.1b: Relative wage gap before and after the matching…………….….…...130 
Figure 4.2: Cumulative distribution of wage for four sub-samples…………………131 
Figure 4.3: Confidence intervals for the unexplained wage gap by gender………..136 
Figure 4.4: Confidence intervals for the unexplained wage gap by marital status….136 
Figure 4.5: Confidence intervals for the unexplained wage gap by age………..…..137 
Figure 4.6: Confidence intervals for the unexplained wage gap by development 
                   level ………………………………………………………………….  137 
Figure 4.7: Confidence intervals for the unexplained wage gap by education  
                   level…………………………………………………………………..  138 
Figure 4.8: Confidence intervals for the unexplained wage gap by job tenure……...138 
Figure 4.9: Confidence intervals for the unexplained wage gap by firm ownership..139 
Figure 4.10: Confidence intervals for the unexplained wage gap by occupation….139 
 
  
v 
 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1: Policy configurations……………………………………………..…...…41 
Table 3.1: A selected Comparison of 1994 Labour Law and 2008 CLCL…..……....58 
Table 3.2: The OECD indicators on the EPL…….………………………………….59 
Table 3.3: Survey questions related to employment status…………………………..69 
Table 3.4: Type of employment (age 16-65), percentage share……………………...71 
Table 3.5: Type of employment status (age 16-65), percentage share……………….72 
Table 3.6: Descriptive statistics………………………………………………...…... 74 
Table 3.7: Panel structure……..…………………………………………...…..…….75 
Table 3.8: Sample probabilities of employment status transitions ……….…………76 
Table 3.9: Descriptive statistics for indicators of EPL enforcement and the judiciary 
                 orientation………………………………………………………………..80 
Table 3.10: Descriptive statistics for macro indicators ……………………….….....81 
Table 3.11: Correlation coefficients between EPL and macro indicators…………... 81 
Table 3.12: Marginal effects: Employment status = formally employed…………...87 
Table 3.13: Marginal effects: Employment status = informal employment ………....89 
Table 3.14: Marginal effects: Employment status = unemployed……………..……91 
Table 3.15: Marginal effects: Employment status = out of labour force ……...……93 
Table 3.16: Regression statistics ………………………………..……………..……95 
Table 4.1: Table of empirical literature on wage gap between rural migrants and 
                 urban workers………………………………………………..………… 113 
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics…………………………………………...……….119 
Table 4.3: Average hourly wage by level of education………………………........120 
Table 4.4: Average hourly wage by firm ownership………………………………120 
Table 4.5: Average hourly wage by occupation……………………………...……120 
Table 4.6: Decomposition results……………………………………………….…128 
Table 4.7: Mean and standard deviation of unexplained wage gap by individual  
                 characteristics……..…………….…………………………………..….132 
vi 
 
Table 4.8: Unexplained wage gap by some personal human capital 
characteristics………………………………………………………….…140 
Table 4.9: Unexplained wage gap by some personal job-related characteristics…..141 
  
vii 
 
Acknowledgement 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisors: Dr Anindya 
Bhattacharya and Dr Emma Tominey for the continuous support of my Ph.D. Their 
guidance and useful discussions helped in all the time of research and writing of the 
thesis. Without their motivation and patience, the Ph.D. would not have been 
achievable.  
Besides my supervisors, I would also like to thank Prof. Peter Simmons for being 
the member of my Thesis Advisory Panel. Peter is always helpful in providing 
suggestions about my research. 
Last but not the least, I would like to thank my parents, my parents-in-law for their 
continuous support in my life. A special thanks to my beloved wife Chen Chen. She 
is always the one I would like to seek support in the moment when I have queries. 
  
viii 
 
Declaration 
I, Jialong Tan, declare that this thesis titled, ‘Economic Analysis of China’s Urban 
Labour Market’ and the work presented in it are my own. I confirm that:  
 This work was done wholly while in candidature for a research degree at 
this University.  
 Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always 
clearly attributed. 
 Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given.  
 I have acknowledged all main sources of help. 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Thesis 
   1.1 Introduction 
The economic effects of employment protection legislations (EPL hereafter) are a 
controversial topic in the literature (Deakin, 2016). EPL, including all rules regulating 
employment relations, are governmental interventions into the labour market to 
increase the job security of workers. However, they are also associated with adverse 
effects such as lower levels of wage and employment flexibility in the labour market. 
The governmental intervention can only be considered to be efficient if the gain of 
better protection of workers outweighs its possible costs (Botero et al., 2004). 
Therefore, the study of the effectiveness of EPL has great policy implications. Over 
the past decades, numerous studies, both theoretical and empirical, have been 
conducted to examine the economic effects of EPL in both developed and developing 
countries. Although there is consensus on the role of labour laws in restricting both 
recruiting and laying off with regard to jobs, their effects on a range of economic 
outcomes such as unemployment and labour mobility are inconclusive (Freeman, 
2007). In addition, previous studies of the effects of EPL on labour market outcomes 
often focus on the formal sector or formal employment (e.g. Lazear (1990); 
Hamermesh (1989) and Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004)). Few of them explore its effects 
on the formal-informal divide of the labour market.  The purpose of chapter 2 is to fill 
in the gap by analysing the effects of EPL on labour market outcomes in a Mortensen 
and Pissarides (1994) job search and matching model where there exist segmented 
labour markets. 
    In chapter 3, we provide an empirical study of the effects of EPL in the context of 
China’s urban labour market. Chapter 3 is motivated by recent reforms in Chinese 
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labour laws. In 2008, China enacted the Labour Contract Law (CLCL hereafter) to 
increase the protection of workers in the labour market. It is the first major law change 
since the 1994 Labour Law. In 1994, China enacted its first Labour Law to regulate 
labour relations. However, because of the vague and confusing provisions in it, there 
has been a trend of increasing informal employment in the urban labour market ever 
since (Park and Cai, 2011).  The main purpose of the CLCL is to reverse this trend in 
the labour market. It requires all employers to sign labour contracts and purchase 
social insurance for their employees. Failing to do so invokes heavy penalties. 
    By far, several empirical studies have been carried out to evaluate the effects of the 
CLCL. One strand of literature focuses on workers’ benefits such as labour contracts, 
social insurance and wage (see Li and Freeman (2015), Cui et al. (2013), Cheng et al. 
(2014) and Gallagher et al. (2013)). Another strand of studies focuses on the impacts 
of the CLCL on firms’ labour demand (see Sun (2010) and Liu & Liu (2014)). In 
Chapter 3, we contribute to the literature by looking at the effects of the CLCL on the 
formal-informal divide. Particularly, we would like to see how the CLCL affects 
individual’s employment choices. 
Chapter 4 is motivated by the recent reform of Chinese household registration 
system (or hukou system). In 2014, the State Council of the People’s Republic of 
China has set out guidelines to reform its hukou system. It aims at abolishing the 
distinction between rural and urban populations in socioeconomic status that was 
created by hukou system 60 years ago. One of the reasons for the reform is that the 
hukou system has put rural migrant workers in a disadvantageous position in the urban 
labour market (Song, 2014). It reflects in lower wage rates, lower job opportunities, 
and no access to urban social benefits compared with urban residents. Since 2000, the 
wage ratio between rural migrant workers and urban workers has been consistently 
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below 0.7 (See Figure 1.1). Such a wage gap, however, can also be attributed to 
differences in individual characteristics, such as the level of education and work 
experience. Therefore, the purpose of chapter 4 is to explore the sources of the 
observed wage gap between rural migrant workers and urban workers. We are keen to 
determine the extent to which the wages of rural migrant workers change if they are 
treated on par with urban workers. The contribution of this study is that, as far as we 
know, we are the first to use a nonparametric method to look at this issue in the Chinese 
context.  
The rest of this chapter includes an introduction to the background of Chinese labour 
law reforms, an introduction to the Chinese hukou system, and an overview of each 
chapter.    
Figure 1.1: Wage ratio between rural migrants and urban workers 
 
Source: Lu (2012), National Bureau of Statistics Database 
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   1.2 Background of Chinese labour laws reform 
Before the economic reform in 1978, the Chinese government adopted a state 
allocation system in the urban labour market. The main feature of this system was 
Chinese workers receiving lifetime employment in state-owned enterprises. Young 
workers were allocated to a work unit by the local labour administration department. 
Social welfare under this system was secured, including housing, pension, free basic 
health care, education, and other welfare benefits. Wages were set by a national 
standard system regardless of performance or productivity. This wage system was 
designed to reduce disparities in income. Wage differences within and across 
enterprises were very small. Moreover, enterprises were prohibited from laying off 
any workers; thus, there was no need to sign labour contracts between employers and 
employees (Ding et al., 2001).  
In the late 1970s, China started its economic reform and started opening up 
economically to the rest of the world. Foreign capital was allowed to lead China’s 
economic development. Consequently, the incidence of Chinese workers employed by 
foreign investment companies increased. Labour contract regulations were initially 
enacted to protect workers working at foreign investment companies.  
The Chinese economy was gradually moving toward a market-oriented economy, 
which featured the decentralisation of state-owned enterprises. The decentralization 
process included the relaxation of personnel management of each enterprise and other 
reforms that curtailed the pervasiveness of lifetime employment and other related 
welfare benefits. Since the 1980s, the number of state-owned enterprises was reduced 
significantly with the removal of lifetime employment in most cases. Instead, fixed-
term labour contracts and new wage systems that gave employers the discretion to set 
wages based on individuals’ productivity and performance were introduced.  
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In the 1990s, with China’s joining the World Trade Organization, the pace of market 
reforms was accelerated. In 1994, the Labour Law of the People’s Republic of China 
was enacted in order to regulate employment relationships. It symbolizes the 
significant fact that the labour contract system was established in the entire China’s 
labour market. The provisions of the labour law regulated a wide range of issues, 
including the conclusion, variation, and termination of labour contracts, reasonable 
working hours, paid leave, an end to discrimination, and a dispute resolution 
framework. It protected employees by providing the circumstances under which 
employers could revoke a labour contract and by listing all illegal dismissal cases. 
With regard to employers dismissing a worker in a situation that warranted dismissal, 
firms were asked to explain the situation to the trade union or all of the employees 30 
days in advance. With regard to cases in which employers revoked labour contracts in 
violation of the labour law, employers shall be ordered by the labour administrative 
department to make corrections, and shall bear the responsibility for compensation if 
damage has been caused to workers. It also includes provisions to protect labours 
rights with respect to probation periods, unemployment insurance, health insurance, 
pension, and so on. 
However, the enactment of the labour law does not mean the job security of workers 
were enhanced. In the late 1990s, China has experienced a wave of lay-offs from the 
state-owned enterprises. The number of workers in state-owned enterprises had 
decreased significantly from 1.077 billion in 1997 to around 70 million1 in 2002. Most 
of the displaced workers are unemployed. Figures from the official statistics shows 
that the urban registered unemployment rate had risen from 2.9% in 1997 to 4% in 
2002. The number would be much higher if we take rural to urban migrants into 
                                                          
1 Figures are from China Statistics Yearbook in 2000 and 2003 
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consideration. Moreover, there is much evidence to suggest that regulations included 
in the 1994 Labour Law were widely violated in China (Cooney, 2007). For instance, 
wages were often unpaid, in particular for rural migrant workers, working hours were 
often unreasonably long and migrant workers were often discriminated against 
(Greenfield and Prigle, 2002; Liu & Tan, 2003; Solinger, 1999). This indicates that 
the employment legislation system still had many shortcomings that led to poor 
enforcement of the labour law. First, the Labour Law itself had a disordered internal 
structure. The labour law system consists of two elements. The major laws, passed by 
China’s supreme legislative organisation, contained general statements of obligations. 
The detailed provisions were brought to bear by lower levels of administrative 
regulations and pronouncements. The problem with this system was that there were 
many confusing and vague provisions. For example, it failed to clarify situations with 
invalid contracts, define wages, or explain what forms of work require payment. This 
was an obstacle to enforcing the Labour Law properly. Secondly, the level of 
enforcement was low due to administrative issues. Although many labour 
administration departments and labour inspection agencies were established after the 
enactment of Labour Law, they were often understaffed (Zimmerman, 2008). Thus, 
they could not fully supervise or enforce the Labour Law. Moreover, since the labour 
administrative departments were funded and staffed by local governments, they were 
greatly influenced by local governments. In order to attract business, local 
governments sometimes were refrained from fully enforcing the law when there were 
conflicts of interests with their favoured business. Thirdly, labour agencies were often 
weak (Cooney, 2007) even when they sought to enforce the law. The penalties that 
they could impose on businesses were very limited, only including warnings, 
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correction notices, fines, compensation orders, and suchlike. The cost for businesses 
that violated the law was very low.  
To overcome the deficiencies, China enacted its Employment Protection and 
Supervision Regulations in 2005. This was the first time the Chinese government 
established its formal labour inspection system. It entitled labour inspectors to greater 
power in dealing with labour abuses. Nevertheless, the gaps and vague provisions 
within the Labour Law itself still existed. Many other problems evolved 
simultaneously. For example, there was a trend of shortening labour contracts and 
informalizing of employment relations. Informalization refers to situations in which 
employers refused to sign labour contracts with employees, did not provide them with 
social insurance, and so on (Josephs, 2009). Moreover, new employment relations 
aiming at reducing labour costs such as hiring and firing costs appeared in the China’s 
labour market. Labour dispatching is a very common practice. Dispatched workers 
often have a labour contract with a labour dispatching agency. They are then 
dispatched to work in a third company. Dispatched workers often cannot enjoy the 
same level of wages and social benefits as they would if they had signed the labour 
contract with this third company directly. The practice of hiring dispatched workers is 
often employed by large companies as a way of reducing their labour costs. 
After a long debate over the inefficient labour laws and regulations, the CLCL was 
enacted in 2008. The CLCL is no major departure from the 1994 Labour Law; however, 
the CLCL is more specific and detailed in some aspects so as to deal with the gaps in 
the old law. There are two major changes of the CLCL. First, it increases the costs of 
laying off workers. Second, it formalises employment relations by requiring 
employers to establishing employment relationships with employees in written form. 
To be specific, they are reflected in the following aspects:  
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 It has clear provisions on the scope of the law (Article 22),  
 It requires employers to sign a written contract with an employee within 30 
days of full-time employment (Article 7; 10), 
 The probation time-period should depend on the length of the labour contract 
(Article 17),  
 It restricts the cut down of more than 20 workers or less than 20 but above 10% 
of the total number of workers (Article 41),  
 How and to what extent economic compensations should be made (article 23; 
47; 50;  85; 87; 93),  
 Compensation should be made even when the labour contract expires and the 
worker disagrees to renew it (paragraph (5) of article 46). 
Meanwhile, the provisions of the 2008 CLCL and its subsequent revision in 2012 
cover regulations for dispatched workers for the first time. Worker-dispatching 
agencies are required to be regulated by a licensing and registration system (Section 
2).  
With this as the backdrop, chapter 3 will examine the effects of the labour law 
reform, particularly the changes in the strictness of EPL, on labour market outcomes. 
Since one of the main concerns for the CLCL is the trend of informalization in the 
urban labour market, Chapter 3 will examine the effect of EPL on the formal–informal 
divide in the context of China’s urban labour market. Whether the formalization of the 
employment relationship makes it easier for individuals to find a formal job in the 
labour market, or makes it harder to find one and thus quit the labour market in China.  
                                                          
2 The English version of CLCL is available at: http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_2135_0_7.html 
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   1.3 Background of household registration system and 
rural urban migration 
    The household registration system, or hukou system, has played a very important 
role in China’s labour market since 1949. The hukou system is not only designed to 
provide population statistics but also to supervise the population distribution among 
rural and urban areas. Many believe that it restricts rural-to-urban migration and 
creates the rural–urban divide in China (Chan and Zhang, 1999). The household 
registration system was initially introduced to urban areas in 1951 and was expanded 
to the rural areas in 1955. In 1958, it was formally established through the enactment 
of the Regulations on Household Registration in the People’s Republic of China (RHR 
hereafter). The hukou system was initially aimed at overall state administration, such 
as securing social and political order. According to the 1958 RHR, every person in 
China has to register with the authority and retain a hukou record. A hukou record is 
the official identification of a person’s place of residence and other personal 
information, such as name, gender, date of birth, parents, and spouse. 
    Officially, there are two classifications of hukou registration (Chan and Zhang, 
1999). The first one records the place of hukou registration. Everyone is required to 
register with only one regular place of residence. In the past, before the 1978 economic 
reform, the government allocated food and meat according to hukou registration. Even 
today, the place of hukou registration defines individuals’ rights in some local social 
and economic activities. For example, many jobs are only open to applications from 
local hukou holders. 
    The second classification is the category of hukou registration: “agricultural” or 
“non-agricultural”. This classification is more important than the place of residence 
because “non-agricultural” hukou holders are always entitled to get more subsidies 
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and privileges. It reflects the holder’s socioeconomic eligibility and other related rights. 
Originally, this classification is from the occupational division as to whether the 
individual works as a farmer. However, this classification gradually becomes 
irrelevant to the occupation status. Basically, one’s hukou status at birth follows 
his/her mother’s hukou status. 
    Before the economic reform in 1978, rural-to-urban hukou conversion was close to 
impossible (Meng, 1998). The criteria for this conversion were extremely strict and 
complicated; moreover, the government controlled it with quotas in order to regulate 
rural-to-urban migration. Because of the hukou system, the Chinese population is 
largely segmented into agricultural (rural) and non-agricultural (urban). There was 
inequality between rural and urban hukou holders with respect to job opportunities, 
obligations, and socioeconomic status. It is worth mentioning that migration control 
between rural and urban areas was not mainly achieved by the police along with 
inspection of the hukou status. Rather, it was achieved by its integration with other 
social and economic control mechanisms. For example, daily necessities were 
allocated according to the hukou status, whereas additional necessities that were 
available in the market were usually unaffordable. It was rather difficult for people to 
live anywhere outside his/her place of hukou registration or beyond his/her hukou 
status. Therefore, the labour market was segregated into urban and rural section.  
The migration control began to relax after the changes in hukou policies in the 1980s. 
With the development of the urban economy, there was increasing demand for workers 
in urban areas. On the other hand, the productivity increased in rural area, which 
resulted in surplus labour in rural areas. Migrant workers started to appear in urban 
labour market. Migrant workers usually refer to those workers with agricultural hukou 
working in urban areas. Because most of them are less educated and lack of skills 
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training opportunities, migrant workers were always treated as second class citizens. 
More than half of them working in manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail 
sectors (China National Bureau of Statistics, 2009) without labour contracts, they 
faced great health and financial risk.  Because of the hukou system, they did not have 
access to local medical services, educational services. They even had difficulties in 
enrolling their children to school.  
The low living standard of migrant workers and increasing mobility of the 
population has challenged the prereform hukou system. As a response, the government 
introduced several new regulations to improve the population registration system. 
New official documents (e.g. Temporary Residence Permit 3 ) with fewer 
administrative hurdles were introduced to allow migrant workers to get access to local 
services, education, medical services, and so on. However, institutional discrimination 
against rural migrant workers still exists in urban areas. The labour law before 2008 
was relatively weak in protecting migrant workers. Some of the employers did not 
sign contract with migrant workers to avoid regulation and punishment if there were 
any conflicts. Even if employers had signed contracts with them, some of the clauses 
are unfair including unpaid excessive overtime work or self-liability for work 
accidents in construction sectors with great health risk. Cases like employers fail to 
pay full amount of remunerations attracted social attention. 
2008 CLCL was launched in part trying to address the problem of discrimination 
against migrant workers through making clear and transparent provisions on above 
mentioned issues. For example, Article 7 requires “an employer to establish labour 
relationship with a worker as of the date of start to use the worker”. Article 4 requires 
                                                          
3 Temporary Residence Permit was first introduced to Shenzhen in 1984 as a way to monitor the 
increasing migrants’ population. It was soon introduced to other cities across China.  
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employers to “establish and perfect labour bylaws so as to ensure that workers can 
enjoy labour rights and perform labour obligations”. Those labour rights and 
obligations include remuneration, working time, rest and vacation, work safety and 
health care, social insurance and welfare, job training, job discipline or quota 
management etc. 
In 2007, China also enact its first ‘Employment Promotion Law’. The employment 
promotion law make it clear that ‘workers shall be entitled by law to enjoy the right to 
equal employment and to seek their own employment. No worker seeking employment 
shall suffer discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity, race, gender or religious belief.’ 
(Article 3). However, the practicality of the law against employment discrimination is 
questioned. There is no detailed clauses defining employment discrimination and how 
in details it should be monitored and regulated. 
There has been improvement in terms of the institutional discriminations against 
migrant workers. However, the wage ratio of rural migrants to urban workers is 
constantly below 1 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2016), which suggests that 
the average wage of migrant workers is systematically lower than workers with non-
agricultural hukou.  Nevertheless, a wage gap between two groups of workers in the 
labour market does not necessarily mean that one group is discriminated against.  
    Given this background, the chapter 4 of the thesis examines how rural migrant 
workers are treated unequally in the urban labour market. Particularly, we would like 
to figure out whether the wage gap observed in Figure 1 is caused by differences in 
individual characteristics or by different returns to individual characteristics. 
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  1.4 Overview of the thesis  
  1.4.1 Chapter 2   
The second chapter studies the effects of one aspect of EPL (increasing firing costs) 
on labour market outcomes in a model which is an extension of the classic Mortensen 
and Pissarides (1994) job search and matching model. The main extension consists in 
introducing an informal sector.   
The informal sector is an important component in both developed and developing 
countries’ labour markets. Its size can be up to 80% of total non-agricultural 
employment (Schneider and Enste, 2000; ILO, 2016). The informal sector often rears 
its head when earning opportunities in an economy are scarce for individuals and 
families. It can also be attributed to the behaviours of entrepreneurs to avoid state 
regulations such as tax arrangements and EPL (William & Lansky, 2013). Considering 
these features, in our model, we assume that the informal sector is marginal and 
competitive. Workers in the sector can find a job instantaneously and earn their 
marginal products. The informal sector is also assumed to be beyond the ambit of EPL.  
According to Cazes and Nesporova (2003), EPL refers to “regulatory provisions that 
relating to ‘hiring and firing’, particularly those governing unfair dismissals, 
termination of employment for economic reasons, severance payments, minimum 
notice periods, administrative authorization for dismissals, and prior consultations 
with trade unions and/or labour administration representatives”. It directly increase the 
firing costs of firms.  In this sense, we measure EPL as the cost of firms to fire a worker. 
In contrast, firms in the informal sector bears no cost of firing workers as they are out 
of formal regulations. 
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With respect to the formal sector, we assume that it is characterized by search 
frictions and is subject to EPL. The assumption of search frictions indicates that it 
takes time for workers and firms to calibrate. Once an unemployed worker and a 
vacancy have been matched, the firm starts to produce. The job relationship ends when 
the firm finds it unprofitable to continue it. Since the job relationship is subject to 
employment protection legislation, the firm bears a cost to job separation. In terms of 
the linkage between the formal and informal sectors, one crucial assumption in this 
study is that workers in the informal sector cannot find jobs directly in the formal 
sector. Rather, they need to be unemployed in the formal sector to begin with. Workers’ 
decisions to move between two sectors then depends on the relative gain of making 
the movement. 
In this chapter, the effects of EPL on a range of labour market outcomes are 
evaluated. The comparative statics indicate that rising costs of laying off workers 
unambiguously decrease the labour market’s tightness and a firm’s reservation 
productivity. Both job creation and job destruction are eschewed. The model also 
predicts that given a Cobb–Douglas-form job matching function, there is a U-shaped 
relationship between layoff costs and the size of the informal sector and an inverse U-
shaped relationship between layoff costs and the wage rate in the formal and informal 
sectors. When layoff costs are low, rising layoff costs increase the wage rate in the 
formal and informal sectors. However, it makes the prospect of working in the formal 
sector better than that in the informal sector. There is a movement of workers from the 
informal sector to the formal sector. As layoff costs pass a certain threshold, both 
formal and informal wages fall with rising layoff costs. In addition, as layoff costs 
increase, workers who are seeking jobs in the formal sector would find it more 
profitable to work in the informal sector. Consequently, there is a movement of 
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workers from the formal sector to the informal sector. The results indicate that 
although EPL do not apply to the informal sector, they can still affect the informal 
sector through their effects on the formal sector. A numerical study is also conducted 
in this chapter. The calibration results are consistent with the model predictions.  
  1.4.2 Chapter 3 
In chapter 3, we empirically examine the effect of EPL on the formal–informal 
divide in the context of China’s urban labour market. As an emerging economy, China 
has been undergoing sweeping reforms in its labour market in recent years. In 2008, it 
enacted the CLCL to regulate labour relations and enhance the protection of workers. 
Ever since its enactment, it has attracted heated debate. A stricter employment 
protection legislation will in no doubt increase the job security for formal workers. 
However, it is argued that informal workers and the unemployed could find it more 
difficult to find jobs in the formal sector. (Bosch, 2007). Therefore, the study of the 
effects of EPL on the labour market has great policy implications. 
In this study, the main challenge is the empirical strategy. In the Chinese context, as 
the CLCL is a one-off law reform and regulates all labour relations, there is only a 
one-off change in the overall level of EPL. No regional variation can be found in the 
level of EPL before or after the changes in the law. In addition, the CLCL is applied 
to all labour relations, which means that we are unable to identify an appropriate 
control group to study the policy effects. In other words, it is difficult to extricate the 
pure effect of EPL change from other factors such as the financial crisis in 2008. To 
overcome this problem, we explore the effects of EPL by examining the effects of 
regional variations in the enforcement of EPL and the judiciary orientation.  
 16 
 
In this study, a range of indicators are used to measure the enforcement of EPL and 
the judiciary orientation,  including the labour inspection rate, incidence of labour 
dispute, court efficiency, and share of  pro-worker resolutions. Panel data discrete 
choice models are estimated to predict individuals’ probabilities of being in each 
employment status. The main advantage of panel data is that we are able to control for 
the individual unobserved heterogeneity. A problem with these indicators is the 
potential endogeneity. Stricter enforcement of EPL in one province can be a response 
to the large share of informal employment in the total employment. In this sense, the 
purpose of this chapter is not to evaluate the causal relationship between EPL and 
labour market outcomes. Rather, we would like to examine the associations between 
the enforcement of EPL, the judiciary orientation and individuals’ employment status 
choices.  
The dataset we use in this study is China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). It is 
a longitudinal dataset with rich information on individuals’ employment information. 
An individual’s employment status is divided into four categories in our study, i.e., 
out of labour force, unemployed, informally employed, and formally employed. The 
decision making process of an individual is to choose one employment status which 
maximise his/her personal utility. A multinomial logit model with random effects is 
estimated to account for correlated random effects. The results show that there is weak 
evidence for an association between EPL enforcement and the judiciary orientation 
indicators and labour force participation, and for the association between these 
indicators and employment status choices. The results indicate that workers from 
provinces with high incidence of labour disputes are associated with higher probability 
of formal employment and lower probability of informal employment. 
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  1.4.3 Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 considers another important issue of the China’s urban labour market: the 
wage gap between urban workers and rural-to-urban migrants. According to the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China (2016), the number of rural migrants in the 
urban labour market is estimated to have reached 270 million in 2015. Although the 
migrant urban wage gap is generally narrowing, the wage ratio of rural migrants to 
urban workers is constantly below 1 (Lu, 2012; National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
2016). Nevertheless, a wage gap between two groups of workers in the labour market 
does not necessarily mean that one group is discriminated against.  
    In this study, we use the wage decomposition method to study the wage gap 
between urban workers and rural-to-urban migrants. Particularly, a nonparametric 
matching approach proposed by Nopo (2008) is employed. The main advantage of the 
approach lies in the fact that it deals with the common support problem. The common 
support problem is often considered in program evaluation literature. When drawing 
causal inferences, researchers usually attempt to compare observations in one state 
with comparable observations in another state (Lechner, 2001). Thin common support 
or no common support is likely to increase the bias and variance of estimators (Kahn 
and Tamer, 2010). Another advantage of the approach is that the nonparametric 
decomposition of the wage gap overcomes the misspecification problem.   
The dataset that we use in this study is the second wave of the Rural to Urban 
Migration in China (RUMiC) dataset. It contains more than 9,000 observations on 
each group of workers and covers the main provinces and cities exporting and 
importing migrants. The results show that the size of the unexplained wage gap (the 
residual wage gap after correction for individual heterogeneity) compared with the 
mean wage gap between urban workers and rural migrants in the China’s urban labour 
 18 
 
market decreases significantly from nearly 50% to 29.7% if we compare comparable 
individuals. In addition, results indicate that labour market segmentation also 
contributes to the unexplained wage gap between urban workers and urban migrant 
workers in China. The size of the unexplained wage gap compared to the mean wage 
of rural migrant workers decreases from 10.8% to 9.4% when we control for 
occupation in the matching process. We also see a reduction in the size of the 
unexplained wage gap from 10.8% to 9.2% when we control for firm ownership. The 
results on the distribution of the unexplained wage gap show that male migrants face 
a larger unexplained wage gap than female migrants. The unexplained wage gap is 
also larger in group with higher education and in group with more job experience. We 
also find almost all of the unexplained wage gap is from state sector.  
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Chapter 2: The Effect of employment 
protection legislations on labour market 
outcomes in a model with an informal sector 
  2.1 Introduction 
EPL generally refers to the regulatory provisions on dismissals and severance 
payments (Cazes and Nesporova, 2003). It plays a key part of the labour market 
institutions throughout the world. However, the economic effect of EPL on labour 
market outcomes is a controversial issue and has attracted heated debate among 
economists and policymakers. Economists who advocate the need of EPL argue that 
EPL is an important tool to deal with labour market failures such as underinvestment 
to human capitals and discrimination (Botero et al., 2004; Boeri and van Ours, 2013). 
Those who are against EPL claim that it is responsible for the high unemployment 
observed in the Europe (e.g. OECD (1994)).  
Previous theoretical studies of the effects of EPL on labour market outcomes often 
focus on the developed countries (e.g. Lazear (1990); Hamermesh (1989) and Cahuc 
and Zylberberg (2004)). Very few look at the issue in the context of developing 
countries. What makes the developing countries labour market distinct is the large 
informal sector. Although the informal sector is an important component in both 
developed and developing economies. Its size can be up to 80% of the total labour 
force in the developing countries (Schneider and Enste, 2000). In addition, the 
informal sector in the developing countries features low productivity, bad work 
conditions and is usually out of any formal regulations. Although EPL is designed to 
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directly regulate the formal sector, it may have some indirect impact on informal sector. 
For example, following a reform of EPL, the value of working in formal sector might 
be higher, which makes it more attractive for those working in the informal sector to 
search for a job in the formal sector. The size of the informal sector may be reduced. 
Therefore, it is of great policy implications to research the links between EPL and the 
informal sector. 
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the effects of EPL in an equilibrium search 
model which includes an informal sector. The study has been constructed on a basic 
job search and matching model based on the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). In this 
model, the formal sector is characterised with search frictions and is also subject to 
EPL. EPL in this model is measured as firing costs to firms. The model also contains 
an informal sector which is assumed to be marginal, competitive and out of any formal 
regulations. In the meantime, workers can find jobs instantaneously in the informal 
sector. Worker’s decision to move between two sectors then lies on the relative gains 
of making the movements. One crucial assumption about the model is the formal-
informal linkage. We follow an assumption widely made in the migration literature 
(e.g. (Fields, 1975), Zenou (2008)) that workers in the informal sector should be 
employed first in order to find a formal sector job. Under these assumptions, worker’s 
employment decisions are determined by the expected payoff in different sector. 
Our model indicates that EPL restrains both job hiring and job firing. Its effects on 
wages and employment in each sector and unemployment is ambiguous. However, 
given the functional form of the matching function, we found a U-shape relationship 
between EPL and the size of the informal sector; and an inverted U-shape relationship 
between EPL and the size of the formal sector, the average wage in the formal sector 
and the wage in the informal sector. The net effect on unemployment is ambiguous. It 
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indicates that a moderate level of EPL in an economy can serve as a tool to tackle the 
informality.  
   The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 is a review of relevant theories and 
developments in linking EPL and labour market outcomes. Section 2.3 provides the 
details of the model and its predictions. Section 2.4 presents the model calibration. 
Section 2.5 provides some concluding remarks. 
  2.2 Literature Review 
    For the past three decades, numerous theories and empirics have been carried out to 
establish links between EPL and labour market outcomes. Early studies mainly focus 
on partial equilibrium analysis. Hamermesh (1989) asserts that stricter EPL might 
result in a lower labour demand if wage is constant and capital and labour are the only 
two factors of input. In this case, a firm can always substitute labour with capital in 
response to the rising hiring costs. Bentolila and Bertola (1990) use stochastic control 
techniques to see the effects of both rising hiring and firing costs on firm’s dynamic 
labour demand. Under the assumption of a fixed cyclical pattern of wage, they find 
that labour turnover costs will reduce a firm’s propensity to fire and hire 
simultaneously during recession. It means labour turnover rate decreases. However, 
the average employment effect is ambiguous since the net amount of workers being 
deterred from firing and hiring are unclear and depend entirely on model specifications 
(e.g. the shape of marginal product of labour (MPL) and the assumptions over 
discounting and voluntary job turnover (Bertola, 1992)). To see, for example, how the 
effect of EPL on employment depends on shape of MPL, Blau and Kahn (2002) 
illustrate that if the shape of marginal product of labour during recession is relatively 
flatter than it is during boom, rising firing costs due to EPL will deter relatively more 
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displacements and result in relatively fewer job hires. It is because without firing costs, 
it requires more dismissals and less hires to bring the marginal product of labour equal 
to wage. Hence, the average employment level is higher. Conversely, the average 
employment will be lower when marginal product of labour at recessions is steeper 
than at booms.  
    The resulting reduction in labour turnover rate, according to Hamermesh (1993), 
can play a role of smoothing the employment fluctuations along business cycles. In 
the presence of EPL, firms would fire less when they are facing negative demand 
shocks and would have less incentive to hire when economy is booming to avoid high 
firing costs in future. Bertola (1999) also point out that lower labour turnover rate 
resulting from EPL may deter the job reallocation from shrinking old sectors to 
booming new sectors.  
    EPL can also affect the employment structure of the labour market. If information 
asymmetry is introduced, firms would prefer to hire those job-seekers with previous 
work experiences than those without because productivity of the former is easier to be 
identified. In this case, for job seekers without work experiences would be more 
difficult to find a job with stricter EPL (Kugler & Saint-Paul, 2004). Moreover, in 
certain labour-intensive industries like construction and manufacturing industries, 
employers would be less likely to hire young and senior workers (Montenegro and 
Pages, 2004). 
However, as Lazear (1990) points out, under a flexible wage assumption firms can 
always respond to an increase in labour turnover costs by signing contracts with 
workers at lower wage rate before jobs start. In this case, the above mentioned effects 
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of EPL on worker turnover, employment level and employment structure could be 
exactly offset. 
The link between EPL and wage can be captured by efficiency wage theory. 
According to Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), the existence of an equilibrium efficiency 
wage above market clearing level is attributable to the need for preventing workers 
from shirking. In other words, the efficiency wage acts as a threat to dismiss for 
misconduct. Fellal (2000) states that high efficiency wages, potentially also stimulate 
employers to make more efforts in recruitments to ensure that employees are of high 
quality so that dismissals may decrease. However, Boeri and Jimeno (2005) asserts 
that, the introduction of EPL will dampen these efforts. Because EPL in most countries 
has strict restrictions on both economic and disciplinary dismissals, firms usually find 
it difficult to prove misconducts. As a consequence, probabilities of those non-
disciplinary workers being dismissed will decrease and equilibrium efficiency wage 
rate is expected to increase. 
    Lindbeck and Snower (2001) asserts that the introduction of EPL will exacerbate 
an insider-outsider segmentation. According to insider-outsider theory, the existence 
of unemployment can also be explained by an insider-outsider divide or dual labour 
markets of which insiders enjoys more privileges on wage settings than outsiders. The 
privileges often come from the existence of labour turnover costs for employers or 
labour unions. Hiring of an outsider will induce job specific training costs and the 
labour unionization can enhance the bargaining power of insiders. In this case, 
employers will not accept an underbidding of the wage from outsiders. Clearly, there 
is an instantaneously ‘labour hoarding’ effect of the EPL. However, its long run effect 
over firm’s employment level is ambiguous and relies on economic conditions. (Kan 
and Lin, 2011) 
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    In recent years, equilibrium search models have become the standard tools to study 
the effects of EPL. The main assumption of this type of models is that there are search 
frictions in the labour market. It means that it takes time for employers and employees 
to match. This search friction assumption in an equilibrium model provides us with a 
quite tractable framework to study unemployment fluctuations, worker flows and a 
large range of other variables which other models can not characterize. Cahuc and 
Zylberberg (2004) have extended Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model to examine 
the effects of EPL under different wage settings. In their model, EPL is associated 
with firm’s firing costs only. Setting the wage to be exogenous, it predicts that stricter 
EPL results in less job turnover, longer unemployment duration and also ambiguous 
unemployment effect. And these effects will be strengthened when wage is set through 
bargaining between employers and employees. It also predicts that the hiring wage is 
driven down by stricter EPL which is consistent with Lezear’s argument. Similar 
results are also reported by Garibaldi (1998). The distinctive feature of his model is 
that instead of fixed firing costs, EPL is assumed to be associated with mandatory 
firing permissions. In addition, he has compared the variations of both job destructions 
and job creations along business cycles. 
    There is also a growing trend to model informality in the labour market and its 
interactions with EPL. Motivated by the empirical evidence from Mexico and Brazil 
where the labour markets are characterized by changes in the proportion of formal jobs, 
Bosch (2007) justify the assumption that firms can create both formal and informal 
contracts for similar jobs in a Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) type search matching 
model. In his model, the EPL is associated with a firing cost for ending a formal 
contract. Informal contracts are not regulated by EPL but are subject to job destruction 
and fines once being detected.  Hence, there is an opportunity cost of signing informal 
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contracts and the choice over formal and informal contract depends on each party’s 
trade-off among contracts. The comparative statics of the model show that an increase 
in the firing costs will not only reduce job creation and job destruction in the formal 
jobs but also reallocate jobs from the formal to the informal type. Since the opportunity 
costs for informal jobs are generally low in developing countries, this reallocation 
effect is very likely to be large. 
    Rather than modelling intra-firm decision choices, Albrecht et al. (2009) build a 
Mortensen and Pissarides type model with an informal sector to study the effects of 
EPL on inter-sectoral mobility of workers. In this model, EPL is modelled as a pure 
severance tax and also only applied to formal jobs. The rules governing the labour 
flow among sectors are complicated. Workers are assumed to be ex-ante 
heterogeneous in terms of formal sector productivities and equally productive in the 
informal sector. However, workers cannot sort themselves perfectly. Most productive 
workers will always choose to stay in formal sector and least productive workers will 
always stay in informal sector. Therefore, the increase in severance payment will only 
affect those in the middle. Due to the complexity of the model, the policy effect can 
only be solved numerically. Their simulation results show that stricter EPL depresses 
both average productivity and net output. It also results in a flow of workers from 
formal to informal sector and lower overall unemployment and therefore lower the 
number of formal-sector works. Average employment duration in the formal sector 
increases. 
     Another strategy is to take informal sector as competitive. Zenou (2008) has 
assumed that informal sector is simply competitive and there is no friction in this 
sector. Every worker can find a job instantaneously in the informal sector and earns 
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his marginal product. He then examines the effects of various policies over the labour 
outcomes. However, the effects of EPL can hardly be examined in this framework.  
    Our model is to fill the gap by introducing a competitive informal sector as in Zenou 
(2008) and firing costs as a measure of stringency of EPL in a Mortenson and 
Pissarides (1994) type endogenous job search matching model.  The main difference 
between our model and Bosch (2007) and Albercht et al. (2009) lies in the assumption 
about informal sector and how changes in policies affect the flow of workers among 
sectors. One advantages of our model is that it is more computationally simpler and 
tractable. 
  2.3 The Model 
To see the effect of EPL on labour mobility in the context of developing countries, 
we have developed a variation of the Mortenson and Pissarides (1994) model. In this 
variation, we add an unregulated but competitive informal sector to the economy.  
There are two sectors in this economy: a formal sector and an informal one. The 
formal sector is regulated by the government which in our context, means that firms 
in this sector are subject to severance tax payments. There are search frictions in the 
formal sector. Wage rates for workers in the formal sector are set through negotiations 
between firms and workers. In contrast, the informal sector is out of the formal 
regulation and firms can fire workers without incurring any payments. Workers in the 
informal sector can find job instantaneously and earn their marginal product. Hence, 
there is no unemployment in the informal sector.  
    The total labour force in this economy is 𝐿 and we assume that all workers are ex 
ante identical in their productivity. Let 
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𝐿 = 𝐿𝑓 + 𝐿𝑖 + 𝐿𝑢 
 𝐿𝑓  is the volume of workers working in the formal sector. 𝐿𝑖  is the volume of 
workers in the informal sector. 𝐿𝑢 is the volume of unemployed in the formal sector. 
Time is continuous in this model. For simplicity, capital is ignored and all products 
are sold to competitive markets (i.e. producers are price-takers). We also normalise 
the price for one unit of goods produced in two sectors to be equal to 1. 
   2.3.1 The formal sector 
    There are many firms in the formal sector. Firms enter the sector with vacancies 
which can either be filled by workers or remain vacant. The formal sector is 
characterised by search frictions which means it takes time for firms and workers to 
match. A job is filled when a firm and a worker are matched and an employment 
contract has been signed. There is no on the job search. For convenience, we assume 
that each firm can hire up to one worker.  Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), 
we can write the job matching function as follow: 
𝑀 = 𝑀(𝐿𝑢, 𝑣) 
Where 𝑣  is the volume of job vacancies. Assume that M(.) is increasing in its 
arguments, concave and homogenous of degree 1. Given the matching function, we 
can derive the expressions for job finding rate and job filling rate. The probability for 
an unemployed to find a job in the formal sector is  
𝑀(𝐿𝑢,𝑣)
𝐿𝑢
 and a vacancy is filled in 
each period with probability  
𝑀(𝐿𝑢,𝑣)
𝑣
 . Let 𝜃 =
𝑣
𝐿𝑢
 be the labour market tightness. The 
job filling rate can be expressed as  
𝑀(𝐿𝑖,𝑣)
𝑣
= 𝑀 (
1
𝜃
, 1) = 𝑞(𝜃) and job finding rate can 
be expressed as  
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𝑀(𝐿𝑖,𝑣)
𝐿𝑖
= 𝑀 (1,
𝑣
𝐿𝑢
) = 𝜃𝑞(𝜃). In addition, we assume that  𝑞′(𝜃) ≤ 0  and 
∂(𝜃𝑞(𝜃))
∂𝜃
≥04. 
These imply that as labour market tightness increases vacancies are more difficult to 
be filled and it is easier for an unemployed to find a job. By definition, both 𝑞(𝜃) and 
𝜃𝑞(𝜃) should be in the range [0, 1]. 
    Once a vacancy is filled, the worker starts to produce. The productivity of the job is 
𝑥 and it is idiosyncratic. We assume that the job productivity is subject to idiosyncratic 
shocks. The productivity of the job would change from 𝑥 to a new level 𝑥′ once a 
shock arrives. 𝑥′ is drawn from distribution G(x) and with 0 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 1. Moreover, as in 
Pissarides (2000), we assume that once a job is filled, the worker starts to work with 
his maximum idiosyncratic productivity 1. Job ends when the new realized 
productivity falls below a certain level which makes it unprofitable for the firm to 
sustain the job and this job separation incurs a firing cost to the firm. 
   2.3.2 The informal sector and formal-informal linkage 
    The informal sector is assumed to be competitive in this two sector economy. Each 
worker can get a job instantaneously in this sector so there is no unemployment in the 
informal sector. Informal sector in this economy is not subject to any formal labour 
regulations. Labour is the only factor of production in the informal sector. The 
production function can be written as 𝑓(𝐿𝑖) with 𝑓
′(𝐿𝑖) > 0 and 𝑓
′′(𝐿𝑖) < 0. The 
wage rate for an informal worker is simply 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑓
′(𝐿𝑖) . 
One crucial assumption is that workers in the informal sector cannot directly search 
for a job in the formal sector but need first to be unemployed in the formal sector. 
Similar assumption can be found in Fields (1975) where in a modified Harris-Todaro 
                                                          
4 For example, a Cobb-Dauglas form matching function 𝐴𝐿𝑢
α𝑣1−α satisfy these properties. 
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(1970) model rural workers need to be unemployed first in urban area in order to find 
an urban sector job. In the case of our model, it can be attributed to the long working 
hours of the informal sector jobs which are common in many developing economies. 
Assuming in this way, we have modelled an economy where informal sector is a 
marginal sector and is taken as the last resort to avoid unemployment which is believed 
to be the case in many less developed economies. 
   2.3.3 Utility functions 
    We look at the steady state situations. Let J𝑓(𝑥), be the present discounted value of 
a formal sector job with idiosyncratic productivity x.  𝑤𝑓(𝑥)  is the associate wage rate 
paid to the worker. V is the expected profit for a firm with a vacancy.   𝑟  is the discount 
rate. The idiosyncratic productivity shocks follow a Poisson process with a rate of 𝜆 . 
Value functions for a filled job and a vacancy are therefore, 
𝑟𝑉 = −𝑐 + 𝑞(𝜃)[𝐽𝑓(1) − 𝑉]                                                                                  (2.1) 
𝑟𝐽𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑥 − 𝑤𝑓(𝑥) + 𝜆 ∫ 𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝐽𝑓(𝑠), 𝑉 − 𝐹]𝑑𝐺(𝑠) − 𝜆𝐽𝑓(𝑥)
1
0
                           (2.2) 
    A vacancy has an instantaneous cost of –c. The vacant job meets workers with a 
probability 𝑞(𝜃). Once the vacancy is matched with a worker, the worker starts to 
produce at his maximum productivity 1. Equation (2.2) is also easy to interpret. A 
filled job with current productivity x generates an instantaneous profit 𝑥 − 𝑤𝑓(𝑥). At 
rate  𝜆  the job is subject to an idiosyncratic shock. After the realization of new 
productivity, the firm has two choices. It can either produce at the new productivity 
level or simply fires the worker if it is not profitable to sustain the job relationship. 
The firing cost is assumed to be F and for simplicity we assume it is a severance tax 
so it is not transferred to the fired worker.  
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    Let 𝑊𝑓(x) be the present discounted value for a worker with current productivity x 
in the formal sector.  𝑈 is his associated expected benefit while unemployed. The 
following value functions hold, 
𝑟𝑈 = 𝑏 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)[𝑊𝑓(1) − 𝑈]                                                                                                  (2.3)                           
𝑟𝑊𝑓(𝑥) =  𝑤𝑓(𝑥) + 𝜆∫0
1
𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝑊𝑓(𝑠), 𝑈]𝑑𝐺(𝑠) − 𝜆𝑊𝑓(𝑥)                                                (2.4)                  
The flow value of an unemployed worker is his instantaneous unemployment 
benefit 𝑏  plus his future expected incomes. A job offer comes with a probability 
𝜃𝑞(𝜃) in each period. Once the job relationship is established between a worker and 
the firm, the flow value for a worker with current productivity x equals his 
instantaneous wage 𝑤𝑓(𝑥)  plus expected future incomes. The productivity shock 
arrives at rate 𝜆. If the new realised productivity is really low, the firm will choose to 
end the job relationship so the worker becomes unemployed. 
   2.3.4 Wage bargaining and equilibrium conditions 
    Both workers and firms can benefit from job match and the joint surplus from a job 
match is  𝑆𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑊𝑓(𝑥) − 𝑈 + 𝐽𝑓(𝑥) − 𝑉 + 𝐹 . Here we assume it is shared through 
a generalised Nash Bargaining Process by the firm and the worker. Let β be the 
worker’s bargaining power and 1-β be the firm’s bargaining power. The Nash 
Bargaining solution gives 
𝑊𝑓(𝑥) − 𝑈 = 𝛽[𝐽𝑓(𝑥) + 𝑊𝑓(𝑥) − 𝑉 + 𝐹 − 𝑈]                                                                       (2.5) 
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    It is not difficult to see that both 𝑊𝑓(𝑥) and J𝑓(𝑥) are increasing in 𝑥
 5. Let us define 
R be the cut-off productivity point where firms find it unprofitable to sustain the job 
relation.  We have 
𝑊𝑓(𝑅) = 𝑈                                                                                                                                (2.6) 
𝐽𝑓(𝑅) = 𝑉 − 𝐹                                                                                                                          (2.7) 
    To close the model, a set of equilibrium conditions are needed. The first equilibrium 
condition is the free entry condition of the firms. In equilibrium, the present discounted 
value of holding a vacancy should be equal to zero otherwise firms can generate profits 
by simply opening vacancies. Hence we have, 
V=0                                                                        (2.8) 
    Given the property of R and (2.8), we can also rewrite (2.2) and (2.4) as 
𝑟J𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑥 − 𝑤𝑓(𝑥) + 𝜆 ∫ J𝑓(𝑠)𝑑𝐺(𝑠) − 𝜆𝐺(𝑅)𝐹 − 𝜆J𝑓(𝑥)
1
𝑅
                                  (2.9) 
𝑟𝑊𝑓(𝑥) =  𝑤𝑓(𝑥) + 𝜆∫𝑅
1
𝑊𝑓(𝑠)𝑑𝐺(𝑠) + 𝜆𝐺(𝑅)𝑈 − 𝜆𝑊𝑓(𝑥)                                   (2.10) 
    In addition, the zero flow condition ensures that the flow of workers in and out of 
employment in the formal sector are equal in equilibrium 
 𝜆𝐺(𝑅)𝐿𝑓 =  𝜃 𝑞(𝜃)𝐿𝑢                                                                                                            (2.11) 
    According to equation (2.1), (2.3), (2.5), (2.9) and (2.10) we can derive the 
expressions for U and 𝑤𝑓(𝑥), 
𝑟𝑈 = 𝑏 +
𝑐𝜃𝛽
1−𝛽
+
𝛽𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝐹
1−𝛽
                                                                                                         (2.12) 
                                                          
5 See Appendix A. 
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𝑤𝑓(𝑥) =  𝛽𝑥 + (1 − 𝛽)𝑏 + 𝑐𝜃𝛽 + 𝑟𝛽𝐹 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽𝐹                                                         (2.13)                 
    Equation (2.13) is the formal sector wage function with current productivity x. It is 
straightforward to see that it increases in θ and F. As labour market tightness increases, 
firms find it more difficult to recruit a worker and the wage rate he would like to pay 
to the worker also increases. The stricter the EPL, firms pays more severance tax if 
the job ends so they would like to pay more to the workers to keep them longer.  
    Substituting (2.13) into (2.9), we obtain 
𝑟J𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑥 − 𝛽𝑥 − (1 − 𝛽)𝑏 −  𝑐𝜃𝛽 − 𝑟𝛽𝐹 − 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽𝐹 + 𝜆 ∫ J𝑓(𝑠)𝑑𝐺(𝑠) −
1
𝑅
𝜆𝐺(𝑅)𝐹 − 𝜆J𝑓(𝑥)                                                                                                 (2.14)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
    Evaluating (2.14) at X=R and deducting it from (2.14), we have 
J𝑓(𝑥) =
(1−𝛽)(𝑥−𝑅)
(𝑟+𝜆)
− 𝐹                                                                                         (2.15)                                                                             
    Evaluate (2.15) at x=1 gives us the job creation condition, 
(𝑟 + 𝜆)
𝑐
𝑞(𝜃)
= (1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝑅) − (𝑟 + 𝜆)𝐹                                                                           (2.16) 
   It implies that the expected gains from creating a new job must be equal to the 
expected cost of hiring a worker. Clearly, R is negatively correlated with 𝜃. 
Replacing the term J𝑓(𝑠) on the right hand side of (2.14) with (2.15), we have 
(𝑟 + 𝜆)J𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑥 − 𝛽𝑥 − (1 − 𝛽)𝑏 −  𝑝𝜃𝛽 − 𝑟𝛽𝐹 − 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽𝐹 +
𝜆(1−𝛽)
𝑟+𝜆
∫ (s −
1
𝑅
𝑅)𝑑𝐺(𝑠) − 𝜆𝐹                                                                                                                                          (2.17) 
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Evaluating (2.17) at x=R, we obtain 
(1 − 𝛽)𝑅 = 𝑐𝜃𝛽 + (1 − 𝛽)𝑏 +  𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽𝐹 − (1 + 𝑡 − 𝛽)𝑟𝐹 −
𝜆(1−𝛽)
𝑟+𝜆
∫ (s −
1
𝑅
R)𝑑𝐺(𝑠)                                                                                                                    (2.18) 
    Equation (2.18) is the firm’s job separation conditions. It is also not difficult to see 
that R is positively correlated with 𝜃. Given (2.16) and (2.18), the values for R and 𝜃 
are unique in equilibrium. 
    Workers’ decisions to move into the formal sector depend on relative gain from 
making the movement. Let 𝑤𝑖 be the wage rate received by informal sector workers. 
The value of an informal sector job should be equal to the discounted present value of 
all its current and future gains which are 
𝑤𝑖 
𝑟
. The value of being unemployed in the 
formal sector is 𝑈. In steady state,  
𝑈 =
𝑤𝑖 
𝑟
                                                                                                                                    (2.19) 
    Otherwise, workers would have incentives to move cross sectors. 
    Since the informal sector is competitive and labour is the only factor of production, 
we have  
𝑤𝑖 = 𝑓
′(𝐿𝑖)                                                                                                                             (2.20)              
    Given (2.12) (2.18) and (2.20), we have 
𝑟𝑈 = 𝑏 +
𝑐𝜃𝛽
1−𝛽
+
𝛽𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝐹
1−𝛽
= 𝑓′(𝐿𝑖)                                                                                          (2.21) 
    According to (2.21), the size of informal sector depends on labour market tightness. 
As labour market tightness increases, the informal sector shrinks which is due to the 
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greater job prospect in the formal sector.  The effect of firing cost or severance tax 
over the size of informal sector is not clear because F also enters the expression for 𝜃.  
   2.3.5 Definition and uniqueness of the equilibrium 
    Equilibrium of the model is a set of values for  𝜃, 𝐿𝑓 , 𝐿𝑖, 𝐿𝑢, 𝑅, 𝑉  such that job 
creation condition (2.16), job destruction condition (2.18), free entry condition (2.8), 
zero flow condition (2.11) and no mobility condition (2.19) are all satisfied. 
To illustrate, given a specific functional form for G(x) and exogenous parameter values, 
we can solve for R and 𝜃 according to (2.16) and (2.18) and they are unique. With 
values for R and 𝜃, we can then calculate the values for 𝐿𝑓  ,𝐿𝑖  and 𝐿𝑢  seperately. 
Hence the equilibrium distribution of workers among sectors is recovered. 
   2.3.6 Comparative Statics 
    In this section I examine the effects of changes in firing costs over set of labour 
market outcomes. 
Proposition 1: An increase in the firing costs F will unambiguously decrease the 
labour market tightness and the reservation productivity in the formal sector. An 
increase in the firing costs F will decrease both job finding rate and job destruction 
rate. 
    Proof: According to (16), 
  𝑅 = 1 −
(𝑟+𝜆)
(1−𝛽)
𝑐
𝑞(𝜃)
−
(𝑟+𝜆)
(1+𝑡−𝛽)
𝐹   .                                                                                         (2.22) 
    Substituting (2.22) into (2.18) and differentiating (2.18) with respect to F, we have 
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{
(𝑟+𝜆)𝑐𝑞′(𝜃)
[𝑞(𝜃)]2
−
𝑑[𝜃𝑞(𝜃)]
𝑑𝜃
𝛽𝐹 − 𝑐𝛽 +
𝜆(1−𝛽)
(𝑟+𝜆)
∫ (𝑠 − 𝑅) [
(𝑟+𝜆)𝑐𝑞′(𝜃)
[𝑞(𝜃)]2
] 𝑑𝐺(𝑠)
1
𝑅
}
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝐹
= 𝜆 +
𝛽𝜃𝑞(𝜃) + 𝛽𝑟 + 𝜆 ∫ (𝑠 − 𝑅)𝑑𝐺(𝑠)
1
𝑅
                                                                          (2.23)                                                                                                                          
    Since 𝑞′(𝜃) < 0,  
𝑑[𝜃𝑞(𝜃)]
𝑑𝜃
> 0 and all exogenous parameter values are assumed to 
be positive, terms in the bracket of the LHS of equation (2.23) are all negative and 
terms on the RHS are all positive. Therefore, it is straightforward that 
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝐹
< 0. 
    Also, differentiating both side of (2.22) with respect to F, we have 
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝐹
= −
(𝑟+𝜆)
(1−𝛽)
𝑐𝑞′(𝜃)
[𝑞(𝜃)]2
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝐹
−
(𝑟+𝜆)
(1−𝛽)
  
    Since 
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝐹
< 0, it is easy to see that 
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝐹
< 0. 
It is also straight forward that 
𝑑𝜃𝑞(𝜃)
𝑑𝐹
=
𝑑[𝜃𝑞(𝜃)]
𝑑𝜃
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝐹
< 0 and 
𝑑𝜆𝐺(𝑅)
𝑑𝐹
= 𝜆𝐺′(𝑅)
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝐹
< 0. 
■ 
The increase in the firing costs has decreased the labour market tightness which 
makes the firms difficult to fill their vacancies. At the same time, firms are more 
cautious in firings. They can bear a lower reservation productivity level than before 
which incurs less job destructions.  
Proposition 2: An increase in the firing cost F has an ambiguous effect on wages in 
both the formal and the informal sector. It also has an ambiguous effect on the relative 
size of the informal sector and the formal sector unemployment rate. 
    Proof: differentiating (2.13) and (2.21) with respect to F, we have 
𝑑𝑤𝑓(𝑥)
𝑑𝐹
= 𝛽 {𝑐 + 𝐹{
𝑑[𝜃𝑞(𝜃)]
𝑑𝜃
}}
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝐹
+ 𝛽[𝑟 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)]                                                                   (2.24) 
𝑑𝑤𝑖
𝑑𝐹
=
𝛽
1−𝛽
{𝑐 + 𝐹 {
𝑑[𝜃𝑞(𝜃)]
𝑑𝜃
}}
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝐹
+
𝛽
1−𝛽
𝜃𝑞(𝜃)                                                                           (2.25) 
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    Since 
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝐹
< 0, the signs of both 
𝑑𝑤𝑓(𝑥)
𝑑𝐹
 and 
𝑑𝑤𝑖
𝑑𝐹
 are ambiguous and the directions of 
the partial effect can be different according to (2.24) and (2.25). As 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑓
′(𝐿𝑖), the 
sign of 
𝑑𝐿𝑖
𝑑𝐹
 is also ambiguous in this model. 
    Given the zero flow condition in (2.11), the formal sector unemployment rate can 
be derived as:  
𝑢𝑓 =
𝐿𝑢
𝐿𝑢+𝐿𝑓
=
𝜆𝐺(𝑅)
𝜆𝐺(𝑅)+ 𝜃 𝑞(𝜃)
                                                                                                 (2.26)                  
    Differentiating 𝑢𝑓 with respect to F, 
𝑑𝑢𝑓
𝑑𝐹
=
𝜆𝐺′(𝑅)
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝐹
 [𝜆𝐺(𝑅)+ 𝜃 𝑞(𝜃)]−𝜆𝐺(𝑅){𝜆𝐺′(𝑅)
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝐹
+
𝑑[𝜃𝑞(𝜃)]
𝑑𝜃
 
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝐹
} 
[𝜆𝐺(𝑅)+ 𝜃 𝑞(𝜃)]2
                                                       (2.27) 
The effect of firing costs on unemployment is also ambiguous and depends on the 
net flow of workers among formal employment and unemployment as both job hiring 
and job firing are constrained. ■ 
Different from common predictions in the literature where firing costs in the formal 
sector will lead to a flow of workers from formal to informal sector, we find the size 
of formal sector may rise. If firing cost raises the value of an unemployed, informal 
sector workers will find it profitable to move into the formal sector.  
The Proposition 2 can be further explored by explicitly assuming the functional 
form of job matching functions. Assuming that the matching function is in Cobb-
Dauglas form where M(𝐿𝑢, 𝑣) = 𝐴𝐿𝑢
α𝑣1−α where A>0 and  0 < 𝛼 < 1.  Then we 
have job finding rate 𝜃𝑞(𝜃) = A𝜃1−𝛼 and job filling rate 𝑞(𝜃) = A𝜃−𝛼. By definition, 
0 < 𝐴𝜃1−𝛼 < 1 and 0 < 𝐴𝜃−𝛼 < 1. 
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Proposition 3: Wages in formal and informal sector increase with firing costs when 
firing costs are small and decreases with it when F is above a certain threshold. There 
is a U-shape relationship between F and the size of the informal sector. To be exact, 
𝑑𝑤𝑓(𝑥)
𝑑𝐹
> 0  if  {
0 < 𝛼 <
1
2
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹 <
𝑟−𝑐+1
(1−𝛼)𝐴2
1
2
≤ 𝛼 < 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹 <
𝑟−𝑐+1
(1−𝛼)𝐴
1
1−𝛼
    
𝑑𝑤𝑓(𝑥)
𝑑𝐹
< 0 if {
0 < 𝛼 <
1
2
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹 >
𝑟−𝑐+1
(1−𝛼)𝐴2
1
2
≤ 𝛼 < 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹 >
𝑟−𝑐+1
(1−𝛼)𝐴
1
1−𝛼
 
𝑑𝑤𝑖(𝑥)
𝑑𝐹
> 0  if  {
0 < 𝛼 <
1
2
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹 <
1−𝑐
(1−𝛼)𝐴2
1
2
≤ 𝛼 < 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹 <
1−𝑐
(1−𝛼)𝐴
1
1−𝛼
 
𝑑𝑤𝑖(𝑥)
𝑑𝐹
< 0  if  {
0 < 𝛼 <
1
2
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹 >
1−𝑐
(1−𝛼)𝐴2
1
2
≤ 𝛼 < 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹 >
1−𝑐
(1−𝛼)𝐴
1
1−𝛼
 
Proof: following Proposition 2,  
𝑑𝑤𝑓(𝑥)
𝑑𝐹
> 0 if 
𝑑[𝜃𝑞(𝜃)]
𝑑𝜃
𝐹 + 𝑐 − 𝜃𝑞(𝜃) − 𝑟 < 0.  To 
explore this condition, we can find if 0 < 𝛼 <
1
2
, we have 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ (
1
𝐴
)
1
𝛼  and 
𝑑[𝜃𝑞(𝜃)]
𝑑𝜃
= 𝐴(1 − 𝛼)𝜃−𝛼 ≥ (1 − 𝛼)𝐴2.  In the case 
1
2
≤ 𝛼 < 1 , we have 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤
(
1
𝐴
)
1
1−𝛼
 and 
𝑑[𝜃𝑞(𝜃)]
𝑑𝜃
= 𝐴(1 − 𝛼)𝜃−𝛼 ≥ (1 − 𝛼)𝐴
1
1−∝. 
Therefore, we have 
𝑑𝑤𝑓(𝑥)
𝑑𝐹
> 0   if  0 < 𝛼 <
1
2
 and 𝐹 <
𝑟−𝑐+𝜃𝑞(𝜃)
𝐴(1−𝛼)𝜃−𝛼
≤
𝑟−𝑐+𝜃𝑞(𝜃)
(1−𝛼)𝐴2
≤
𝑟−𝑐+1
(1−𝛼)𝐴2
;  
𝑑𝑤𝑓(𝑥)
𝑑𝐹
> 0   if  
1
2
≤ 𝛼 < 1  and 𝐹 <
𝑟−𝑐+1
(1−𝛼)𝐴
1
1−𝛼
; 
𝑑𝑤𝑓(𝑥)
𝑑𝐹
< 0  if  0 < 𝛼 <
1
2
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹 >
𝑟−𝑐+1
(1−𝛼)𝐴2
; 
𝑑𝑤𝑓(𝑥)
𝑑𝐹
< 0 if  
1
2
≤ 𝛼 < 1 and 𝐹 >
𝑟−𝑐+1
(1−𝛼)𝐴
1
1−𝛼
.  
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Similarly, 
𝑑𝑤𝑖
𝑑𝐹
> 0 𝑖𝑓 0 < 𝛼 <
1
2
 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐹 <
1−𝑐
(1−𝛼)𝐴2
 ; 
𝑑𝑤𝑖
𝑑𝐹
> 0  if  
1
2
≤ 𝛼 < 1 and 𝐹 <
1−𝑐
(1−𝛼)𝐴
1
1−𝛼
. 
𝑑𝑤𝑖
𝑑𝐹
< 0 𝑖𝑓 0 < 𝛼 <
1
2
 and  𝐹 >
1−𝑐
(1−𝛼)𝐴2
 ; 
𝑑𝑤𝑖
𝑑𝐹
> 0 if  
1
2
≤ 𝛼 < 1 and 𝐹 >
1−𝑐
(1−𝛼)𝐴
1
1−𝛼
. 
Since 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑓′(𝐿𝑖) > 0  and 𝑓′′(𝐿𝑖) < 0 , 𝐿𝑖  is negatively correlated with informal 
sector wage. So we have 
𝑑𝐿𝑖
𝑑𝐹
< 0  if  {
0 < 𝛼 <
1
2
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹 <
1−𝑐
(1−𝛼)𝐴2
1
2
≤ 𝛼 < 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹 <
1−𝑐
(1−𝛼)𝐴
1
1−𝛼
 
𝑑𝐿𝑖
𝑑𝐹
> 0  if  {
0 < 𝛼 <
1
2
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹 >
1−𝑐
(1−𝛼)𝐴2
1
2
≤ 𝛼 < 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹 >
1−𝑐
(1−𝛼)𝐴
1
1−𝛼
    ■ 
    When firing costs are relatively low, an increase in firing costs would result in an 
increase in wages in both formal and informal sector. However, further increase in F 
would result in lower wages when F is over a certain threshold. The graph below 
illustrate the relationship between F and 𝐿𝑖. The size of informal sector goes down 
first and then goes up with firing costs. There is a U-shape relationship between firing 
costs and the size of the informal sector in this urban labour market. It implies a 
moderate level of firing costs can reduce the level of informality in the urban labour 
market.  
This is different from the traditional theoretical prediction that firing costs will 
unambiguously lead to informality in urban market. The mechanism underlying 
previous literature such as Bosch (2007) and Albrecht et al (2009) is usually that firing 
costs lower formal sector firm’s reservation productivity. Therefore, as workers are 
ex-ante identical, workers are less likely to be working in informal sector. In contrast, 
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our model employs a competitive informal sector setting and workers decision 
makings are based on comparing expected payoffs from informal sector jobs and 
formal sector unemployment. In this context, an increase in firing costs will on one 
hand decreases workers probability to be fired in the formal sector. On the other hand, 
part of the increase in firing costs are transferred to workers through wage bargaining. 
When firing costs are relatively small, increases in job security outweighs the increase 
in wage loss caused by firing costs. The value to be unemployed in the formal sector 
increases. We can observe a flow of workers from informal sector to formal sector. 
On contrary, when firing costs are large, value to be unemployed in the formal sector 
decreases, we can observe a flow of workers from formal sector to informal sector 
until ′(𝐿𝑖)  = 𝑤𝑖 . 
2.3.7 Introduction of capital to the model  
Capital decisions can also be included in the model. Pissarides (2000) has discussed 
about this issue and shows that under the assumption of a perfect second hand market 
for capital goods, main features of the equilibrium unemployment model are 
unchanged. In addition, the assumption of matching frictions doesn't affect the capital 
decisions. To see these, let’s assume that there is perfect market for formal sector firms 
to trade in capital goods. The firm can also buy and sell capital goods at the price of 
the output. There is also no time lapse for the firm to execute the decision of selling 
the capital goods. Therefore, capital goods will only be bought once a job is filled.  Let 
H(K, L) be the two factor production function with first-order and second order partial 
derivatives satisfying 𝐻𝐾 > 0, 𝐻𝐿 > 0, 𝐻𝐾𝐾 > 0, 𝐻𝐿𝐿 > 0. We also assume H(K, L)  is 
strictly quasi-concave which means the isoquants are strictly convex to the origin. We 
also assume H(K, L) is homogenous of degree 1.  Let  k be the unit of capital goods 
per efficient unit of labour and h(k) be the production per efficient unit of labour. The 
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realised productivity x is in the range of [R, 1] which can be interpreted as efficient 
unit of labour. Hence, the total output of a filled job can be expressed as xh(k). The 
total capital purchased by the firm is xk. When a productivity shock arrives and the 
new realised productivity x’ is less than R, the job matching will separate and the firm 
will sell the capital. If x’ is greater than R, the firm will sell (x-x’)k units of capital 
goods in the market. (2.2) then can be rewritten as, 
𝑟[𝐽𝑓(𝑥) + 𝑥𝑘] = 𝑥[ℎ(𝑘) − 𝛿𝑘] − 𝑤𝑓(𝑥) + 𝜆 ∫ 𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝐽𝑓(𝑠), 𝑉 − 𝐹]𝑑𝐺(𝑠) − 𝜆𝐽𝑓(𝑥)
1
0
                  (2.28) 
Here 𝛿 is the rate of depreciation of capital goods. Differentiate (2.22) with respect to 
k will obtain  
h’(k)=r+𝛿                                                                                                             (2.29) 
(2.28) is another equilibrium condition to the model. It is the firm’s decision rule for 
capital goods. However, the introduction of capital in this model won’t affect value 
functions for workers, profit sharing condition, free entry condition, zero flow 
condition and no mobility condition. In this sense, (2.13) can be derived as 
𝑤𝑓(𝑥) =  𝛽𝑥[ℎ(𝑘) − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘] + (1 − 𝛽)𝑏 + 𝑐𝜃𝛽 + 𝑟𝛽𝐹 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽𝐹            (2.30) 
In equilibrium, the value of k is given by (2.28). The difference between (2.13) and 
(2.30) is that it is simply a multiply of  ℎ(𝑘) − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 to the productivity x. It is 
not difficult to verify that all the properties of the model are not changed and the 
comparative statics are unaltered.                                   
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  2.4 Model calibration 
In this section, we explore the effects of firing costs numerically. Assume that the 
distribution function G(x) is uniform on the interval [0, 1] and the productivity shock 
arrives at rate 0.15.The matching function is assumed to be in Cobb-Douglas form 
𝑀(𝐿𝑢, 𝑣) = 𝐴𝐿𝑢
α𝑣1−α. 𝐴 is the scale factor which should be less than 1 to ensure an 
interior solution.(Ribó and Vilalta-Bufí ,2012). In this calibration, I set the value of A 
at 0.25.  The informal sector production function is assumed to be in Cobb-Dauglas 
form where (𝐿𝑖) = 8𝐿𝑖
0.5  . The total population in this economy is L=100. Other 
exogenous parameter values are listed in the Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Policy configurations 
β λ α a c r 
0.5 0.15 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.05 
 
    I start the calibration with a baseline case which models a labour market with a 
moderate size of its informal sector. I set the baseline firing cost F=0.3. The calibrated 
unemployment rate is 12% and about 34.4% of the population are working in the 
informal sector. The population of formal sector worker is 53.6. The calibrated job 
creation and job destruction rate are 23.6% and 5.3% respectively. The informal-
formal wage ratio in this calibrated model is about 86%. 
    The Figure 2.1 to Figure 2.8 below show the effects of firing costs over labour 
outcomes. The calibration results show a decrease in both job creation and job 
destruction as firing costs increase. The trends are consistent with findings in other 
theoretical literature and empirical studies. If we focus on the formal sector, as firing 
costs go up, the formal sector employment shrinks. It implies the increase in the 
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expected formal sector employment duration outweigh the reductions in the job 
creation so that the unemployment in the formal sector decreases. As firing costs 
increases, jobs are less likely to be destroyed which makes formal sector jobs more 
attractive to workers in the informal sector. The reallocation of workers from informal 
to formal sector makes informal sector wage rate increase since marginal product of 
labour in informal sector increases.  
Interestingly, although the model predictions are inconclusive, the calibration 
results are quite different from predictions from the literature where it is generally 
believed that firing costs lead to the informalization of the economy. It means the size 
of informal sector should be increasing rather than decreasing with firing costs in our 
calibrated model. According to Figure 2.1 – 2.8, rising firing costs not only increases 
formal sector wage and employment but also decreases unemployment. It implies 
employment protection legislation has led to a win-win situation for workers in both 
sectors. However, as was discussed in Proposition (3) the impacts of firing costs on 
formal/informal wage rates are largely affected by values of exogenous parameters. 
The calibrated results are valid as long as those parameters are corrected measured. 
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Figure 2.1: Effects of firing costs on labour market tightness 𝜃 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Effects of firing costs on job finding rate 𝜃𝑞(𝜃) 
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Figure 2.3: Effects of firing costs on job separation rate 𝜆𝐺(𝑅) 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Effects of firing costs on average wage in formal sector 𝑤𝑓 
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Figure 2.5: Effects of firing costs on average wage in formal sector 𝑤𝑖 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Effects of firing costs on size of the informal sector 𝐿𝑖 
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Figure 2.7: Effects of firing costs on size of the formal sector 𝐿𝑓 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Effects of firing costs on size of unemployed 𝐿𝑢 
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  2.5 Conclusion 
    I have examined the effect of EPL on inter-sectoral mobility of workers. EPL 
increases firing costs of firms in a formal sector which directly affect their incentive 
to create and destroy jobs in response to exogenous shocks. EPL also affects expected 
welfare of ongoing workers and unemployed workers. Although the effect is 
ambiguous, the model predicts that under certain circumstances, EPL can improve the 
values to be unemployed which indirectly causes a flow of workers from informal to 
formal. The effect over unemployment then depends on the net flow of reallocations 
from informal to formal sector and reallocations from unemployment to formal 
employment. One variant of the model indicates that size of the informal sector is 
decreasing in firing costs when firing costs are relatively small but starts to increase 
with firing costs when firing costs are above a certain threshold. It is a result of the 
assumption about the informal sector being competitive and the assumption that 
workers in the informal sector needs to be unemployed in order to look for a formal 
sector job. In this context, workers make decisions based on comparing expected 
payoffs from being unemployment in the formal sector and working in the informal 
sector. When firing costs are small, value for unemployed increases and workers flow 
form the informal sector to formal sector.  I then calibrate and solve the model 
numerically. The calibration results are generally consistent the theoretical predictions. 
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Chapter 3: EPL and employment decisions in 
China’s urban labour market 
  3.1 Introduction 
  Ever since its appearance in Europe after World War II, EPL have attracted extensive 
research among economists and policy makers. China has enacted its first Labour 
Contract Law (CLCL hereafter) in 2008. It soon represents a significant piece of EPL 
in China. The CLCL has been described as “the most significant reform to the law of 
employment relations [in China] in more than a decade” (Cooney et al., 2007). The 
CLCL aims to deal with the inefficiencies of previous labour market legislations and 
protect the rights of labour force (Remington & Cui, 2015). It requires employers to 
provide written labour contracts and social insurance to their employees. Failure to do 
so would result in double wage payments to employees for the period without labour 
contract and fines from labour inspection agencies. In addition, employers now need 
to make severance payments to employees even when the labour contract expires. 
Moreover, the CLCL specifies that any employee who has worked for more than a 
decade with an employer or signed two successive fixed term contracts, must be given 
an open-ended contract. All these amendments since 2008 have made the employment 
protection legislation in china one of the strictest in the world (Gallagher et al., 2013). 
   The enactment of the CLCL provided us with an opportunity to study the effects of 
EPL in the context of China’s urban labour market. Although the level of employment 
protection increases, concerns over enactment of the CLCL including higher labour 
costs to firms, higher unemployment rate and lower international competitiveness still 
exist (Gallagher and Dong, 2011; Gallagher et al., 2013). Recently, several studies 
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have been carried out to examine the effect of the CLCL. One strand of literature 
focuses on workers’ benefits. With a longitudinal survey data for migrant workers in 
the Chinese Pearl River Delta area, Li and Freeman (2015) find that migrant workers 
have a higher probability to be provided a labour contract after the law reform. The 
probability to receive social insurance also increases in the presence of a written labour 
contract. However, they also find evidence of an increase in the incidence of wage 
arrears after the reform. Similar results are also found in Cui et al. (2013), Cheng et al. 
(2014) and Gallagher et al. (2013). Another strand of studies focuses on the impacts 
of the CLCL on firms’ labour demand. Sun (2010) uses a large panel data of Chinese 
industrial enterprises to show that firms’ speed of adjustment to the level of 
employment significantly reduces as EPL becomes stricter. Liu & Liu (2014) also find 
a decrease in firms’ speed of labour adjustment to exogenous shocks with panel data 
from Chinese listed firms. In addition, their results reveal that an increase in the labour 
adjustment costs has led to a substitution between labour and capital among Chinese 
industrial enterprises.  
In this chapter, we contribute to the existing literature by empirically examining the 
effect of EPL on formal-informal divide in the China’s urban labour market. Informal 
employment is generally perceived as employment out of formal labour regulations 
including own-account workers, contributing family workers, employees with 
informal jobs (Hussmanns, 2004). The informal employment in China’s urban labour 
market is often associated with low income, long working hours, unstable employment, 
poor work conditions and less legal protections (Cooke, 2008; Park et al., 2012; Liang 
et al., 2016) Although there is no precise definition on informal employment and the 
official statistics in China is absent, the size of the informal sector is estimated to 
account for about 20% of total employment which is about a population of nearly 150 
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million workers (Cooke, 2011). Estimates with survey data indicates the share of urban 
informal employment can be up to 57% of total the urban labour force (Park et al., 
2012; Liang et al. 2016). a stricter EPL will undoubtedly increase the job security for 
formal workers. However, it could also become more difficult for those unemployed 
or informal workers to find formal jobs. Therefore, the empirical examination of the 
effects of EPL on the formal-informal divide is of great policy implications. 
 In the Chinese context, as the CLCL is a one-off law reform and regulates all labour 
relations, there is only a one-off change in the overall level of EPL but no regional 
variation in the level of EPL before and after the law change. In addition, it is applied 
to all labour relations which means that we are not able to find an appropriate control 
group. In this sense, it is difficult to disentangle the pure effect of EPL change from 
other unobservable factors such as the financial crisis of 2008. To overcome this 
problem, we explore the effects of EPL by examining the effects of regional variation 
in the enforcement of EPL and the judiciary orientation. Specifically, discrete choice 
models with panel data are estimated to predict individuals’ probabilities to participate 
in the labour market and the conditional probabilities to be in each employment status 
(formal, informal, and unemployed). Next, we examine the associations between these 
indicators and individual’s employment status choices. The indicators we consider 
here include labour inspection rate, incidence of the labour disputes, court efficiency 
and pro-worker share of labour dispute resolutions. Labour inspection rate is a measure 
of the intensity of labour inspections. Incidence of labour disputes reflects how EPL 
are complied. Court efficiency and pro-worker share of labour dispute resolutions are 
measures of provincial judiciary efficiency.  
The results show that there is weak evidence for an association between EPL 
enforcement and the judiciary orientation indicators and labour force participation, 
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and for the association between these indicators and employment status choices. The 
results indicate that workers from provinces with high incidence of labour disputes are 
associated with higher probability of formal employment and lower probability of 
informal employment. Section 3.2 introduces the relevant literature. Section 3.3 is a 
description of the Chinese labour regulations and their enforcement. Section 3.4 
discusses the empirical methods used in this study. Section 3.5 introduces the dataset. 
Section 3.6 is a discussion of the empirical results. Section 3.7 concludes and discuss 
about the policy implications of the study.  
  3.2 Related Literature 
   Empirical studies of the effects of EPL on labour market outcomes can be traced 
back to Lazear (1990). Using a cross-country aggregate panel data, Lazear (1990) 
finds that countries with relative high firing costs have a relatively low labour market 
participation rate and higher unemployment rate.  The level of employment is 
decreasing with firing costs. When firing costs increase from zero to an equivalence 
of three months’ wage of a typical blue collar worker, level of employment decreases 
by 1%. The measures of strictness of EPL that Lazear (1990) uses include advance 
notification periods and severance payments. Addison and Teixeira (2005) then 
extended Lazear’s study in various aspects. They use a set of more comprehensive 
measures of strictness of employment protection, including the OECD composite 
index of the severity or coerciveness of employment laws. In addition, a set of 
robustness tests are carried out. Their findings show that although unemployment 
increases with employment protection, the effects on long term unemployment and 
employment are much weaker than in Lazear’s findings. Similarly, findings from 
OECD (1994, 2004) studies show that unemployment and employment has no 
significant relation with the stringency of employment protection. A cross country 
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study conducted by Bassanini and Duval (2006) also finds no evidence that the EPL 
has any effect on aggregate unemployment. Generally speaking, as Skedinger (2006) 
points out, cross country aggregate data shows no evidence of correlation between 
employment protection and aggregate employment or unemployment. This empirical 
result is consistent with the prediction from theoretical literature. However, empirical 
studies based on cross-country evidence have some limitations: (1) a universal 
measure of stringency of employment protection is implausible as the culture or 
enforcement of labour regulations may differ across countries; cross-country studies 
rarely take those into consideration; (2) cross-country studies with aggregate data 
cannot capture the heterogeneous effects of EPL on groups of people. For instance, 
young workers may be more vulnerable to stricter employment protection compared 
to mature workers. 
     Another indicator of the strictness of the EPL is its level of enforcement. Although 
it has been widely acknowledged, the research over the enforcement of EPL in practice 
is very rare. One recently study is from Gimpelson et al. (2010). They look at the 
effects of regional variation in EPL enforcements on Russia’s labour market outcomes. 
In their study, three measures of regional EPL enforcements are used: number of 
labour inspectors, number of labour disputes filed by courts and perception of 
enforcement. By regressing regional employment and unemployment on EPL 
enforcements, they find that regions with higher levels of EPL enforcement are 
associated with lower levels of employment and higher levels of unemployment. Same 
results are found even after controlling for other regional characteristics. Another 
study conducted by Almeida and Carneiro (2012) in the context of Brazil used a richer 
set of measures (such as distance to the nearest labour inspectorate office and so on) 
for the EPL enforcements and concludes that stricter EPL enforcement leads to lower 
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informal employment within firms, but at the cost of lower average wages, lower 
productivity and higher unemployment. Nevertheless, both studies have ignored the 
potential endogeneity of law enforcements.  As Bertola, et al. (2000) emphasizes, the 
level of labour law enforcements in practice may be endogenous to the economic 
outcomes. 
    Cross-country studies with disaggregate data often focus on the effect of 
employment protection on job reallocation and a firm’s employment dynamics. 
Abraham et al. (1994) compare the employment adjustment speed in West Germany, 
France and Belgium with the US. The former European countries are often seen to 
have stronger labour regulations than the latter. Using aggregate industry level data, 
they find that job security regulations do not decrease the employment flexibility of 
employers. They suggest that employers in countries with strict employment 
protection may have developed alternate strategies to escape regulations. In contrast, 
Burgess et al. (2000) analyse the effect of employment protection over the speed of 
adjustment to changes in output and labour demand in seven OECD countries. Their 
results show that the speed of adjustment in response to exogenous shocks is slower 
in countries with strict employment protection. Nevertheless, they admit that it is hard 
to measure the magnitude of such effect to the labour market since job security 
regulations are not price regulations. Addison and Teixeira (2005) compare the speed 
of employment adjustment with time series data in Portugal and Germany. German 
labour market features strong trade unions while Portuguese labour market is trapped 
in low job creations and destructions. By estimating with an ECM model they found 
that employment adjustment speed is faster in Portugal than in Germany. Nickell and 
Nunziata (2000) examine the interactions between trade unions and employment 
protection laws and their effect over the speed of employment adjustment in 20 OECD 
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countries. They find strict employment protection and high trade unions density6 can 
both reduce the speed of adjustment. However, in countries with high trade union 
coverage7 and union coordination, strict employment protection can help to increase 
the employment flexibility. It is consistent with the view that employers would focus 
on the shocks to the employment margin and have more rapid response. 
Within-country studies of the effects of employment protection often focus on a 
typical law reform which affect only a group of people. One advantage of within 
country studies is that the policy effect can be revealed because a partial reform creates 
an appropriate control group. Another advantages of within-country study is the 
possibilities to control for country specific conditions where cross country studies are 
hard to account for. One example is from Kugler and Pica (2008). They have studied 
the effect of the 1990 Italy labour reform where only firms with more than 15 
employees bear a cost of unjust dismissals. Small firms were not affected by this 
reform. The result shows that small firms have more job accessions and job separations 
than large firms after the reform. Schivardi and Torrini (2008) study the effect of 1990 
Italy labour reform on firm growth. Their results show that firms with a threshold of 
15 employees are less likely to grow. At the same time, large firms have a higher 
labour turnover after the reform, which may be due to the use of informal workers 
because those workers are not covered by labour regulations (Schivardi and Torrini, 
2008). 
In the context of developing countries, Besley and Burgess (2004) exploits time and 
regional variation of employment protection in India. They use a difference-in-
                                                          
6 It is defined as trade union members as a percentage of all wage earners. 
7 It is defined as number of workers covered by collective agreements as a percentage of wage 
earners. 
 55 
 
difference methodology and the results suggest significant effects of employment 
protection on output and employment. They argue that different states hold different 
attitudes towards workers and employers in terms of labour market legislation. Some 
of the states are pro-workers while others pro-employers. Their findings show that 
states with pro-worker legislations have slower manufacturing growth compared with 
pro-employer states. They also find that pro-worker legislation has increased the size 
of the informal sector. In fact, there are a large number of empirical evidence focusing 
on Latin-American and Caribbean countries’ labour market reform in past decades 
(e.g. a book edited by Heckman and Pages (2004)).  Kugler (2000) has looked at the 
effects of the 1990 Columbian labour market reform on worker’s entry and exit to the 
formal and informal sectors. Using a difference-in-differences method, he finds that a 
reduction in the strictness of EPL leads to an increase in the hazard rate into and out 
of unemployment. The rising flexibility can also be used to explain the increasing 
unemployment rate during recessions after the labour reform because firings become 
relative easier.  
With respect to the effects of EPL over workers mobility between formal and 
informal sectors (or between formal/informal employment), the empirical evidence is 
less conclusive. As mentioned in the literature survey above, most studies focus on the 
effects of EPL on the level of employment or on formal employment. Studies relating 
EPL to informal employment mainly focus on self-employment. Márquez and Pagés 
(1998) estimates the correlation between self-employment and EPL index for a sample 
of Latin-America and OECD countries. Their results indicate a strong correlation 
between the two. However, as they argued, the evidence cannot be used to infer 
whether self-employment is a voluntary choice or is simply due to the fact that they 
have limited access to formal employment. In contrast, with a panel data from 16 
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Latin-American countries, Heckman and Pages (2000) have found a positive 
relationship between job security and self-employment. Galli and Kucera (2003) have 
attributed these contradictory results to the short and long run effects of EPL. In the 
short run, weaker EPL could result in an increase in job firings. Therefore, the share 
of informal employment rises. As job firing and hiring adjust to their long-run 
equilibrium, the process could be positive to formal employment. In addition, Bosch 
et al. (2012) look at the relationship between EPL and informal employment. 
Motivated by the increasing informality of Brazilian metropolitan labour markets, the 
authors examine a range of policy variables including trade liberalization, unionization 
of industries and firing costs of industries on share of informal employment. With a 
dynamic specification, their results indicate that labour reforms can account for 30-40 
percent of the rising share of informal employment in Brazil metropolitan labour 
markets. In this chapter, we contribute to the literature by looking at the effects of EPL 
on formal-informal divide in the context of China’s urban labour market. In the next 
section, we introduce the evolution of Chinese EPL, discuss about how well these 
labour regulations are enforced and the judiciary orientation towards it. 
  3.3 EPL in China 
   3.3.1 Evolution of EPL in China 
    The evolution of China’s labour laws has been introduced in chapter 1. Generally, 
the strictness of EPL is highest in the early decades of the People’s Republic of China. 
The fixed-employment system in the urban labour market has made it impossible for 
firms to dismiss a worker. There is also no labour contracts between employers and 
employees as employees were believed to be the natural owners of the enterprises. 
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    The late 1970s and 1980s has witnessed a rapid growth of private sector and 
decentralisation of state sector in China. Although labour contract regulations were 
introduced to the whole country, rigidities in the labour market were largely reduced. 
The Enactment of the Labour Law in 1994 symbolized that the formal employment 
protection system was established in the whole China’s labour market. It protects 
employees by providing the cases that the employer can revoke labour contract and by 
listing all illegal dismissal cases. Employers are asked to explain the situation to its 
trade union or all employees 30 days in advance if they are about to dismiss a worker. 
With regard to the cases where employers revoke labour contracts in violation to the 
Labour Law, employers “are ordered by labour administrative departments to make 
corrections and assume responsibility over compensation for any losses that may be 
sustained by labourers therefrom” (Brown, 2009). It also includes provisions to protect 
labours rights with respect to probation periods, unemployment insurance, health 
insurance and pension. Together with the enactment of the Employment Protection 
and Supervision Regulations in 2005, the Labour Law have significantly increased the 
strictness of EPL in China.  
However, as is also discussed in chapter 1, the problem with the Labour Law is that 
there are many confusing and vague provisions. For example, it failed to clarify 
situations with invalid contracts, define wages, or explain what forms of work require 
payments. This was an obstacle to enforce the Labour Law properly. In addition, many 
new situations evolve. For example, there is a trend of shortening labour contracts and 
informalising of employment relations (National People’s Congress Standing 
Committee, 2005).  
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Under this background, the CLCL was enacted in 2008 to increase the job security 
and protect the rights of workers. There is no major departures between the 1994 
Labour Law and 2008 CLCL. However, it is more specific and detailed to avoid 
employers getting around the Labour Law. Table 3.1 below compares some clauses 
between 1994 Labour Law and 2008 CLCL. 
Table 3.1: A selected comparison of 1994 Labour Law and 2008 CLCL 
  1994 Labour Law 2008 CLCL 
Probationary 
Period 
Maximum 6 months Maximum 2 months 
Labour 
Contracts 
Written contracts, allow to be extended 
to non-fixed term contract after 10 
years of service 
Compulsory written contract and is 
automatically transferred to non-fixed 
term contract after 10 years of service or 
signing two consecutive fixed-term 
contracts 
Severance 
Payments 
1 month wage if tenure≤1 year. It 
increases with job tenure to a 
maximum of 20 months 
1 month wage if tenure≤1 year. It 
increases with job tenure to a maximum 
of 20 months. Severance payment 
should be made even when the contract 
expires 
Social 
Insurance 
Should be provided 
Should be provided and written in the 
labour contract 
 
The enactment of CLCL has enabled China to be among the countries with strictest 
employment protection. Table 3.2 compares the strictness of EPL in OECD and 7 
emerging economies. The OECD indicators on the EPL measure the strictness of EPL 
in each country from 4 aspects: protection of permanent workers against individual 
and collective dismissals, protection of permanent workers against (individual) 
dismissal, specific requirements for collective dismissal, regulation on temporary 
forms of employment lists the details of the measurements of EPL by OECD. 
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According to Table 3.2, China has the highest level of protection of permanent workers 
against individual and collective dismissals.  
Table 3.2: The OECD indicators on the EPL8 
Scale from 0 (least restrictions) to 6 (most restrictions) 
  
Protection of 
permanent 
workers against 
individual and 
collective 
dismissals 
Protection of 
permanent 
workers against 
(individual) 
dismissal 
Specific 
requirements for 
collective 
dismissal 
Regulation on 
temporary forms 
of employment 
OECD 
unweighted 
average 
2.29 2.04 2.91 2.08 
Argentina 2.86 2.45 3.88 3.04 
Brazil 1.75 1.84 1.5 4.08 
China 3.22 3.31 2.25 1.88 
India 2.61 3.49 0.44 2.54 
Russian 
Federation 
2.47 2.86 1.5 1.25 
Saudi Arabia 1.15 1.61 0 3.46 
South Africa 2.01 2.06 1.88 0.58 
Source: OECD/IAB Employment Protection Database, 2013 update. 
The 2008 CLCL was immediately put into effect in China after its enactment. The 
figure below shows the number of labour disputes files by all level labour dispute 
arbitrage agencies before and after the law enactment. The number of labour disputes 
soared up from 350,000 to nearly 700,000 after the reform and remains over 600,000 
                                                          
8 The table does not compare the EPL indicators in the same year. The EPL indicators for OECD 
countries measures the labour regulations in force in 2013. The EPL indicators for Brazil, China. 
India, Russia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa reflects the respective labour regulations in force in 
2012.  
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thereafter (China Labour Statistical Yearbook, 2015). In fact, the numbers could even 
be doubled if we consider those mediated cases by labour disputes mediation agencies. 
 
Figure 3.1: Total number of cases accepted by labour arbitration and mediation 
agencies 
 
Source: China Labour Statistical Yearbook 2015 
   3.3.2 The EPL enforcement and the judiciary orientation 
A stricter EPL does not imply higher level of protection of workers in practice. 
Although China ranks high in terms of the strictness of EPL in the world, the 
ineffective law enforcement has been a chronic problem (Zheng, 2009).  
After the enactment of the Labour Law in 1994, Labour administration departments 
have been established at each local government, acting as the main department that is 
responsible for enforcing China’s Labour Law. According to China Law Yearbook 
(2003), more than 3,000 labour inspection agencies and 40,000 inspectors were in 
places to deal with labour complains, and for conducting inspections. Legal provisions 
about regulating these departments are included in 2005 Employment Protection and 
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Supervision Regulations. However, it does not necessarily mean a high enforcement 
level.  
There are several reasons to explain the low enforcement level in China.  First, 
although labour departments are directly subordinate to the central government, local 
governments are at a better position to influence these labour departments. This is 
because funding and staffing are both provided by local governments. To attract 
businesses, local governments sometimes refrain from properly enforcing the law 
(Taylor et al., 2003). Besides, the primary goal for local labour departments is 
promoting employment rather than enforcing the labour regulations (Yang, 2002).  
Secondly, even if they want to enforce the law, labour inspection agencies are either 
understaffed or have weak powers (Zimmerman, 2008; Cooney, 2007). Before the 
enactment of the 2008 CLCL, there has always been an understaffing problem in the 
labour inspection agencies. This led to a consequence that they could not fully 
supervise or enforce the Labour Law (Zimmerman, 2008). This situation has been 
gradually improved during the recent years; however, the speed of improvement varies 
across different regions. In addition, penalties that local labour departments can 
impose to business were very limited, especially before the 2008 CLCL. The penalties 
only included warnings, correction notice, fines and compensation orders. The cost for 
businesses to violate the law was very low. In most cases, labour departments could 
not order a business to close unless there is a public disturbance (Cooney, 2007). 
Moreover, due to the vagueness in the Labour Law, there is scope for business to go 
challenge the inspections by labour inspection agencies. Under this background, the 
2008 CLCL was enacted to deal with the legal deficiencies of previous labour laws 
and regulations. Labour departments are entitled with stronger power under this law, 
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but they are still subject to regional variations because of administrative differences 
across different local governments.  
Another important factor associated with the effectiveness of EPL is the judiciary 
orientation toward labour disputes.  China clearly stated certain procedures to deal 
with labour disputes. It is a linear process, including consultation, dedication, 
arbitration, litigation and appeal. When a dispute occurs, it initially begins with an 
informal consultation between the two parties. If the consultation stage fails or is 
ignored, the two parties can start intra-firm mediation or more formal arbitration. If 
this process failed or is ignored, parties can refer the dispute to labour arbitration, 
which is conducted by labour disputes arbitration committees. Further, if either party 
does not satisfy the labour arbitration, they can refer the dispute to local People’s 
courts to seek a formal resolution.  
As EPL becomes stricter in China, there is also a shift of judiciary orientation over 
the labour disputes after 2008. Figure 3.2 illustrate the share of cases resolved by all 
level labour disputes arbitration agencies in each year. Generally, there is a downward 
trend before 2008. After 2008, the overall court efficiency is improved. Figure 3.3 
depicts the overall share of labour disputes cases won by employees in each year. 
According to the Figure 3.3, the pro-worker share of labour disputes resolutions is 
decreasing from over 50% in 1997 to slightly more than 30% in 2009. The downward 
trend has been locked in since then.  
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Figure 3.2: Share of labour disputes resolved in each year 
 
Source: China Labour Statistical Yearbook 2015 
 
Figure 3.3: Share of labour disputes cases won by employees 
 
Source: China Labour Statistical Yearbook 2015    
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3.4 Empirical methods 
Based on the literature review, there are mainly three empirical methods to measure 
the effects of EPL on labour market outcomes. First, most country-specific studies are 
conducted in a natural experiment setting. These studies show that only a part of the 
labour force were affected by the change of EPL. In this case, those unaffected by the 
change of EPL become an ideal control group to capture the causal effect of EPL on 
labour market outcomes. Second, cross-country/region studies usually take advantage 
of the cross-country/region variation in the level of EPL. Third, the effects of EPL can 
be studied by considering the regional variation in the level of enforcement of the EPL 
and judiciary orientation towards EPL. Since the CLCL is a one-off law change and is 
applied to all labour relations, the first and second method are unfit for our study. An 
EPL indicator in this case is equivalent to a time dummy. Even if we control for macro 
indicators and time trend, the estimated effect of EPL may still capture the effects from 
other unobserved factors. 
To overcome the problem discussed above, we study the effects of EPL on 
individuals’ employment status choices by exploring the regional variation in the 
enforcement of EPL and judiciary orientation. The qualitative response models are 
common to be used in the analysis of categorical dependant variables such as the 
employment status choices. Particularly, we employ a random effect multinomial logit 
model. The framework is derived from the random utility model which is developed 
by McFadden (1974). Under the framework, we assume a utility is associated with 
each employment status (formal, informal, unemployed, out of labour force). The 
utility is completely known only to the person himself/herself. The person chooses 
his/her employment status in order to maximise his/her utility. Arguably, the choice 
of alternative employment status is more likely to be determined by the demand side 
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such as the job availability and employers, or by general macro conditions such as 
tightness of the labour market. It is worth noting that the utility used in the model is 
an indirect utility which takes both demand and supply factors into consideration. In 
other words, it is a reduced form expression to determine the classification of 
individuals into employment statuses.   
Model and estimation methods     
    Let 𝑄𝑖𝑡 ∈ {1, … , 𝐽} be the employment status for individual i at time t. J is the 
number of employment statuses in the labour market. Let  𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡  be the value for an 
individual i in employment state j at time t.  
 𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝒙𝑖𝑡𝜷𝑗 + 𝛼𝑖𝑗+𝜃𝑗1𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡 + 𝜃𝑗2𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                                           (3.6) 
    Here 𝒙𝑖𝑡  is a vector of control variables for observation i at time t. 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑡  is an 
indicator for labour laws enforcement or judiciary orientation in province m. 𝛼𝑖𝑗 
captures the individual heterogeneous effects. The reason to include 𝛼𝑖𝑗 is because we 
have a longitudinal data and there are repeated observations for the same individual. 
Unobserved individual heterogeneity is likely to present. We assume 𝛼𝑖𝑗 is a random 
intercept and arise from a multivariate normal distribution with zero mean and a 4x4 
variance covariance matrix ∑.  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the error term that is independent of 𝒙𝑖𝑡  and 
𝛼𝑖𝑗 and follows a Type I extreme value distribution. 𝜷𝑗  𝜃𝑗1 and 𝜃𝑗2  are associated 
parameters to be estimated. We assume that the log-odds of each employment status 
to the reference employment status J follow a linear model:  
log (
Pr(𝑄𝑖𝑡=𝑗)
Pr(𝑄𝑖𝑡=𝐽)
) = 𝒙𝑖𝑡𝜷𝑗 + 𝛼𝑖𝑗+𝜃𝑗1𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡 + 𝜃𝑗2𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                     (3.7) 
    We assume  exp(𝒙𝑖𝑡𝜷𝐽 + 𝛼𝑖𝐽+𝜃1𝐽𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡 + 𝜃𝐽2𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑡) = 1 so that (3.7) holds when j = 
J. Here 𝜷𝑗, 𝜃𝑗1 and 𝜃𝑗2 can also be interpreted as marginal effect of control variables on 
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log-odds of alternative employment status j to the reference employment status. In this 
study, we consider formally employed as the reference employment status J. The 
probability of an individual choosing employment status j can then be written as 
Pr(𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗) =
exp (𝒙𝑖𝑡𝜷𝑗+𝛼𝑖𝑗+𝜃𝑗1𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡+𝜃𝑗2𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑡)
∑ exp (
𝐽
𝑘=1 𝒙𝑖𝑡𝜷𝑘+𝛼𝑖𝑘+𝜃𝑘1𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡+𝜃𝑘2𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑡)
                                                                         (3.8) 
In this case, for the reference employment status J. Pr(𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝐽) =
1
1+∑ exp (
𝐽−1
𝑘=1 𝒙𝑖𝑡𝜷𝑘+𝛼𝑖𝑘+𝜃𝑘1𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡+𝜃𝑘2𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑡)
. As the choices probabilities depend on 𝛼𝑖𝑗,  we 
need to integrate over the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity 𝛼𝑖𝑗 and derive the 
sample likelihood function which is: 
𝐿 = ∏ ∫ ∏ ∏ {
exp (𝒙𝑖𝑡𝜷𝑗+𝛼𝑖𝑗+𝜃𝑗1𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡+𝜃𝑗2𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑡)
∑ exp (4𝑘=1 𝒙𝑖𝑡𝜷𝑘+𝛼𝑖𝑘+𝜃𝑘1𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡+𝜃𝑘2𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑡)
}𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑓(𝛼)𝑑𝛼4𝑗=1
4
𝑡=1
+∞
−∞
𝑁
𝑖=1                          (3.9)           
Where 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if individual i choose j at time t.  A 
standard assumption regarding 𝛼 is that it is strictly not correlated with 𝒙𝑖𝑡. A solution 
to the maximization of (3.9) cannot be analytically obtained. Instead, we need to use 
approximation methods such as Gauss–Hermite quadrature and the adaptive Gauss–
Hermite quadrature.  In this study, we use Stata build-in program GSEM (Generalised 
Structural Equation Modelling) to estimate the random effects multinomial logit 
model. The default estimation methods implemented by this program is the adaptive 
Gauss–Hermite quadrature as it is believed to be generally more efficient (Rabe-
Hesketh, Skrondal, and Pickles, 2005).  
The sample estimates of the random effect multinomial logit model cannot be 
directly interpreted. Instead, the marginal effect of the CLCL on probabilities to be in 
each status can be calculated as follows: 
𝜕Pr (𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗)
𝜕𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑡
= Pr (𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗) ∗ [𝜃𝑗2 − ∑ Pr (𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗)𝜃𝑘2]
𝐽−1
𝑘=1
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Clearly, the marginal effect of the enforcement of the CLCL and the judiciary 
orientation on the probability of being in employment status j depends not only on 
parameter 𝜃𝑗2  but also on the average of 𝜃𝑗2  across employment status and the 
predicted probabilities to be in employment status j.  It is worth noting that the sign of 
the marginal effect can be opposite to 𝜃𝑗 .  
  3.5 Data  
   3.5.1 The China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) 
    The main source of data used to study the effects of EPL in China on employment 
status choices are the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) that were conducted 
by the Carolina Population Centre at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
and the National Institute for Nutrition and Health at the Chinese Centre for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CCDC). The longitudinal CHNS datasets aim at providing 
information for health, demographic, socioeconomic and nutrition policy studies. It is 
not designed to be national representative but covers nine provinces from north to 
south of China with different geographies, economic development, public resources 
and health indicators. This survey uses a multistage and random cluster process to 
draw samples. To be exact, in each province, counties are stratified by low, middle 
and high income groups. Four counties are randomly chosen from a weighted 
sampling scheme. Provincial cities and a lower income city are chosen in seven 
provinces, while large cities were selected in other two provinces. Households from 
three autonomous cities (Beijing, Shanghai and Chongqing) are included in the 2011 
survey. 
By far, nine waves of surveys have been conducted since 1989 (1989, 1991, 1993, 
1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011) on four different levels, including household 
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survey, individual survey, community survey, and nutrition and physical examination. 
Different questionnaires are designed for different levels of survey. For each wave, 
they take three consecutive days to collect data for all four surveys. The household 
survey questionnaire enquires about demographic information and economic activities 
(e.g. income, expenditure) of the household. Information relating to an individual’s 
employment status is included in individual survey. Overall, the datasets cover around 
4,400 households and 19,000 individuals for all nine waves. Although new households 
and cities are added into the survey, the overall attrition rate to the previous wave is 
around 80-88% (Zhang et al., 2014).  In this study, we use the latest 4 waves (2004, 
2006, 2009, and 2011) of CHNS datasets to estimate the relationship between EPL 
and individual’s employment status choice. We only use the latest four waves because 
indicators relating to the enforcement of EPL and the judiciary orientation in most 
provinces are available after 2001.  
To identify an individual’s employment status, we use answers to a series of 
questions listed in Table 3.3 below. First, a respondent is asked whether or not he/she 
is employed. If an individual is not employed at the moment, the reasons for will be 
asked. The answers to this question will help us distinguish those who are unemployed 
but are looking for jobs against those who are simply out of the labour force. In this 
study, among individuals who are not employed, we classify those who are looking 
for jobs as unemployed and the rest as out of the labour force. If an individual is 
working at the time of the survey, he/she is then asked about the occupation and 
employment position in the occupation. Workers in CHNS survey are classified into 
seven types of employment positions. They can be permanent workers in enterprises, 
contractors for others or enterprises, temporary workers, self-employed with or 
without employees, and paid or unpaid household workers.  
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We further classify these seven types of employment positions into two categories 
of employment status: formally and informally employed. Informal employment is 
generally defined as jobs that are outside the framework of labour regulations 
(Hussmann, 2004). According to the 2008 CLCL and its subsequent revision, all 
labour relationships are governed by the CLCL. In this sense, only self-employed 
individuals without employees fit with the definition of informal employment. 
However, in reality, those temporary workers, contractors and household workers in 
the China’s labour market usually enjoys less social protection than permanent 
workers. Therefore, we also classify temporary and household workers as informally 
employed. In addition, informally employed workers also refers to contractors who 
received no social benefits contribution from their employers. The rest of the workers 
are then classified as formal employed. Together with the unemployed and those out 
of the labour force, we have defined four types of employment statuses in the China’s 
labour market. 
 
Table 3.3: Survey questions related to employment status 
1)       Are your presently working? 0 no 1 yes 
  
2)       Why are you not working? 
1.       Seeking work 
2.       Doing housework 
3.       Disabled 
4.       Student  
5.       Retired 
6.       Other  
7.       Unknown 
 
3)       What is your primary occupation? 
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Table 3.3 continued 
1.       Senior professional/technical worker (doctor, professor, lawyer, architect, engineer) 
2.       Junior professional/technical worker (midwife, nurse, teacher, editor, photographer) 
3.      Administrator/executive/manager (working proprietor, government official, section chief, department or bureau 
director, administrative cadre, village leader) 
4.       Office staff (secretary, office helper) 
5.       Farmer, fisherman, hunter 
6.       Skilled worker (foreman, group leader, craftsman) 
7.       Non-skilled worker (ordinary labourer, logger) 
8.       Army officer, police officer 
9.       Ordinary soldier, policeman 
10.     Driver 
11.     Service worker (housekeeper, cook, waiter, doorkeeper, hairdresser, counter salesperson, launderer, child care worker) 
12.     Athlete, actor, musician 
13.     Other (specify: __________) 
14.     Unknown 
 
4)       What is your employment position in this occupation 
1.       Self-employed, owner-manager with employees 
2.       Self-employed, independent operator with no employees (includes farmer) 
3.       Works for another person or enterprise (includes small-, medium-, and large-scale collective enterprise, farm, and 
private enterprise) as a permanent employee 
4.       Contractor with other people or enterprise 
5.        Temporary worker 
6.       Paid family worker 
7.        Unpaid family worker 
8.        Other (specify: __________) 
9.        Unknown 
 
Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 below show the distribution of individuals in different types 
of employment and employment statuses respectively. To restrict our focus on the 
urban labour market, we have excluded all rural observations and farmers. Among 
individuals who were working at the time of the survey, the share of self-employed, 
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temporary and household workers is relatively stable across four waves. Although 
there is a slight downward trend, the share of permanent workers is still around half 
of the total number of workers. The most significant change is the share of contractors 
that sees an increase by nearly 10% of the total workers from 2004 to 2011. According 
to Table 3.5, the labour market participation rate in the China’s labour market has been 
relatively stable from 2004 to 2011.  The share of the formally employed increased 
from 14% in 2004 to 31% in 2011 and the share of the informally employed workers 
decreases from 37% in 2004 to 25% in 2011. The changes are partly due to the 
inclusion of new households from three developed autonomous cities in 2011. If we 
exclude the newly added observations from the three autonomous cities, the changes 
are mostly compromised. However, there is still a steady increase in formal 
employment (11%) and a decrease in informal employment (6%). 
 
Table 3.4: Type of employment (age 16-65), percentage share 
  2004 2006 2009 2011 
Self-employed 0.18 0.22 0.19 0.17 
Permanent 0.56 0.50 0.47 0.49 
Contractor 0.11 0.12 0.19 0.21 
Temporary 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 
Household workers 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Total urban workers 1767 1808 1925 2982 
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Table 3.5: Type of employment status (age 16-65), percentage share 
  2004 2006 2009 2011 
2011 (excluding 
autonomous cities) 
Formally employed 0.14 0.22 0.24 0.31 0.25 
Informally employed 0.37 0.31 0.28 0.25 0.31 
Unemployed 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.05 
Out of labour force 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.39 
Total urban working age sample 3427 3426 3644 5323 3446 
 
Table 3.6 presents the data descriptive statistics to provide a general picture of the 
scenario. The sample for analysis is restricted to those who are above 16 and below 
65 years old. In addition, to obtain more consistent distributions of observations across 
waves, we have excluded the newly added observations from three autonomous cities. 
The variable ‘Urban’ is included to distinguish urban hukou holders against rural 
hukou holders. Altogether, there are approximately 65% of observations having urban 
hukou in the urban labour market. The fluctuation across the four waves is not 
tremendous. The average age in the sample is 44.47 years old, among which 48% of 
them are male and 82% of them are married. Over 70% observations age over 35 in 
the sample. With respect to education, we have classified observations into five levels 
of education: illiterate, primary, secondary, vocational and tertiary education. 
According to Table 3.6, about 75% of individuals have secondary education or lower. 
Although there is an increase in the share of individuals with tertiary education or 
higher from 9% in 2004 to 17% in 2011, on average, the share is only about 13%. The 
size of households are stable across the four waves; on an average, there are 3.48 
people in each household.  
Table 3.7 describes the panel structure of the dataset. We have a unbalanced panel. 
The average number of observations for each individual is around 2.14.   It reports 
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both between and within variation of each variable. Although they cannot be compared 
directly due to different degree of freedom, they can be used a good approximation. 
Time invariant variables such as ‘Urban’ have no within-individual variation. Table 
3.7 indicates that for most time-varying variables in our dataset, the between- 
individual variation is greater than the within variation. 
Table 3.8 shows the transition matrix of four employment status. The upper 
numbers in the Table represent the number of transitions from one employment state 
at t-1 to another state at t. The lower numbers refer to the associated transition 
probabilities. For instance, of 1371 informal workers at t-1, 746 (54.41%) remain 
informal at t; 245 (17.87%) becomes formal workers; 86 (6.27) are unemployed and 
294 (21.44%) are out of the labour force. Clearly, such transitions are substantial. 
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Table 3.6: Descriptive statistics 
  2004 2006 2009 2011 Whole sample   
Variable: Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
Urban 0.65 0.48 0.64 0.48 0.63 0.48 0.64 0.48 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Illiterate 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.29 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Primary education 0.14 0.34 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.32 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Secondary education 0.56 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Vocational education 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.34 0.14 0.34 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Tertiary education 0.09 0.29 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.32 0.17 0.38 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Age 42.99 12.27 44.01 12.16 45.08 12.29 45.75 12.03 44.47 12.23 16 65 
Age: 16-24 yrs 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Age: 25-34 yrs 0.19 0.39 0.16 0.36 0.14 0.34 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Age: 35-50 yrs 0.39 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.38 0.48 0.39 0.49 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Age: 50+ yrs 0.33 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.40 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.37 0.49 0 1 
Marital status 0.81 0.39 0.82 0.39 0.83 0.38 0.84 0.37 0.82 0.38 0 1 
Male 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Household size 3.48 1.24 3.50 1.26 3.49 1.23 3.49 1.22 3.49 1.23 1 11 
Number of Observations 3427 3426 3644 3446 13943     
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Table 3.7: Panel structure 
Variable:  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs 
Formal overall 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 N =   13943 
  between  0.44 0.00 1.00 n =    6507 
  within  0.22 -0.40 1.10 T-bar = 2.14 
        
Informal overall 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 N =   13943 
  between  0.34 0.00 1.00 n =    6507 
  within  0.22 -0.56 0.94 T-bar = 2.14 
        
Unemployed overall 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 N =   13943 
  between  0.22 0.00 1.00 n =    6507 
  within  0.15 -0.69 0.81 T-bar = 2.14 
        
Out labour force overall 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 N =   13943 
  between  0.45 0.00 1.00 n =    6507 
  within  0.23 -0.34 1.16 T-bar = 2.14 
        
Urban overall 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 N =   13925 
  between  0.48 0.00 1.00 n =    6493 
  within  0.00 0.64 0.64 T-bar = 2.14 
        
Illiterate overall 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 N =   13943 
  between  0.26 0.00 1.00 n =    6507 
  within  0.12 -0.66 0.84 T-bar = 2.14 
        
Primary overall 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 N =   13943 
  between  0.29 0.00 1.00 n =    6507 
  within  0.16 -0.63 0.87 T-bar = 2.14 
        
Secondary overall 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 N =   13943 
  between  0.47 0.00 1.00 n =    6507 
  within  0.21 -0.21 1.29 T-bar = 2.14 
        
Vocational overall 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 N =   13943 
  between  0.31 0.00 1.00 n =    6507 
  within  0.15 -0.62 0.88 T-bar = 2.14 
        
Tertiary overall 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 N =   13943 
  between  0.32 0.00 1.00 n =    6507 
  within  0.13 -0.62 0.88 T-bar = 2.14 
        
Age overall 44.47 12.23 16.05 65.00 N =   13943 
  between  13.02 16.05 65.00 n =    6507 
  within  2.03 40.38 48.60 T-bar = 2.14 
        
Marital status overall 0.82 0.38 0.00 1.00 N =   13943 
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Table 3.7 continued 
 
Variable:  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs 
  between  0.39 0.00 1.00 n =    6507 
  within  0.13 0.07 1.57 T-bar = 2.14 
        
Male overall 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 N =   13943 
  between  0.50 0.00 1.00 n =    6507 
  within  0.00 0.48 0.48 T-bar = 2.14 
        
Household Size overall 3.49 1.23 1.00 11.00 N =   13943 
  between  1.22 1.00 11.00 n =    6507 
  within   0.35 0.24 7.99 T-bar =  2.14 
 
 
Table 3.8: Sample probabilities of employment status transitions 
                                     State at t      
State at t-1 
Formal Informal Unemployed 
Out labour 
force 
Total 
Formal Obs 2,026 239 71 316 2,652 
  % 76.4 9.01 2.68 11.92 100 
  
 
     
Informal Obs 245 746 86 294 1,371 
  % 17.87 54.41 6.27 21.44 100 
        
Unemployed Obs 117 139 75 126 457 
  % 25.6 30.42 16.41 27.57 100 
        
Out labour force Obs 181 316 112 2,347 2,956 
  % 6.12 10.69 3.79 79.4 100 
        
Total Obs 2,569 1,440 344 3,083 7,436 
  % 34.55 19.37 4.63 41.46 100 
 
 
3.5.2 EPL and macro indicators 
We use four indicators to proxy the provincial variation in the level of EPL 
enforcement and the judiciary orientation in China. The source of data to calculate 
these indicators are from the 2005, 2007, 2010 and 2012 China Labour Statistical 
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Yearbook and the provincial Statistics for Human Resource and Social Security 
Development in the respective year. The most direct measurement to the level of EPL 
enforcement is the provincial labour inspection rate. It is calculated as the ratio of the 
number of firms being inspected by labour inspection agencies in a year to the total 
number of firms in each province. It directly reflects the regional variation in the 
intensity of labour inspection. The second indicator measures the incidence of labour 
disputes in each province. It is calculated as the ratio of number of workers involved 
in the labour disputes to the total number of workers in each province. The indicator 
reflects the degree of compliance to EPL in each province. The third indicator is the 
court efficiency. It is calculated as the ratio of total number of cases settled to the total 
number of cases accepted by all level labour dispute arbitration and mediation 
agencies and courts in a year in each province. The fourth indicator is the pro-worker 
share of labour disputes resolutions. It is calculated as the share of cases won by 
workers to total cases. The third and fourth indicator reflects the judiciary orientation 
in each province.  
Table 3.9 below shows a summary of the EPL indicators in each province. 
According to Table 3.9, the labour inspection rate varies across provinces. The mean 
labour inspection rates in Heilongjiang and Guangxi are over 35% while it is just about 
5% in Hunan province. With respect to the incidence of labour disputes, Liaoning 
province sees the highest average incidence of labour disputes with 3.5 out of 1000 
workers involved in labour disputes. Heilongjiang, Henan and Hubei are among 
provinces with the lowest incidence of labour disputes. According to the China 
National Bureau of Statistics (2017), provincial variation in number of labour disputes 
in highly correlated with the level of development. For example, of 589244 cases 
accepted by all level labour dispute and arbitration agencies, 93817 cases are in 
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Guangdong Province, around 60000 cases are in Beijing, 55000 cases in Shanghai, 
54000 cases in Jiangsu province and 38000 cases in Zhejiang provinces. These 
provinces and cities are perceived as most developed regions with large private sector 
in China. However, taking the total number of worker in each province into 
consideration, the provincial variations in the incidence of labour dispute become 
smaller. In addition, as is discussed in chapter 1, most labour disputes are mediated 
before they are brought to courts. As for court efficiency, there is no significant 
variation across provinces as is the case of labour inspection rate. Over 90% of labour 
disputes can be resolved in all provinces within a year except for Liaoning. With 
respect to the pro-worker share, Heilongjiang province tops the table with over 60% 
cases won by workers; it is just over 40% in Guangxi and Shandong provinces. In 
Heilongjiang and Guizhou, the union coverage is over 70% while in provinces like 
Jiangsu, the union coverage is less than 50%. 
Other variables included in the study that might affect an individual’s employment 
status choices are vacancy unemployment ratio and log GDP per capita. The former is 
to control for the local labour market conditions and the latter controls for the general 
level of economic development. Table 3.10 below summarise the two macro indicators 
in each province. The vacancy unemployment ratio is lower in Guangxi and Henan 
than in other provinces. It indicates that unemployed workers face a tighter labour 
market which means more people are competing for jobs.  
Table 11 shows the correlation coefficients between the EPL indicators and macro 
indicators and within EPL indicators. There is a positive and significant correlation 
between VU ratio and log GDP per capita. It indicates that workers in wealthier 
provinces are associated with a higher probability to find a job. Correlations between 
EPL indicators are moderate. However, we observe a high correlation between macro 
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indicators and EPL indicators. The correlation between labour inspection rate and log 
GDP per capita and is -0.4. The correlation between VU ratio and union coverage is 
0.44. These should be accounted for when we carry out the regression analysis. 
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Table 3.9: Descriptive statistics for indicators of EPL enforcement and the judiciary 
orientation 
Indicators Province Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Inspection Rate 
Liaoning 4 0.231 0.061 0.122 0.288 
Heilongjiang 4 0.36 0.058 0.271 0.433 
Jiangsu 4 0.162 0.077 0.075 0.285 
Shandong 4 0.188 0.088 0.093 0.308 
Henan 4 0.177 0.047 0.101 0.22 
Hubei 4 0.313 0.076 0.202 0.39 
Hunan 4 0.053 0.029 0.022 0.098 
Guangxi  4 0.391 0.091 0.291 0.537 
Guizhou 4 0.228 0.054 0.162 0.298 
Incidence (per 
1000 workers) 
Liaoning 4 3.48 3.396 0.73 9.086 
Heilongjiang 4 1.18 0.447 0.521 1.769 
Jiangsu 4 2.161 0.577 1.484 2.919 
Shandong 4 1.705 0.735 0.636 2.518 
Henan 4 1.149 0.369 0.494 1.412 
Hubei 4 1.165 0.512 0.508 1.782 
Hunan 4 1.488 1.318 0.501 3.783 
Guangxi  4 1.388 0.495 0.625 1.997 
Guizhou 4 2.002 1.084 0.614 3.632 
Efficiency 
Liaoning 4 0.888 0.064 0.782 0.944 
Heilongjiang 4 0.936 0.023 0.904 0.969 
Jiangsu 4 0.95 0.017 0.927 0.975 
Shandong 4 0.916 0.016 0.905 0.945 
Henan 4 0.915 0.035 0.855 0.946 
Hubei 4 0.944 0.017 0.916 0.962 
Hunan 4 0.926 0.054 0.829 0.96 
Guangxi  4 0.953 0.012 0.943 0.973 
Guizhou 4 0.936 0.007 0.924 0.944 
Pro-worker 
share 
Liaoning 4 0.567 0.074 0.439 0.626 
Heilongjiang 4 0.661 0.041 0.603 0.712 
Jiangsu 4 0.424 0.057 0.356 0.516 
Shandong 4 0.417 0.051 0.375 0.501 
Henan 4 0.471 0.047 0.412 0.54 
Hubei 4 0.476 0.102 0.355 0.629 
Hunan 4 0.482 0.14 0.293 0.65 
Guangxi  4 0.41 0.062 0.357 0.512 
Guizhou 4 0.507 0.062 0.445 0.612 
Unionization 
Liaoning 4 0.579 0.093 0.5 0.735 
Heilongjiang 4 0.715 0.152 0.511 0.873 
Jiangsu 4 0.415 0.02 0.387 0.436 
Shandong 4 0.488 0.133 0.315 0.619 
Henan 4 0.54 0.141 0.379 0.681 
Hubei 4 0.637 0.106 0.491 0.759 
Hunan 4 0.529 0.088 0.435 0.639 
Guangxi  4 0.484 0.105 0.356 0.588 
Guizhou 4 0.778 0.41 0.398 1.39 
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Table 3.10: Descriptive statistics for macro indicators 
Indicators Province 
Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
VU ratio 
Liaoning 4 0.938 0.183 0.775 1.267 
Heilongjiang 4 0.933 0.033 0.892 0.982 
Jiangsu 4 0.947 0.090 0.858 1.102 
Shandong 4 1.022 0.047 0.945 1.070 
Henan 4 0.863 0.368 0.556 1.480 
Hubei 4 1.108 0.190 0.898 1.395 
Hunan 4 0.914 0.159 0.642 1.049 
Guangxi  4 0.779 0.209 0.532 1.046 
Guizhou 4 0.967 0.167 0.800 1.250 
Ln(GDP) 
Liaoning 4 9.917 0.450 9.292 10.469 
Heilongjiang 4 9.496 0.499 8.693 10.036 
Jiangsu 4 10.1641 0.445089 9.506289 10.66146 
Shandong 4 9.974 0.403 9.356 10.400 
Henan 4 9.421 0.446 8.777 9.908 
Hubei 4 9.525 0.443 9.023 10.083 
Hunan 4 9.371 0.462 8.783 9.948 
Guangxi  4 9.216 0.494 8.497 9.787 
Guizhou 4 8.668 0.484 8.046 9.330 
 
Table 3.11 Correlation coefficients between EPL and macro indicators 
  Ln(GDP) VUratio Unionization 
Inspection 
rate 
Incidence 
Court 
efficiency 
Pro-worker 
share 
Ln(GDP) 1       
VUratio 0.54 1      
Unionization 0.21 0.44 1     
Inspection 
rate 
-0.40 -0.31 -0.06 1    
Incidence 0.09 0.03 0.14 -0.04 1   
Court 
efficiency 
0.08 0.28 0.02 0.11 0.12 1  
Pro-worker 
share 
-0.24 -0.15 0.13 0.28 0.03 -0.07 1 
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  3.6 Results 
As stated in the last section that we use the GSEM (Generalised Structural Equation 
Model) program built in the Stata software to estimate the multinomial logit model 
with random effect. Also, there are 4 types of employment status: formal employment, 
informal employment, unemployment and out of labour force. We use formal 
employment as the base category. We also assume random effects within individuals 
are correlated. It means individual’s employment decision choices are assumed to be 
correlated. Otherwise, a pooled multinomial logit model will be sufficient.   
Table 3.12, Table 3.13, Table 3.14 and Table 3.15 present the results for the 
multinomial logit models with random effects. Here we assume that 𝛼𝑖𝑗 = 1  and 
report only marginal effects (average partial effects) for the convenience of 
interpretation. Marginal effects can be interpreted as the change of probability by 
increasing one unit of explanatory variable. Nine models are estimated to account for 
the possibility of multicollinearity caused by high correlation between EPL and macro 
indicators. Model 1 contains all EPL indicators. Model 2-4 excludes the EPL 
indicators one by one. Model 5-9 include each EPL indicators only. Table 3.12 
contains nine separate sets of marginal effects to predict the probability of being 
formally employed; Table 3.13 contains nine separate sets of marginal effects to 
predict the probability of being informally employed; Table 3.14 contains nine 
separate sets of marginal effects to predict the probability of being unemployed and 
Table 3.15 contains nine separate sets of marginal effects to predict the probability of 
being out of labour force respectively. Table 3.16 shows the goodness of fit (pseudo 
R2) for all nine models and the details of random effects (their variance and 
covariance). According to Table 3.16, covariance of random effects within individual 
are substantial and statistically significant at 1% level. It confirms the plausibility of a 
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panel model to study repeated employment status choices by individuals.  Here only a 
3x3 variance covariance matrix is estimated as we treat formal employment as the 
reference group. In (3.7), we assume that exp(𝒙𝑖𝑡𝜷𝐽 + 𝛼𝑖𝐽+𝜃1𝐽𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡 + 𝜃𝐽2𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑡) = 1 
for j=J. Hence, 𝜷𝐽 = 0, 𝛼𝑖𝐽 = 0, 𝜃1𝐽 = 0 and 𝜃𝐽2 = 0 by assumption. 
Our results show that several explanatory variables do have effects on individual’s 
employment status choices. We first turn to the effects of individual characteristics. In 
our models, we include individual’s human capital factors such as level of education 
and age. An individual’s human capital factors play a key role in his/her labour market 
performance. Level of education reflects one’s skill level. Age can be generally used 
a proxy for work related experience. According to Table 3.12 – Table 3.15, for an 
average worker with no education attainment, having a vocational education will raise 
the probability of being formally employed by 5.4%. The probability will increase by 
around 10% if he/she has received a tertiary education. In contrast, having a vocational 
education will decrease his/her probability of being informally employed by 7.5%. It 
will decrease by 16.9% if he receives a tertiary education. Having higher levels of 
education (vocational or above) have significantly decrease the chance of being 
unemployed and out of labour force. The largest effect is on labour market 
participation. According to Table 3.14, having a tertiary education will decrease the 
probability by 38%. With respect to age, other things being equal, an individual 
between 35-49 years old will be more likely to be formally employment compared 
with the same individual aged between 16-24 years old. The probability will increase 
by 11.8% if he is over 50. However, there is no significant age effect on probabilities 
of being informally employed except for those over 50 (decrease by 13.2%). Getting 
over 50 will significantly increase the individual’s probability of out of the labour 
force (by around 28.7%).  
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Other individual characteristics we include in the models are gender, hukou status, 
household size and the marital status.  Compared with females, males are more likely 
to be in formal employment (by around 4.7%) and less likely to be informal 
employment (by around 6.1%). Although males in average are more likely to be 
unemployed than females (by 4%), they are much more likely to participate in the 
labour market than females (by 24.8%). The finding is consistent with the data that 
labour market participation rate is higher for males. With respect to the rural and urban 
divide, the hukou status has widely been regarded as barrier for rural to urban migrants 
getting access to certain jobs or being treated equally in the urban labour market (Song, 
2015). Nevertheless, our results shows that obtaining an urban hukou has no 
significant effect on the probability of being formally employed, informally employed. 
Holding an urban hukou decreases one’s probability of out of labour force by 4%. 
Similarly, marital status has no significant effect on probabilities of being formally 
employed and informally employed. However, a married individual is less likely to be 
out of labour force than singles. In terms of the household size, we find small but 
significant effects on individual’s employment status choices. Other things being 
equal, as household size increases, individuals are less likely to be in formal 
employment (by 0.9%) and more likely to be in informal employment (by 1.9%). 
Let’s look at the effects of general macro background. We include the log GDP per 
capital in each province to show its effect on employment status choices.  We don't 
find evidence of a positive effect on probability of being formally employed. However, 
we do find a negative relationship between log GDP per capital and informal 
employment. A unit increase in log GDP per capita will decrease the probability by 
1.9%.  
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The associations between employment choices and EPL indicators are our main 
concern. According to Tables 3.12 – 3.15, the enactment of the CLCL has decreased 
the probability of being formally employed by about 1.5%. It also has increased the 
probability of being unemployed by around 1.5%. However, its effects on probability 
of being informally employed and out of labour force are insignificant. It indicates that 
after controlling for other individual characteristics, the enactment of the CLCL results 
in a lower probability for individuals to be formally employed. It may be caused by 
the increasing labour turnover costs associated with the CLCL. Firms are reluctant to 
employ formal workers. Although the purpose of the CLCL is to regulate labour 
relations and increase the protection of workers in China, we see insignificant effect 
on individual’s probability on informal employment. Part of it can be explained the 
use of labour despatching agencies by firms in the Chinese labour market. However, 
we do see adverse effects of the CLCL on unemployment.  
With respect to the effects of EPL enforcement and the judiciary orientation, we 
include 5 indicators: incidence of labour dispute, share of pro-worker resolutions, 
share of unionized workers, court efficiency and probability of being inspected by 
labour inspection agencies. One of our hypothesis is that if EPL is strictly enforced or 
better complied with, workers are more likely to be formally employed and less likely 
to be informally employed. Another hypothesis is that if the provincial judiciary 
system is more worker oriented, workers are more likely to be formally employed and 
less likely to be informally employed. Due to the high correlation between some of 
the indicators, we estimate 9 models with different combinations of indicators. 
However, generally, among the 9 models no evidence has been found on the 
association between workers employment status choices and court efficiency, labour 
inspection rate, unionization, and pro-worker share. The only exception is the 
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incidence of labour disputes. One unit increase in the incidence of labour disputes is 
associated with a higher probability (by 0.03%) to be formally employed and is 
associated with a lower probability of 0.06% to be informally employed. In addition, 
it is also associated with lower probability (by 0.02%) to be unemployed. In this case, 
it is hard to conclude that the enforcement of labour regulations and the efficiency of 
judiciary system have a significant impact on individual’s employment status choices. 
Thus, the relationship between employment status choices and EPL indicators are 
ambiguous. However, it is arguable that the sample size of the data is relatively small 
and time dimension of the panel is short. 
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Table 3.12: Marginal effects: Employment status = formally employed 
 
  (1.a) (2.a) (3.a) (4.a) (5.a) (6.a) (7.a) (8.a) (9.a) 
Primary -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Secondary 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
Vocational 0.054 0.054 0.053 0.054 0.053 0.053 0.054 0.053 0.054 
  (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** 
Tertiary 0.101 0.100 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.102 
  (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** 
Age (25-34) 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age (35-49) 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 
  (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** 
Age (50+) 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.119 
  (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** 
Male 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 -0.047 -0.047 
  (0.0040)*** (0.0040)*** (0.0040)*** (0.0040)*** (0.0040)*** (0.0040)*** (0.0040)*** (0.0040)*** (0.0040)*** 
Urban 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 
  （0.004） （0.004） （0.004） （0.004） （0.004） （0.004） （0.004） （0.004） （0.004） 
Household            
size 
-0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 
  (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Married 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ln(GDP) -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
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Table 3.12 continued 
 
  (1.a) (2.a) (3.a) (4.a) (5.a) (6.a) (7.a) (8.a) (9.a) 
Reform -0.015 -0.015 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 
  (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)* (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.006)** (0.005)* (0.005) (0.005)* 
Efficiency 0.067 0.063 0.055 0.053   0.081   
  (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.041)   (0.041)**   
Union 0.009 0.004 0.002   0.003    
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)   (0.012)    
Pro-worker -0.024        -0.019 
  (0.017)        (0.016) 
Incidence 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004     
  (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)***     
Inspection rate -0.015 -0.018      -0.012  
  (0.017) (0.017)      (0.016)  
N 13,913 13,913 13,913 13,913 13,913 13,913 13,913 13,913 13,913 
(* significant at 10% level;  ** significant at  5% level;   *** significant at 1% level) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 89 
 
 
Table 3.13: Marginal effects: Employment status = informal employment 
 
  (1.b) (2.b) (3.b) (4.b) (5.b) (6.b) (7.b) (8.b) (9.b) 
Primary 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.019 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Secondary 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.010 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Vocational -0.075 -0.075 -0.075 -0.075 -0.074 -0.074 -0.076 -0.075 -0.075 
  (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** 
Tertiary -0.169 -0.169 -0.169 -0.169 -0.169 -0.169 -0.170 -0.169 -0.170 
  (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.019) (0.019) 
Age (25-34) 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.017 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Age (35-49) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Age (50+) -0.132 -0.132 -0.132 -0.132 -0.132 -0.132 -0.132 -0.132 -0.133 
  (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** 
Male -0.061 -0.061 -0.061 -0.061 -0.061 -0.061 -0.061 0.061 0.061 
  (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** 
Urban 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Household            
size 
0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.016 
  (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
Married 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 
  (0.010)* (0.010)* (0.010)* (0.010)* (0.010)* (0.010)* (0.010)* (0.010)* (0.010)* 
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Table 3.13 continued 
 
  (1.b) (2.b) (3.b) (4.b) (5.b) (6.b) (7.b) (8.b) (9.b) 
Ln(GDP) -0.019 -0.019 -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.020 -0.020 -0.023 -0.021 
  (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.008)** (0.007)** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** 
Reform 0.014 0.011 0.010 0.008 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
Efficiency -0.077 -0.073 -0.059 -0.056   -0.104   
  (0.078) (0.078) (0.077) (0.075)   (0.074)   
Union -0.012 -0.007 -0.005   -0.007    
  (0.023) (0.022) (0.021)   (0.021)    
Pro-worker 0.023        0.018 
  (0.032)        (0.030) 
Incidence -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006     
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***     
Inspection rate 0.030 0.034      0.027  
  (0.031) (0.031)      (0.030)  
N 13,913 13,913 13,913 13,913 13,913 13,913 13,913 13,913 13,913 
(* significant at 10% level;  ** significant at  5% level;   *** significant at 1% level) 
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Table 3.14: Marginal effects: Employment status = unemployment 
 
  (1.c) (2.c) (3.c) (4.c) (5.c) (6.c) (7.c) (8.c) (9.c) 
Primary -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Secondary -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Vocational -0.042 -0.042 -0.042 -0.041 -0.041 -0.041 -0.042 -0.042 -0.041 
  (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** 
Tertiary -0.051 -0.050 -0.050 -0.050 -0.050 -0.050 -0.050 -0.050 -0.050 
  (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** 
Age (25-34) -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 
  (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** 
Age (35-49) -0.061 -0.061 -0.061 -0.061 -0.061 -0.061 -0.061 -0.061 -0.061 
  (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
Age (50+) -0.125 -0.125 -0.125 -0.125 -0.125 -0.125 -0.125 -0.125 -0.125 
  (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** 
Male 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 
  (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 
Urban -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 
  (0.004)* (0.004)* (0.004)* (0.004)* (0.004)* (0.004)* (0.004)* (0.004)* (0.004)* 
Household            
size 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
  (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Married -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 -0.030 
  (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** 
Ln(GDP) 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.017 
  (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** 
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Table 3.14 continued 
 
  (1.c) (2.c) (3.c) (4.c) (5.c) (6.c) (7.c) (8.c) (9.c) 
Reform 0.019 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.012 0.014 0.012 0.014 
  (0.008)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.006)** (0.005)*** (0.007)* (0.007)** (0.005)** (0.005)** 
Efficiency -0.069 -0.063 -0.059 -0.059   -0.073   
  (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049)   (0.048)   
Union -0.007 0.0003 -0.0002   0.0002    
  (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)   (0.013)    
Pro-worker 0.029        0.023 
  (0.020)        (0.019) 
Incidence -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002     
  (0.000)* (0.000)* (0.000)* (0.000)* (0.000)*     
Inspection rate 0.003 0.006      0.000  
  (0.017) (0.017)      (0.017)  
N 13,913 13,913 13,913 13,913 13,913 13,913 13,913 13,913 13,913 
(* significant at 10% level;  ** significant at  5% level;   *** significant at 1% level) 
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Table 3.15: Marginal effects: Employment status = out of labour force 
 
  (1.d) (2.d) (3.d) (4.d) (5.d) (6.d) (7.d) (8.d) (9.d) 
Primary -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 -0.035 -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 
  (0.020)* (0.020)* (0.020)* (0.020)* (0.020)* (0.020)* (0.020)* (0.020)* (0.020)* 
Secondary -0.136 -0.136 -0.136 -0.136 -0.135 -0.135 -0.136 -0.135 -0.135 
  (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** 
Vocational -0.297 -0.297 -0.297 -0.297 -0.296 -0.297 -0.297 -0.296 -0.296 
  (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** 
Tertiary -0.380 -0.380 -0.380 -0.379 -0.379 -0.380 -0.379 -0.379 -0.379 
  (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** 
Age (25-34) -0.149 -0.149 -0.149 -0.149 -0.149 -0.149 -0.149 -0.149 -0.149 
  (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** 
Age (35-49) -0.092 -0.092 -0.093 -0.092 -0.093 -0.093 -0.092 -0.092 -0.093 
  (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** 
Age (50+) 0.287 0.287 0.287 0.288 0.287 0.287 0.288 0.287 0.287 
  (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** 
Male -0.248 -0.248 -0.248 -0.249 -0.249 -0.249 -0.249 -0.249 -0.249 
  (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** 
Urban -0.040 -0.040 -0.040 -0.040 -0.040 -0.040 -0.040 -0.041 -0.040 
  (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** 
Household            
size 
-0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)* (0.004) (0.004)* (0.004)* (0.004)* 
Married -0.035 -0.035 -0.035 -0.035 -0.035 -0.035 -0.035 -0.035 -0.035 
  (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** 
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Table 3.15 continued 
 
  (1.d) (2.d) (3.d) (4.d) (5.d) (6.d) (7.d) (8.d) (9.d) 
Ln(GDP) -0.018 -0.018 -0.015 -0.018 -0.018 -0.015 -0.018 -0.021 -0.018 
  (0.011)* (0.011)* (0.010) (0.010)* (0.010)* (0.010) (0.010)* (0.011)* (0.010)* 
Reform -0.015 -0.014 -0.012 -0.004 -0.005 -0.014 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Efficiency -0.041 -0.042 -0.061 -0.078   -0.077   
  (0.105) (0.105) (0.103) (0.102)   (0.100)   
Union 0.031 0.030 0.027   0.030    
  (0.030) (0.029) (0.029)   (0.028)    
Pro-worker -0.005        -0.001 
  (0.042)        (0.040) 
Incidence -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000     
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Inspection rate -0.041 -0.042      -0.042  
  (0.042) (0.042)      (0.041)  
N 13,913 13,913 13,913 13,913 13,913 13,913 13,913 13,913 13,913 
(* significant at 10% level;  ** significant at  5% level;   *** significant at 1% level)  
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Table 3.16: Regression statistics 
  N 
log-
likelihood 
Pseudo 
R2 var(u2) var(u3) var(u4) 
cov(u2, 
u3) 
cov(u2, 
u4) 
cov(u3, 
u4) 
Model 1 13913  -15473.2 0.569 4.238 1.999 4.027 2.168*** 0.576*** 0.947*** 
Model 2 13913 -15474.5 0.563 4.230 1.988 4.029 2.160*** 0.579*** 0.944*** 
Model 3 13913 -15475.1 0.558 4.246 1.995 4.035 2.170*** 0.581*** 0.950*** 
Model 4 13913 -15475.2 0.550 4.247 1.996 4.037 2.171*** 0.581*** 0.952*** 
Model 5 13913 -15476.2 0.549 4.252 1.995 4.043 2.171*** 0.582*** 0.953*** 
Model 6 13913 -15483.6 0.553 4.196 1.985 4.040 2.140*** 0.566*** 0.930*** 
Model 7 13913 -15481.6 0.549  4.200 1.993 4.044 2.149*** 0.569*** 0.921*** 
Model 8 13913 -15483.3 0.541  4.186 1.983 4.041 2.136*** 0.570*** 0.928*** 
Model 9 13913 -15482.8 0.546 4.204 1.992 4.035 2.149*** 0.563*** 0.933*** 
(* significant at 10% level;  ** significant at  5% level;   *** significant at 1% level) 
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3.7 Conclusion  
    The chapter has evaluated the effects of EPL on individuals’ employment status 
choices with micro survey data from China. We use random effect discrete choice 
models to control for individual unobserved heterogeneity and identify various factors 
associated with the individual’s employment status choices. Our results find no 
significant change of male and female labour force participation before and after the 
enactment of the CLCL. We also find weak association between the EPL enforcement 
and labour force participation and weak association between the judiciary orientation 
and labour force participation. Our results show that female from provinces with 
higher labour inspection rate are more likely to participate in the labour force.  
With respect to individual’s choices over employment status conditional on 
participating in the labour market, our results show that generally workers are more 
likely to be formally employed and unemployed, and are less likely to be informally 
employed after 2008. The enforcement of EPL and the judiciary orientation appear to 
have little association with worker’s choices of employment status. One exception is 
for the pro-worker share of court resolutions. Workers from provinces with higher pro-
worker shares are associated with higher probability of being formally employed, 
lower probability to be informally employed and higher probability to be unemployed.  
The weak association between the enforcement of EPL and the judiciary orientation 
and worker’s choices of employment suggests that workers labour force participation 
decisions and employment status are hardly affected by labour inspections and 
judiciary system orientation. It may derive from firm’s counter strategy to the stricter 
EPL and its enforcement. For example, the use of dispatched workers by firms 
becomes common after 2008 (Wang et al., 2016). Although dispatched workers are 
offered labour contracts, those labour contracts are signed between workers and labour 
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dispatching agencies. It can hardly be considered formal employment as most 
dispatched workers are employed without social insurance. Another possible reason 
to the results found in our study is the insufficient variation of the indicators for law 
enforcements and the judiciary orientation due to data availability. The indicators are 
aggregated at provincial level and only 9 provinces are included in our study. 
Workers decisions over labour market participation are likely to be affected by 
many factors. Although we find minimal role of law enforcement and the judiciary 
orientation, it is worth to note that individual’s demographic and social economic 
characteristics such as level of education, age and hukou status play important roles in 
individual’s labour market decisions. These factors are more relevant for policy 
implications.   
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Chapter 4: The wage gap between rural 
migrants and urban workers in China: a 
matching approach 
  4.1 Introduction  
The wage gap between rural migrants and urban workers in the urban labor market 
is persistent in China. The institutional discrimination associated with the household 
registration system is widely believed to be one of the main causes of the wage gap. 
Under the system, every Chinese national should be registered and given a hukou 
according to his/her place of residence, either rural (agricultural) or urban (non-
agricultural). Although rural hukou holders are each allocated a piece of farmland, 
they are excluded from highly subsidized urban social benefits such as medical care, 
education, housing, and pensions. These rural residents were also restricted from 
finding non-agricultural jobs in urban areas in the past. Due to the development of the 
Chinese economy, the restriction on labor migration was gradually relaxed in recent 
decades. The number of rural migrants in the urban labor market is estimated to have 
reached 270 million in 2015 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2015). However, there are 
concerns that rural migrants in the urban labor market are still treated differently from 
their urban counterparts in terms of wages, social welfare, and work conditions 
(Demurger et al., 2009). Figures from national statistics indicate that although the 
migrant urban wage gap is generally narrowing, the wage ratio of rural migrants to 
urban workers is constantly below 0.7 in the last two decades (see Figure 1.1). It has 
also been highlighted in the literature that rural migrants face higher job mobility 
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(Knight and Yueh, 2004), late payment of wages (Demurger et al., 2009), and 
restrictions on getting access to certain well-paid jobs (Knight et al., 1999; Appleton 
et al., 2004).  
Nevertheless, a wage gap between two groups in the labor market does not 
necessarily mean one group is discriminated against. The difference in labor income 
might be a result of a difference in human capital such as investment in education, 
knowledge, and ability (Mincer, 1970). It could also be attributed to a segmented labor 
market where one group of workers is concentrated in low paid sectors or occupations. 
The segregation can be either associated with discrimination by employers or just a 
reflection of individual preferences or household decisions (Meng and Zhang, 2001). 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the origin of the 
wage gap between migrants and urban workers in the China’s urban labor market. 
Only by carefully looking into all factors that determine individuals’ wage formation 
can we have a better understanding of the urban labor market and think of policies to 
tackle urban inequality. 
In fact, there is much literature investigating the wage gap between groups of 
workers in the context of the China’s urban labor market. Most of the studies employ 
an empirical strategy developed by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). This strategy 
involves a decomposition of the wage gap into parts that can be attributed to 
differences in individual characteristics and parts that represents different wage returns 
to the same characteristics, i.e. discrimination. Another popular approach is its 
extension in Brown et al.’s (1980) decomposition in which the effect of occupation 
segregation on the wage gap is further investigated. There is also growing interest in 
the approach proposed by Machado and Mata (2005) and Melly (2006), where the 
wage gap is decomposed along the wage distribution. These approaches often impose 
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a restriction on the structures of wage formation for different groups of workers. For 
example, wage formation in Oaxaca-Blinder type approaches often are assumed to be 
linear. In addition, they are parametric. The former approach uses OLS to fit a linear 
model for the conditional mean, while the latter uses quantile regression to fit a linear 
model for the conditional quantiles. The predetermined linear model is often criticized 
because of a potential misspecification problem (Wooldridge, 2015). Moreover, the 
conventional approaches might have a common support problem (i.e., the distribution 
of individual characteristics for different groups of workers have little common 
support). The common support problem is often considered in literature evaluating 
programs. When drawing causal inferences, researchers usually attempt to compare 
observations in one state with comparable observations in another state (Lechner, 
2001). Very little or no common support is likely to increase the bias and variance of 
estimators (Kahn and Tamer, 2010). In this respect, if we want to measure the extent 
to which the wage gap (either at the mean or at different quantiles) between rural 
migrant and urban workers is caused by differences in individual characteristics, it 
would be pointless to include those workers outside the common support as they are 
incomparable.  
The method we employ is a non-parametric matching approach. As far as we know, 
we are the first to study the wage gap between rural migrants and urban workers in the 
China’s urban labor market with a matching approach. Particularly, we follow a 
matching method proposed by Nopo (2008) to deal with the common support problem. 
In the conventional parametric approach researchers are keen to know to what extent 
the wage gap between rural migrants and urban workers can be explained by the 
difference in wages of urban workers and the counterfactual wages of rural migrant 
workers if they have the same wage structure as urban workers. The non-parametric 
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method we use constructs the counterfactual wages distribution rural migrant workers 
would have if they had the same distribution of individual characteristics as urban 
workers. Another advantage of Nopo’s approach is that it also provides rich 
information on the distribution of the unexplained wage gap. Moreover, the non-
parametric feature of the method eases the reliance on assumptions of specification 
and the assumption of conditional independence. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that 
the matching approach has limitations. It has the problem of dimensionality where the 
more variables we choose to match with, the smaller the size of the matched sample 
will be.  
A second contribution is to employ a dataset with a large coverage of individuals 
in urban areas, with the rural and urban hukou. To carry out the study, we use a national 
representative dataset (Rural to Urban Migration in China) collected in 2009. It 
contains more than 9000 observations in each group of workers and covers the main 
migrants to exporting and importing provinces and cities. Problems with previous 
studies over the wage gap between rural migrant and urban workers include the 
relative small sample size and the concentration on limited area/cities (Demurger et 
al., 2009). For example, Meng and Zhang (2001) study the migrant urban worker wage 
gap in Shanghai. Wang et al. (2015) looks at the same issue with data from 4 large 
cities. Another national representative dataset is from the 2005 One Percent Population 
Survey collected by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics and contains rich 
information on migrants and urban workers (e.g., Zhang and Wu, 2013). However, 
this dataset was collected before 2008 and cannot reflect the current labor market 
situations, as China has experienced major labor law reform since 2008. 
Our results show that the size of the unexplained wage gap compared to the mean 
wage gap between urban workers and rural migrants in the China’s urban labor market 
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decreases significantly from nearly 50% to 29.7% if we compare comparable 
individuals on common support. We have also examined the effect of labor market 
segmentation (occupational segregation and sector segregation) on the wage gap. 
Results imply that the size of the unexplained wage gap to the mean wage of rural 
migrant workers decreases from 10.8% to 9.4% when we control occupation in the 
matching process. We can also see a reduction in the size of the unexplained wage gap 
from 10.8% to 9.2% when we control for firm ownership. It indicates that the existence 
of labor market segmentation enlarges the unexplained wage gap between urban 
workers and urban migrant workers in China. Results from the distribution of the 
unexplained wage gap show that male migrants face a larger unexplained wage gap 
than female migrants. Migrants are also more disadvantaged in the state-owned 
enterprises than in the private sector.  
The rest of the chapter will be divided into 5 sections. Section 4.2 presents the 
literature review, including the review of the empirical methods used to address the 
problem and related Chinese empirical studies on this topic. Section 4.3 introduces the 
data used and its descriptive analysis. Section 4.4 introduces the empirical strategy we 
use to explore the wage gap between rural migrants and urban workers in the China’s 
urban labor market. Section 4.5 presents the results. The last section includes some 
remarks in conclusion.  
  4.2 Literature Review 
    In this section a review of the existing literature will be presented. First, theories 
and empirical strategies that are adopted to investigate wage gap will be reviewed. 
Second, we will present empirical studies that look at, in particular, the wage gap 
between urban and rural migrant workers in the China’s urban labor market.  
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   4.2.1 Theories and empirical strategies used in existing 
literature 
    Beside the non-discriminatory factors such as differences in preferences and skills, 
discrimination and labor market segmentation are the most widely used theories to 
explain the wage gap between two groups of workers (Wang et al., 2015). Becker 
(1957) discusses three types of taste-based discrimination in the workplace: employer 
discrimination, employee discrimination, and customer discrimination. The wage gap 
may result from distaste on the part of the employer toward a group of workers. A 
discriminatory employer would rather give up part of his profit to satisfy his prejudice. 
The wage gap can also be caused by employee discrimination where the majority 
group of workers dislike working with the minority group of workers. Consumer 
discrimination against one group of workers can also lower the expected remuneration 
of these workers when consumers are mostly prejudiced members. Phelps (1972) and 
Arrow (1973) discuss the effects of statistical discrimination on the wage gap between 
two groups of workers. Under imperfect information assumption, some employers are 
likely to statistically discriminate against a group of workers based on easily 
observable characteristics.  
    The labor market segmentation theory suggests that the labor market consists of two 
segments: a primary market and a secondary market (Piore and Doeringer, 1971). The 
primary market features good jobs (e.g., good pay, good working conditions, etc.). In 
contrast, the secondary market features bad jobs (e.g., low pay, bad working conditions, 
etc.). The presence of occupational segregation in the segmented labor market will 
lead to a wage gap between groups of workers. The occupational segregation could 
simply be a result of employer discrimination or institutional discrimination against 
one group of workers. It can also be attributed to group preferences. Moreover, the 
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occupational segregation can be a result of differences in pre-labor market human 
capital investment (Altonji and Blank, 1999).   
    Decomposition methods are perhaps the most popular way to study the effects of 
various factors on wage gap between groups. Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) have 
independently developed similar decomposition techniques to study the mean wage 
gap among two groups of workers. In particular, their method decomposes the mean 
wage gap among groups into two parts. Part of the wage differential can be explained 
by differences in individual characteristics (characteristic effect) and the rest is 
unexplainable (which is often called “coefficient effect”). For better clarity, let us 
consider two groups of workers, 𝑖 = {𝑢, 𝑟}. Here, u denotes the group with relatively 
higher wages (urban workers in our case) and r denotes the group with relatively lower 
wages (rural migrant workers in our case). A Mincer type wage equation can be 
estimated for each group,  
ln 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖𝛽𝑖  + 𝜀𝑖 where 𝑖 = {𝑢, 𝑟}.                                                                        (4.1) 
x is a vector of individual characteristics with 𝑥1 = 1 as the constant term, and β 
contains associated coefficients. w is the equilibrium wage in the labor market. ε is the 
error term that has E(ε|x) = 0. The OLS estimation will give us ln ?̅?𝑖 = ?̅?𝑖𝛽?̂? where 
?̅?𝑖 is the average wage across group i, and ?̅?𝑖 denotes the sample average of individual 
characteristics. Hence, the wage gap between u and r can be expressed as 
ln ?̅?𝑢 − ln ?̅?𝑟 = 𝑥𝑢?̂?𝑢 − 𝑥𝑟?̂?𝑟                                                                                (4.2) 
Simple transformations of (2.2) can lead to: 
ln ?̅?𝑢 − ln ?̅?𝑟 = (𝑥𝑢−𝑥𝑟)?̂?𝑢 + 𝑥𝑟(?̂?𝑢 − ?̂?𝑟)                                                         (4.3)  
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If ?̂?𝑢 is believed to be the non-discriminatory wage structure, then the first term on 
the right hand side of (2.3) can be interpreted as the part of the wage gap caused by 
differences in individual characteristics and the second term on the right hand side of 
(2.3) is the part of the wage gap due to differences in wage structure across groups 
(i.e., differences between discriminatory wage structure and non-discriminatory wage 
structure). 
The traditional Oaxaca-Blinder technique explicitly chose a non-discriminatory 
wage structure. It suffers from an index problem where the choice of another non-
discriminatory wage structure such as ?̂?𝑟 would result in a different size of coefficient 
effect. Ever since then, economists have been trying to overcome the index problem 
by finding more convincing non-discriminatory wage structures. Reimers (1983) 
suggests that a non-discriminatory wage structure can be a weighted sum of wage 
structures for two groups. However, the weights he imposes are not justified and can 
be any number. In contrast, Cotton (1988) considers different forms of discrimination 
in the labor market. He argues that in addition to a direct discrimination against a low 
wage group, high wage group workers tend to be overvalued in the labor market. In 
this case, a proper non-discriminatory wage structure should be between the wage 
structures of two groups. The weights he suggests are relative proportions of each type 
of worker in the whole sample. However, both Reimers (1983) and Cotton (1988) are 
criticized by Neumark (1988). Neumark argues that non-discrimination wage structure 
should be “derived from a theoretical model of discriminatory behavior.” He extends 
Becker (1957) and Arrow (1973) type employer discrimination models and considers 
two types of discriminatory behavior as in Cotton (1988): the existence of nepotism 
toward one group and discrimination against another. Under the assumption that “the 
utility function of an employer is homogeneous of degree zero with respect to labor 
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inputs from each group,” the non-discriminatory wage structure is approximately 
equal to the wage structure from pooled regression. 
Juhn et al. (1991) propose an extension of the Oaxaca and Blinder method to 
explore the causes of slower convergence of the Black-White wage gap in the US. In 
their approach, they ignore the index problem by assuming that African Americans 
and Caucasians should have the same wage structure in the absence of discrimination. 
In addition, wage distributions are assumed to be identical among two groups. The 
change in wage gap between two groups can then be decomposed into two parts. One 
part can be explained by changes in the wage structure of groups and changes in 
individual characteristics across time. The other part attributes the wage gap to 
unobservable changes in two groups and changes in the distribution of wages of 
Caucasians across time. Their empirical results show that increased wage dispersion 
has played an important role in the slower convergence of the Black-White wage gap 
in the US since 1979. However, the strong assumption of identical wage distribution 
across groups is criticized by Guo et al. (2011). They argue that in the US labor market, 
the wage distribution of Caucasians is more dispersed than it is in the case of African 
Americans.  
Occupational segregation can also have an impact on the wage gap between groups 
(Brown et al., 1980). In the Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) type literature, 
occupation is often regarded as exogenous in the wage structure estimation. They 
implicitly assume that the occupational distribution of two sub-groups studied is 
random and thus that there is no inequality of opportunity to enter certain occupations. 
Brown et al. (1980) relax the assumption and estimate two separate occupational 
choice equations for each group of workers. Their decomposition method indicates the 
wage gap may be caused not only by differences in individual characteristics and wage 
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structure but also by differences in occupational choice structures. Similar to Oaxaca 
(1973) and Blinder (1973), this method also suffers from an index number problem. 
On the one hand, it still uses the wage structure of high wage group workers as a non-
discriminatory structure while decomposing the wage gaps. On the other hand, they 
have used the occupational choice structure of high wage groups as a non-
discriminatory one, which is quite arbitrary. Appleton et al. (1999) correct these 
problems with a strategy borrowed from Neumark (1988), that is, using wage structure 
derived from the estimation of a pooled sample wage equation as a non-discriminatory 
one. The non-discriminatory occupational choice structure is obtained through a 
weighted sum of sub-group occupational choice structures.  
Wage decomposition techniques such as the ones used by Oaxaca-Blinder and its 
extensions often use a linear OLS model to obtain wage structures. The linear model 
focuses on the conditional mean of the response variable and describes the average 
partial effects of independent variables on the dependent variable. It cannot show the 
conditional distributional properties of the dependent variable. Juhn et al. (1993) look 
at the causes of the changes in wage inequality within a group across time. The study 
extends Juhn et al. (1991) to consider the distribution of residuals. In particular, they 
measure the changes in wage inequality within groups across time as changes in 
distance between two quantiles in wage distribution. The problem with the Juhn (1993) 
decomposition method is that the effects of unobservable changes on group wage 
inequality cannot be further decomposed (i.e., we are unable to see the exact price 
effect/quantity effect of those unobservable.  
Conditional quantile regression can estimate the potential differential effect of the 
independent variables on various quantiles of the conditional distribution. Machado 
and Mata (2005) develop a conditional quantile regression decomposition method to 
 108 
 
study the wage gap between two groups of workers along the entire wage distribution. 
The essence of the method is to construct an unconditional wage distribution function. 
A counterfactual wage distribution can then be estimated and compared with the actual 
wage distribution to see the unexplained wage gap between two groups along wage 
distribution. Their approach can also estimate the partial effect of change in 
distribution of one control variable on wage distribution. An extension of the approach 
can be found in Melly (2006), where she has solved the problem of the crossing of 
quantile curves. 
In recent years, there is a growing trend of using semi- or non-parametric methods 
to investigate the wage gap between different groups of workers. The problems with 
linear Oaxaca-Blinder type methods or distribution based approaches are similar. As 
we briefly discussed in the introduction section of this chapter, the strict assumption 
over the functional form of the wage equation is implausible and has the potential 
problem of misspecification. DiNardo et al. (1996) are the first to use a non-parametric 
decomposition method. Their method requires no assumption on shapes of distribution. 
In addition, it does not require a conditional independence assumption as in parametric 
approaches. The authors use a weighted kernel density estimation method to estimate 
the probability density function of the wage. In addition, they use an empirical 
reweighting function to construct counterfactual wage distribution. The change in 
wage distribution across time can then be easily decomposed into one part due to 
changes in individual characteristics (composition effect) and into another part 
attributed to changes in wage distribution (wage structure effect). However, the 
decomposition method is usually computationally complicated (Melly, 2006). 
A similar non-parametric approach is employed by Barsky et al. (2002).  They have 
stressed the importance of a common support problem in explaining the wealth gap 
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between African Americans and Caucasians in the US, which makes the approach 
interesting. The traditional Oaxaca-Blinder method indicates that only around 20% of 
the wealth gap between African American and Caucasian families in the US can be 
explained by their income differences. After focusing on the common support, the 
proportion of the wealth gap due to work earnings increases to 64%. The common 
support problem is dealt with by the authors in way to assign zero weight to the wealth 
of those Caucasian families falling above the maximum of African American families. 
The main problem with the method is that it cannot capture the effects of other 
observable variables on the wealth gap. 
The common support problem is also emphasized in Frolich (2007) and Nopo 
(2008). They have proposed non-parametric matching techniques to study the 
determinants of the wage gap between two groups of workers. The main difference 
between the two approaches lies in the way they construct the comparable pairs of 
workers in the two groups of workers they study. The former method uses propensity 
score matching, while the latter matches those with exactly the same set of individual 
characteristics. Both have advantages and disadvantages. They not only provide us 
with information on the effect of individual characteristics on the wage gap but also 
provide information on the distribution of the unexplained wage gap. Propensity score 
matching performs better when there is a relatively small sample, but the matching 
quality is relatively low. The main problem with exact matching is the “curse of 
dimensionality” where the matched sample size will shrink significantly when we 
choose more variables to control for.  
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   4.2.2 Chinese empirical studies  
Empirical studies in China started from the 1990s as rural to urban migration 
became common and micro level data for the Chinese labor market became available. 
The reform of state-owned enterprises since the early 1990s has led to many urban 
workers being laid off. It was well documented in the literature that there was an 
environment of protection against urban workers at that time (Yang, 2002).  
Meng and Zhang (2001) study the effects of occupation segregation on the wage 
gap between rural migrants and urban workers in Shanghai. The decomposition 
method they use follows the one used by Brown et al. (1980). Meng and Zhang use a 
dataset collected by the Shanghai Academy of Social Science in 1996 and have 
classified occupations into 5 categories: white collar, wholesale workers, service 
personnel, manufacturing personnel, and other workers. Their results show that 22% 
of urban residents who should have been blue collars take white-collar jobs. In contrast, 
about 6% of rural migrant workers who should have been white collars take blue-collar 
jobs. This research demonstrated that there are big differences between urban and 
migrant workers in terms of occupation. Rural migrant workers were concentrated in 
the manufacturing sector and other sectors, but urban residents were more likely to be 
in white-collar occupations. Wage differential caused by occupation segregation only 
accounted for 6% of the whole wage gap, and most of the discrimination was from 
occupational discrimination.  
    Instead of considering occupational segregation, Wang (2005) looked at the role of 
institutions on the wage gap between urban workers and rural migrants. She used data 
from the China Urban Labor Survey, 2001. Four types of workers based on their firm 
ownership are considered: self-employed, state-owned staff, non-state-owned staff, 
and non-state-owned senior staff. This study suggested that, if rural migrants and 
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urban workers were treated equally, the ratio of rural migrant workers who were self-
employed should have decreased by 31.38% and the ratio of migrant workers as state-
owned staff should have increased by 28.07%. It means that migrant workers are 
mostly excluded by the state sector. Moreover, Wang also investigated the sources of 
the wage gap using the Brown et al. (1980) decomposition method. The results show 
that 58.73% of the wage gap came from the occupational wage differential of which 
26.93% cannot be explained by differences in observable characteristics.   
Although the Brown et al. decomposition takes occupational segregation into 
consideration, it could not present the feature of wage distribution. Based on this 
weakness, Deng (2007) used a quantile decomposition method to research the causes 
of the wage differential between migrant and urban workers. This research showed 
that in the low and middle-income quantile, discrimination was the most important 
reason leading to the wage gap between migrant and urban workers. Meanwhile, 
within the top 10% income quantile, the income gap was mostly caused by 
characteristic effects. Therefore, it is the low-income migrants who suffer from 
discrimination. 
Empirical studies with a mean wage approach using data collected after 2005 
suggest that the unexplained part of the wage gap is generally lower than before. 
Adopting data from the 1% National Population Survey in 2005, Xing (2008) 
demonstrated that around 90% of the wage gap between urban and migrant workers 
could be explained by a difference in individual, observable characteristics. Similar 
results are found in Lee (2012), Xu and Zhao (2014), and Yu and Chen (2012). 
However, research from Qu (2014) came to different conclusions from the above 
studies. Qu found that discrimination or an unexplained wage gap increased from 2001 
to 2010. One point of note is that, even in those studies that found unexplained wage 
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gap was a decreasing trend, there was no improvement among low-income migrant 
workers. Meng (2014) compared the wage gap among areas with different levels of 
economic development. In the less developed western area, human capital and other 
job-related factors can still only explain a small part of the wage gap between urban 
and migrant workers. However, in central and eastern China where migrant workers 
are in large demand, it seems that much of the wage gap can be explained. A summary 
of the Chinese empirical studies can be found in Table 4.1.  
Although empirical literature in the context of the China’s urban labor market 
suggested that there is a significant wage gap between rural migrants and urban 
workers, the empirical strategies they used are often parametric estimation. Moreover, 
the common support problem is ignored in the Chinese empirical studies. As is pointed 
out by Nopo (2008), failing to account for the common support problem could result 
in an overestimation of the unexplained wage gap.  
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Table 4.1: Table of empirical literature on wage gap between rural migrants and urban workers 
Literature Data Methodology Results 
Meng and Zhang (2001) Surveys of floating population and urban 
residents in Shanghai in 1995 and 1996 by 
Shanghai Academy of Social Science  
Brown et al. decomposition method to see 
the effects of occupation segregation on 
wage gap  
Earning gaps cannot be explained by 
individual endowments increase from 50% to 
110% after considering occupation 
segregation. The proportion of  the 
contribution of occupation segregation to 
unexplained earning gap is just 6%. Most of 
the unexplained gap is caused by disparity 
within occupations. 
Wang (2005) China Urban Labor Survey in 2001. The 
survey is conducted in five megacities: 
Shanghai, Wuhan, Shenyang, Fuzhou, and 
Xi’an 
Brown et al. decomposition method to see 
the effects of sector segregation on wage gap 
Sector segregation leads to concentration of 
rural migrant workers in non-state-owned 
enterprises. Occupation segregation 
contributes 26.93% to the unexplained wage 
gap.   
Deng (2007) CASS surveys on urban households and 
temporary residents in 12 provinces in 2002. 
It contains 6853 urban households and 2000 
migrant households 
Oaxaca-Blinder technique and Machado and 
Mata (2005) Quantile regression 
decomposition technique to decompose 
wage gap 
   Oaxaca-Blinder method shows that about 
60% of the wage gap cannot be explained by 
individual characteristics. The unexplained 
wage gap is largest in low and middle income 
groups of workers. The wage gap between 
those on top of wage distribution is mainly 
caused by differences in human capital factors. 
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Table 4.1 continued 
Literature Data Methodology Results 
Xing (2008)  1% national population sample survey in 
2005  
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 90% of the wage gap can be explained by 
differences in individual characteristics. 
Education is the main contributor to the 
observed wage gap.  
Lee (2012) China Urban Labour Survey in 2005. The 
survey is conducted in 12 cities. 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 90% of the wage gap can be explained by 
differences in individual characteristics. 
Xu and Zhao (2014) Matched Employer-Employee dataset in 
China in 2012. It is conducted in 350 firms 
across 10 cities. 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to look at 
both wage gap between rural migrants and 
urban workers and wage gap between locals 
and non-locals. 
86% of the rural migrants urban workers’ 
wage gap can be explained by differences in 
individual characteristics. 
Yu and Chen (2012) 1993–2009 China Health and Nutrition 
Survey 
Melly (2006) Quantile regression 
decomposition method with endogenous 
treatment effect to study the wage gap along 
the wage distribution and corrects for 
potential effects of endogenous sector and 
occupational segregation.  
Growing effects of hukou on wage gap along 
wage distribution are noted. The 
discrimination effects are even worse in 2009. 
Unexplained wage gap accounts for more than 
50% of observed wage gap for low and middle 
income groups and is still more than 40% for 
high income groups. 
Qu (2014) China Urban Labour Survey: 2001, 2005, 
2010 
Use Machado and Mata (2005) Quantile 
regression decomposition technique to study 
the wage gap along the wage distribution 
“Sticky floor” effect in the lower quantiles of 
wage distribution. Unexplained wage gap was 
increasing from 2001–2010.  
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Table 4.1 continued 
Literature Data Methodology Results 
Zhang and Wu (2013) 1% national population sample survey in 
2005 
Brown et al. decomposition method to study 
the effects of occupation segregation. It 
contains 38 categories 
Occupation segregation contributes to the 
observed wage gap while within occupation 
inequality plays a minimum role. 
Zhu (2016) 2002, 2007 China Household Income Project The unconditional quantile regression 
decomposition method by Firpo, Fortin, and 
Lemieux (2009) to study the wage gap along 
the wage distribution and to see the effect of 
each variable on wage gap along wage 
distribution 
Return to education becomes more similar 
between two groups of workers. Unexplained 
wage gap is larger at upper quantiles of wage 
distribution. Generally, discrimination against 
rural migrants is intensified. 
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  4.3 Data 
The Rural Urban Migration in China (RUMiC) dataset is used to study the wage gap 
between rural migrants and urban workers. It is a longitudinal survey conducted by 
the Institute for the Study of Labor, Australian National University, and Beijing 
Normal University. Currently, two waves (2008, 2009) are now publicly available. 
The dataset contains three separate surveys: the urban household survey (UHS), the 
rural household survey and the migrant household survey (MHS). We restrict our 
analysis to the 2009 wave of UHS and MHS. Both UHS and MHS are conducted in 
the nine largest migrant-sending and -receiving provinces (out of 31 provinces and 
autonomous regions) and contain around 5000 households in each sample. The MHS 
is conducted in 15 cities, while the UHS covers four more cities. The sampling scheme 
for the UHS uses random samples from annual household income and expenditure 
surveys conducted by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. To obtain a 
representative sample, the MHS uses a census listing and workplace based sampling 
frame (Akgüç et al., 2014). Both MHS and UHS are collected through face-to-face 
interviews. The questions mainly concern the welfare status of the household members; 
thus, they cover the details of respondents’ demographic, economic, and health related 
information. 
To compare the wage gap between rural migrants and urban workers, we keep only 
those wage earners who are older than 16 years and younger than 65 years. Wage is 
the main concern in our analysis. The average monthly earnings reported include post-
tax wages, bonuses, and allowances. As some Chinese firms provide catering and 
accommodation to their employees, we also include the benefits from catering and 
accommodation in the monthly earnings. This is important in the Chinese context as 
accommodation and catering account for a large proportion of household expenditure 
 117 
 
for rural migrants. In addition, we derive the hourly wage from the information on 
number of hours worked per week. Lastly, similar to (Demurger et al, 2009), we adjust 
for differences in provincial purchasing power with price deflators estimated by 
Brandt and Holz (2006). 
Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics for individual characteristics in the UHS 
and MHS. We dismissed all observations with missing values and ended up with a 
sample consisting of 6222 urban workers and 4867 rural migrant workers. The 
differences between the urban workers and rural migrant workers are all significant at 
1% level.  According to Table 4.2, 83.62% of urban wage earners are married (it is 
53.93% for rural migrants). Rural migrants on average earn just 7.08 yuan per hour. 
This is less than half of the mean hourly wage for urban workers. However, the urban 
workers in the sample on an average are approximately 10 years older than the rural 
migrants and have nine more years of non-agricultural job experience in the same 
occupation. In addition, among the urban wage earners, approximately 46% have 
received tertiary education. The percentage for rural migrants is just over 8% for 
tertiary education. In contrast, the proportion of males and the proportion of workers 
in coastal developed provinces in the MHS sample (60.55% and 51.67%, respectively) 
are slightly higher than in the UHS sample (55.93% and 45.74%. respectively). 
With respect to the types of firm ownership, we have divided it into four categories. 
State-owned enterprises refer to those firms either held or partly held by the 
government. Collective-owned enterprises mainly refer to those firms owned by town 
and village level communities. Self-employed individual firms are distinguished from 
private-owned enterprises by their capital requirements and the number of employees 
they can hire. However, the requirements on the registration of private enterprises have 
relaxed substantially since 2012 in an attempt to boost innovation and increase urban 
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employment. Among urban workers, 59.12% of them are employed by state-owned 
enterprises, and 6.33% of them work for collective-owned enterprises. Just about one-
third of them work in the private sector. In contrast, more than 80% of rural migrant 
wage earners are employed in the private sector. The proportion of them working in 
state-owned enterprises is only 13.56%. 
The classification of occupations follows the Chinese Standard Classification of 
Occupations 1999 in 1-digit level. In view of the survey questionnaire, we generate 
eight types of occupations: managers and principals in state agencies, professional 
technicians, clerks, commercial and service personnel, agriculture workers, 
manufacturing and transport equipment practitioners, military personnel, and other 
practitioners. According to Table 4.2, there is also a significant difference in the 
distribution of occupations between the two groups of workers. Urban wage earners 
are more equally distributed across occupations while rural migrants are more likely 
to work as service and commercial personnel and manufacturing/transport personnel. 
Over 82% of rural migrant wage earners work either as commercial and service 
personnel or manufacturing/transport equipment practitioners, while the majority of 
urban workers (about 56%) are in non-blue-collar occupations (principals and 
managers, professionals, and clerks). 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics 
 Urban  Migrants  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Hourly Wage (Yuan) 14.93 22.19 7.08 4.11 
Age 40.47 9.88 30.43 10.18 
Gender (Male = 1) 55.93% 0.5 60.55% 0.49 
Marital status (Married = 1) 83.62% 0.37 53.93% 0.5 
Education Level:     
Primary 2.23% 0.15 11.73% 0.32 
Secondary 41.41% 0.3 69.04% 0.46 
Specialized Secondary 10.37% 0.3 11.11% 0.31 
Tertiary 45.98% 0.49 8.12% 0.27 
Ownership:     
State-owned 59.12% 0.49 13.56% 0.34 
Collective-owned 6.33% 0.24 5.05% 0.22 
Private-owned 23.82% 0.43 60.34% 0.49 
Self-employed 10.72% 0.31 21.04% 0.41 
Occupation:     
Managers and Principals 5.69% 0.24 4.36% 0.2 
Professional technicians 24.27% 0.43 0.82% 0.09 
Clerks 26.23% 0.44 6.39% 0.24 
Commercial and service 21.23% 0.41 56.52% 0.5 
Agriculture workers 0.68% 0.08 0 0 
Manufacturing and transport 15.53% 0.36 31.25% 0.46 
Military Personnel 0.63% 0.08 0 0 
Other 5.75% 0.23 0.66% 0.08 
Coastal Provinces 45.74% 49.82% 51.67% 0.5 
Job Experience 13.92 10.91 4.47 4.89 
No. of obs. 6222  4867  
 
To have a better understanding of the source of the mean gap between urban workers 
and rural migrants, we summarize the average hourly wage by level of education, types 
of firm ownership, and occupations among two groups in Table 4.3, Table 4.4 and 
Table 4.5 respectively. It is very easy to see that higher level of education, being 
employed in the state sector and having non-blue-collar jobs are all associated with a 
higher hourly wage within each group of workers. It is also indicated by Table 4.3 that 
the return to education is much higher for urban workers than rural migrants. An urban 
worker with tertiary education can earn on the average more than double than a rural 
migrant worker. Similar results can be found when we compare the average wage of 
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urban and rural migrant workers by type of firm ownership and occupation, shown in 
Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, respectively.  
Table 4.3: Average hourly wage by level of education 
  Urban Migrants 
Level of education: Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Primary 8.18 7.31 5.42 2.76 
Secondary 10.74 16.59 6.99 3.96 
Specialized Secondary 12.34 9.99 7.66 4.33 
Tertiary 19.61 27.5 9.43 5.31 
 
Table 4.4: Average hourly wage by firm ownership 
  Urban Migrants 
Type of firm ownership: Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
State-owned 16.56 23.78 7.64 4.6 
Collective-owned 13.4 19.84 7.59 3.65 
Private-owned 13.9 21.18 7.1 4.23 
Self-employed 9.12 13.93 6.53 3.4 
 
Table 4.5: Average hourly wage by occupation 
  Urban Migrants 
Type of firm ownership: Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Managers and Principals 22.61 22.17 10.53 5.05 
Professional technicians 19.69 30.2 12.2 8.01 
Clerks  16.24 23.54 7.92 4.34 
Commercial and service  9.73 13.64 6.45 3.83 
Agriculture workers 11.51 8.57 0 0 
Manufacturing and transport  11.3 12.94 7.44 3.83 
Military Personnel  22.48 12.07 0 0 
Other  9.83 14.55 6.84 4.63 
 
    In summary, the RUMiC wave 2009 dataset shows that in the China urban labour 
market, the urban workers received on an average a much higher wage rate than the 
rural migrant workers did. Descriptive statistics indicate that urban workers are more 
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experienced and have higher levels of education. In the meantime, urban workers are 
more concentrated in non-blue-collar occupations and state-owned enterprises. These 
job-related characteristics are observed to be associated with a high hourly wage. 
However, at this stage, we can hardly determine to what extent the mean wage gap 
can be explained by the difference in human capital factors and individual job-related 
characteristics. The next section presents the empirical methodology used to deal with 
the problem.  
  4.4 Empirical Strategy 
The empirical strategy in this study follows Nopo (2008) to decompose the rural 
urban wage gap in a non-parametric way. Particularly, a matching approach is 
employed to address the problem of the difference in the distribution of individual 
characteristics of rural migrants and urban workers. The non-parametric estimation 
also imposes no restriction on the functional form of wage formation as in the Oaxaca-
Blinder technique. Since the comparison of mean wages among rural and urban 
workers is only over the common support, no extra assumption on out of common 
support property is needed. Another advantage of the approach is that it provides us 
with information over the distribution of the unexplained pay gap. 
   4.4.1 The model setup 
Consider two groups of workers 𝑖 = {𝑢, 𝑟}. u denotes urban workers and r denotes 
the group of rural migrant workers. Let 𝐸(𝑤|𝑋, 𝑖) be the average wage for group i 
conditional on individual characteristics X and g𝑖(𝑥) denotes the average wage for 
individuals in group i with characteristics x. 𝐹𝑖(. ) denotes the conditional cumulative 
distribution function of individual characteristics X for group i and f 𝑖(. )  is the 
associated density function. Therefore, we have, 
 122 
 
𝐸(𝑤|𝑋, 𝑖) = ∫ 𝑔𝑖(𝑥)𝑑𝐹𝑖(𝑥)
𝑆𝑖
                                                                                      (4.4) 
    Here 𝑆𝑖 is the support of the distribution of characteristics for group i workers. The 
wage gap between rural and urban workers can then be written as, 
∆= 𝐸(𝑤|𝑋, 𝑢) − 𝐸(𝑤|𝑋, 𝑟) = ∫ 𝑔𝑢(𝑥)𝑑𝐹𝑢(𝑥)
𝑆𝑢
− ∫ 𝑔𝑟(𝑥)𝑑𝐹𝑟(𝑥)
𝑆𝑟
                         (4.5)                                                                  
    The main concern for the matching approach is that support 𝑆𝑢 and 𝑆𝑟 may not be 
identical. Based on this idea, Nopo (2008) has decomposed the wage gap into 
endowment effect and “coefficients” effect over the common support and two 
components of wage gap due to individuals out of common support. Let S be the 
common support 𝑆 = 𝑆𝑢 ∩ 𝑆𝑟. Let ∅𝑖(𝑆) be the probability measure of the set S in 
F𝑖(. ) so we have ∅𝑖(𝑆) = ∫ 𝑑
𝑆
F𝑖(x). We then can write the wage gap function ∆ as 
∆= ∫ g𝑢(x)𝑑F𝑢(x)
𝑆
+ ∫ g𝑢(x)𝑑F𝑢(x)
𝑆𝑢∩𝑆𝑟̅̅̅̅
− (∫ g𝑟(x)𝑑F𝑟(x)
𝑆
+ ∫ g𝑟(x)𝑑F𝑟(x))
𝑆𝑟∩𝑆𝑢̅̅ ̅̅
                 (4.6)                                                                      
    Here 𝑆𝑟̅̅ ̅  and 𝑆𝑢̅̅ ̅  denote the complement of set 𝑆  within 𝑆𝑟  and 𝑆𝑢  respectively. 
Since f 𝑢(. ) is zero outside the domain 𝑆𝑢  and f 𝑟(. ) is zero outside the domain 𝑆𝑟 
equation (4.4) above can be rewritten as, 
∆= ∫ g𝑢(x)𝑑F𝑢(x)
𝑆
+ ∫ g𝑢(x)𝑑F𝑢(x)
𝑆𝑟̅̅̅̅
− (∫ g𝑟(x)𝑑F𝑟(x)
𝑆
+ ∫ g𝑟(x)𝑑F𝑟(x)
𝑆𝑢̅̅ ̅̅
                           (4.7)                                                                              
    Nopo (2008) has shown that a simple rearrangement of equation (4.7) will give us 
∆= [∫ g𝑢(x)
𝑑F𝑢(x)
 ∅𝑢(𝑆𝑟̅̅̅̅ )𝑆𝑟̅̅̅̅
− ∫ g𝑢(x)
𝑑F𝑢(x)
 ∅𝑢(𝑆𝑟)𝑆𝑟
]  ∅𝑢(𝑆𝑟̅̅ ̅) + [∫ g𝑢(x)
𝑑F𝑢(x)
 ∅𝑢(𝑆𝑟)𝑆
−
∫ g𝑟(x)
𝑑F𝑟(x)
 ∅𝑟(𝑆𝑢)𝑆
] + ∫ [g𝑢(x) − g𝑟(x)]
𝑑F𝑢(x)
 ∅𝑟(𝑆𝑢)𝑆
+ [∫ g𝑟(x)
𝑑F𝑢(x)
 ∅𝑟(𝑆𝑢)𝑆𝑢
−
∫ g𝑟(x)
𝑑F𝑟(x)
 ∅𝑟(𝑆𝑢̅̅ ̅̅ )
] ∅𝑟(𝑆𝑢̅̅ ̅)
𝑆𝑢̅̅ ̅̅
]                                                                                          (4.8) 
    The average wage gap between rural and urban workers has been decomposed to 
four intuitive terms. Following Nopo (2008), we let 
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∆𝑢= [∫ g𝑢(x)
𝑑F𝑢(x)
 ∅𝑢(𝑆𝑟̅̅̅̅ )𝑆𝑟̅̅̅̅
− ∫ g𝑢(x)
𝑑F𝑢(x)
 ∅𝑢(𝑆𝑟)𝑆𝑟
]  ∅𝑢(𝑆𝑟̅̅ ̅)                                                   (4.9) 
∆𝑥= [∫ g𝑢(x)
𝑑F𝑢(x)
 ∅𝑢(𝑆𝑟)𝑆
− ∫ g𝑢(x)
𝑑F𝑟(x)
 ∅𝑟(𝑆𝑢)𝑆
]                                                                    (4.10) 
∆𝑜= ∫ [g𝑢(x) − g𝑟(x)]
𝑑F𝑢(x)
 ∅𝑟(𝑆𝑢)𝑆
                                                                                   (4.11) 
∆𝑟= [∫ g𝑟(x)
𝑑F𝑟(x)
 ∅𝑟(𝑆𝑢)𝑆𝑢
− ∫ g𝑟(x)
𝑑F𝑟(x)
 ∅𝑟(𝑆𝑢̅̅ ̅̅ )
] ∅𝑟(𝑆𝑢̅̅ ̅)
𝑆𝑢̅̅ ̅̅
                                                    (4.12) 
    ∆𝑢 can be interpreted as the part of the wage gap due to the difference between those 
urban workers who are in the common support and those who are not. The first term 
in the bracket is the average wage for urban workers with characteristics out of the 
common support and the second term is the average wage for those urban workers 
who can be matched with rural migrant workers (i.e., those urban workers with a set 
of individual characteristics in the common support).  ∅𝑢(𝑆𝑟̅̅ ̅) is the proportion of 
urban workers with characteristics outside the common support. 
    Similarly, ∆𝑟 can be interpreted as the part of the wage gap due to the difference 
between those rural migrant workers who are in the common support and those who 
are not. ∆𝑟 can reach zero when the average wage of those rural migrant workers in 
the common support is equal to the average wage of those migrants out of common 
support or  ∅𝑟(𝑆𝑢̅̅ ̅) = 0  (i.e., combinations of individual characteristics for rural 
migrants can all be matched with urban workers).  ∅𝑟(𝑆𝑢̅̅ ̅) is the proportion of rural 
migrant workers with characteristics outside the common support. 
    ∆𝑥 + ∆𝑜 is the wage gap partition capturing the average wage gap over the common 
support. ∆𝑥  can be interpreted as the part of the urban rural migrants’ wage gap 
attributed to the difference in the distribution of individual characteristics over their 
common support. It is similar to the endowment effect term (?̅?𝑢−?̅?𝑟)?̂?𝑢  in the 
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Oaxaca-Blinder wage decomposition method. The expression for ∆𝑥 implies that the 
urban rural migrants’ wage gap can decrease if rural migrant workers have the same 
distribution of individual characteristics over the common support as urban workers. 
For example, in the China’s urban labor market both rural migrants and urban workers 
are observed to be working in the state sector. However, the proportion of urban 
workers in the state sector is believed to be much higher than the proportion of rural 
migrants. The term ∆𝑜, according to (4.11), is the partition of the wage gap attributed 
to the difference in wage formation over the common support. ∆𝑜 is also referred to as 
the unexplained part of the wage gap. Similar to the term ?̅?𝑟(?̂?𝑢 − ?̂?𝑟) in the Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition, the unexplained part of the wage gap is often attributed to 
omitted variables or simply discrimination. To estimate all four components above, a 
matching process is introduced. 
   4.4.2 The matching process   
    The matching process applied in this study is Exact Matching. Although several 
other matching methods are available (e.g., Propensity Score Matching, etc.), exact 
matching is considered to be a faster and easier matching method that requires fewer 
assumptions, and processes more attractive statistical properties for many applications 
than other existing matching methods (Blackwell et al., 2009). This matching method 
performs exact matching for discrete variables, and coarsens continuing variables into 
several groups to perform exact matching. 
    The implementation of the matching process includes four steps:  
    Step 1: Choose one rural migrant from the rural migrants’ sub-sample.  
    Step 2: Determine the individual characteristics (age, gender, etc.) we try to match 
on. Find all the urban workers who have the same combination of individual 
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characteristics x as the migrant chosen in step 1. If no urban workers can be found, 
we label the chosen migrant worker as “unmatched” and go back to step 1. If yes, we 
label those rural migrant workers and urban workers as “matched” and move on to 
the next step. 
    Step 3: Construct a synthetic individual whose log hourly wage is the average of all 
of those urban workers selected in step 2 and match him to the migrant selected in 
step 1.  
    Step 4: Put matched synthetic urban workers and rural migrants in a new sample 
of matched individuals. Then we repeat the 4 steps until all rural migrants are chosen.  
    The purpose of constructing a sub-sample of synthetic individuals is to obtain the 
counterfactual wage of rural migrant workers if they have the same distribution of 
individual characteristics as urban workers. It is an analogy to the Oaxaca-Blinder 
method where what would a rural migrant worker earn if he has the same wage 
structure as an urban worker.   
    After the matching process, each individual in the original sample falls into one of 
four sub-groups: unmatched rural migrant workers, matched rural migrant workers, 
unmatched urban workers and matched urban workers. According to (4.9), (4.10), 
(4.11) and (4.12),  ∆𝑢  can be calculated as the average wage difference between 
unmatched urban workers and matched urban workers times the proportion of 
unmatched urban workers. Similarly,  ∆𝑟  can be calculated as the average wage 
difference between unmatched rural migrant workers and matched rural migrant 
workers times the proportion of unmatched rural migrant workers.  ∆𝑥 is measured by 
the difference between the average wage of matched urban workers and the 
counterfactual average wage of rural migrant workers (which is the average wage of 
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synthetic individuals).  ∆𝑢 +  ∆𝑟 +  ∆𝑥  constitutes the wage gap part due to the 
difference in endowments (endowment effect in the Oaxaca-Blinder setup). The 
unexplained part of the wage gap  ∆𝑜  is calculated as the difference between the 
counterfactual average wage of rural migrant workers and the actual average of 
matched rural migrant workers (coefficient effect in the Oaxaca-Blinder setup).  ∆𝑜 is 
our main concern. It captures the possible effects of those individual unobservable 
characteristics or discrimination after comparing the average wages of rural migrants 
and urban workers over the common support of individual characteristics. 
    To calculate four components of the wage gap decomposition results, we use 5 sets 
of individual characteristics to match the two groups of workers. Set 1 contains only 
demographic information: level of education, age, gender, marital status and level of 
regional development. Set 2 contains the factors in set 1 and job tenure. Set 3 includes 
the factors in set 1 and occupation. Set 4 includes factors in set 1 and firm ownership. 
Set 5 includes all demographic and job-related information. Similar to other matching 
techniques, the matching method has a problem of dimensionality. There is a trade-off 
between including more matching variables and maintaining the original sample. As 
the number of individual characteristics increases, the sample of matched individuals 
will shrink. This is not plausible especially when the sample size is small.  
  4.5 Results 
   4.5.1 Decomposition results 
Table 4.6 reports results from both the classical Oaxaca-Blinder technique and the 
matching approach. Generally, Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition tends to predict a 
larger unexplained wage gap than the matching approach. As we can see, the raw wage 
gap between rural migrant workers and urban workers is 27.2% to the mean wage of 
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rural migrant workers. If we only control for human capital factors, the Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition results shows that only 5.5% out of 27.2% can be explained by 
differences in individual observables between rural migrants and urban workers. It 
also shows that almost 21.7% out of 27.2% (which is about 79.78%) is unexplainable. 
Results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition indicate that a large proportion of the 
wage gap cannot be explained by individual difference in characteristics. This 
unexplained wage gap might be due to the omission of other important variables. It 
can also be attributed to a discrimination effect. To see this, if we include more control 
variables (as in set 2–5) in the wage determination regression, we see an increase in 
the explained part of the raw wage gap. Nevertheless, almost half of the wage gap 
cannot be explained by differences in individual characteristics even when we control 
for all demographic and job-related information. In contrast, results of the matching 
approach after controlling only demographic characteristics show that the unexplained 
part of the relative wage gap after matching is only 10.8% to the average of migrant 
workers compared with 21.7% by the Oaxaca-Blinder method. The inclusion of job-
related characteristics in the matching process does not affect the decomposition 
results significantly. When matching with demographic characteristics and occupation, 
the unexplained wage gap after matching has dropped from 10.8% to 9.4% of the 
average wage for migrant workers. If we match two groups of workers with 
demographic information and firm ownership, the unexplained wage gap drops from 
10.8% to 9.2%. There is a significant change from 10.8% to 8.1% in the decomposition 
result when we match two groups of workers with all job-related information in 
addition to demographic information. The wage gap due to the difference in 
characteristics between those urban workers in the common support and those out of 
common support has increased from 1.6% to 11.6%. This might be due to the dramatic 
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change in the size of the common support. As we can see from the table below, the 
share of urban workers and the share of rural migrant workers shrink as the number of 
control variables increases. When only demographic information is matched, 91.4% 
of urban workers and 98.4% of rural migrant workers are in the common support. 
When job-related information is included, there are only 34.1% of urban workers and 
54.8% of rural migrant workers in the matched sample.  
Table 4.6: Decomposition results 
Controls 
Raw 
Wage 
Gap 
Oaxaca-Blinder 
Decomposition 
Decomposition with Matching Method 
Explain
ed 
Wage 
Gap  
Unexpl
ained 
Wage 
Gap 
Δ Δ𝑈 Δ𝑋 Δ0 Δ𝑅 
Share of 
matched 
urban 
workers 
Share of 
matched 
rural 
migrants 
Set 1 
27.2% 
5.5% 21.7% 
27.2% 
1.6% 14.7% 10.8% 0% 91.4% 98.6% 
Set 2 9.3% 17.9% 6.8% 9.0% 10.8% 0.5% 86.0% 93.8% 
Set 3 8.3% 16.2% 1.2% 16.5% 9.4% 0.1% 63.8% 84.4% 
Set 4 5.9% 21.3% 1.5% 16.3% 9.2% 0% 85.6% 94.0% 
Set 5 14.9% 12.3% 11.6% 8.8% 8.1% −1.3% 34.1% 54.7% 
 
The results from the Oaxaca-Blinder and matching approaches above decompose 
the mean wage gap between rural migrants and urban workers. They fail to show the 
wage difference along the entire wage distribution. Figure 4.1a and Figure 4.1b below 
illustrates the absolute and relative wage gap in different percentiles along the wage 
distribution between two groups of workers before and after matching. The set of 
control variables for the matching process is set 5 where all demographic and job-
related information is included. The absolute wage gap is simply measured as the 
difference in the values of log hourly wage between urban workers and rural migrant 
workers. The relative wage gap is measured as the ratio of absolute wage gap to the 
average wage of rural migrant workers. According to Figure 4.1a and Figure 4.1b, the 
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wage gap is enlarging along the wage distribution before and after matching. It shows 
evidence that it is the upper percentiles of the wage distribution that contribute most 
to the observed wage gap between rural migrant and urban workers. In addition, both 
figures shows that, while the patterns remain similar, both the absolute and relative 
wage gaps decrease after matching. It indicates that part of the wage gap between rural 
migrants and urban workers can be attributed to the incomparability between the two 
samples of workers. Failure to recognise the overlapping support of the combinations 
of individual characteristics between the two groups is very likely to lead to an 
overestimation of the unexplained wage gap. 
Figure 4.1a: Absolute wage gap before and after the matching 
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Figure 4.1b: Relative wage gap before and after the matching 
 
 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the cumulative distribution of log hourly wage for migrant 
workers and urban workers in and out of common support in 2009 after controlling 
for set 5 of variables. According to Figure 4.2, urban workers out of common support 
earn more than urban workers within common support over the entire distribution. The 
pattern is different for rural migrant workers. Unmatched migrant workers earn more 
than matched migrant workers in the lower end of wage distribution and earn less than 
matched migrant workers in the upper end of wage distribution. But generally the 
differences in distribution do not seem significant. Nevertheless, Figure 4.2 further 
demonstrates the concern that not all individuals in the two samples are comparable to 
each other. If we restrict our attention to those who are comparable, the wage gap 
between rural migrant workers and urban workers would decrease significantly. 
Figure 4.2 also implies that the observed wage gap between rural migrants and urban 
workers is exacerbated because too many high–wage, incomparable urban workers are 
presented in the sample.   
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Figure 4.2: Cumulative distribution of wage for four sub-samples 
 
   4.5.2 Distribution of the unexplained wage gap 
One of the advantages of the matching approach is that it can generate the 
distribution of the unexplained wage gap:  ∆𝑜. As stated in the last section, it is simply 
the wage differences between matched rural migrant workers and their matched 
synthetic urban workers. In this sense, we are able to analyze the distribution of the 
unexplained wage gap by individual characteristics. Table 4.7 shows the unexplained 
wage gap and its standard deviation by individual characteristics after controlling for 
demographic information and job-related information. For further clarification, we 
plot the mean and confidence intervals of each characteristic with an error-bar chart. 
The upper bar corresponds to the maximum of 95% confidence interval for the mean 
unexplained wage gap and the lower bar corresponds to the minimum of 95% 
confidence interval. Figures 4.3–4.10 are associated plots. 
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Table 4.7: Mean and standard deviation of unexplained wage gap by individual 
characteristics 
 
Relative unexplained wage 
gap  
Std. Dev. 
By Marital Status:   
Single 0.0872 0.0056 
Married 0.1066 0.0056 
By Gender:   
Male 0.1200 0.0045 
Female 0.0582 0.0035 
By Age:   
18–24 years old 0.0655 0.0089 
25–34 years old 0.1194 0.0067 
35–49 years old 0.1013 0.0079 
50–65 years old 0.1652 0.0304 
By Education Level:   
Primary Education 0.0513 0.0103 
Secondary Education 0.1072 0.0042 
Specialized Secondary 
Education 
0.0554 0.0085 
Tertiary Education 0.1175 0.0195 
By Region:   
Developing  0.0466 0.0031 
Developed 0.1416 0.0034 
By Occupation Experience:   
0–2 years 0.0920 0.0072 
2–5 years 0.0621 0.0044 
5–10 years 0.1197 0.0140 
More than 10 years 0.1588 0.0131 
By Ownership:   
State-owned  0.0845 0.0104 
Collective-owned 0.0772 0.0210 
Private-owned 0.0199 0.0060 
Self-employed-owned 0.0023 0.0114 
By Occupation:   
Managers and Principals 0.1126  
Professional technicians −0.0253 0.1101 
Clerk and Relating personnel 0.0930 0.0285 
Commercial and service 
personnel 
0.0964 0.0067 
Manufacturing and 
transporting 
0.0525  
Other practitioner −0.0022 0.0480 
 
 
 
 133 
 
According to Figure 4.3, there is clear evidence that the average unexplained 
migrant urban wage gap between male and female workers is different. In particular, 
the unexplained wage gap is higher for males than for females. With respect to marital 
status, there is no clear evidence of the average unexplained wage gap for married 
individuals being significantly larger than the average unexplained wage gap for 
singles. The unexplained wage gap is also not significant different across age groups. 
There is only a weak upward trend in the unexplained wage gap by age group. This 
might be because the classification of age groups is too general. A similar result is also 
found in the level of education. According to Figure 4.7, the unexplained wage gap 
for workers with tertiary education is not significantly different from those with 
secondary education. However, the unexplained wage gap is more dispersed among 
those with tertiary education than among those with other levels of education.  
With respect to the unexplained wage gap by level of regional development, we 
find that those who work in the developed areas have a significantly higher average 
unexplained wage gap between migrants and urban workers than those working in the 
less developed region. In general, the unexplained wage gap is only about 5% to the 
average wage of migrants in the developing area. In contrast, in developed coastal 
areas, the average unexplained wage gap is nearly 14% to the average wage of migrant 
workers. 
Figure 4.8 shows evidence of a U shape relationship between the unexplained wage 
gap and job experience. The unexplained wage gap is smallest among those with 2-5 
years of work experience and biggest among those with more than 10 years of 
experience. Figure 4.9 shows that most of the unexplained wage gap is from state-
owned enterprises and collective owned enterprise. The unexplained wage gap is 
almost zero in the private sector. It reflects that private sector is more competitive than 
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state sector. Moreover, migrant workers not only have entry barriers to the state sector 
but also paid less even when they find jobs in state sector compared to urban workers.  
The unexplained wage gaps by occupation, according to Figure 4.10, are relatively 
stable along occupations. 
Table 4.8 shows the mean unexplained wage gap between rural migrants and their 
urban counterparts on the matched sample by some combinations of human capital 
characteristics. Typically, we show the migrant urban differences for individuals with 
specific combinations of age, level of education and gender. Type 1 to type 4 are 
individuals who are males and with secondary education but belong to different age 
groups. They enable us to see the effect of age on the wage gap between different types 
of individuals. Wage gap, either in terms of absolute wage gap or relative wage gap, 
tends to become wider for older males with secondary education. It is the same for 
females with secondary education if we compare the figures for type 5- type 8 
individuals. Comparing type 1 (2, 3, 4) and type 5 (6, 7, 8) provide us information on 
the gender effect on the wage gap. Table 4.8 indicates that female rural migrants at 
different ages face less wage penalty than male rural migrants. Comparing type 3, type 
9 and type 10 individuals tell us the education effects on the wage gap. Typically, for 
male middle-aged rural migrants, those with secondary education experience larger 
‘discrimination’. 
Table 4.9 shows the mean unexplained wage gap between rural migrants and their 
urban counterparts on the matched sample by some combinations of job-related 
characteristics. We first combine the following characteristics: firm ownership and 
level of regional development. Then we add occupation to see how the wage gap varies 
by occupation for different types of individuals. According to table 4.9, no matter what 
type of firm a rural migrant works in, he/she will in average face larger ‘discrimination’ 
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in the developed coastal provinces than in the developing ones. The comparison of 
type 11 and type 13 individuals indicates that there is no significant difference in the 
mean wage gap between state-owned enterprises and private-owned enterprises in the 
developed coastal provinces. In contrast, rural migrants in the developing provinces in 
average face larger wage penalty in the state-owned enterprises than in the private-
owned enterprises. Focusing on the mean wage gap by occupation, comparisons 
among type 19 to type 21individuals and among type 22 to type 24 individuals indicate 
that in the private-owned enterprises mean wage gap tends to be larger for office-based 
jobs. The comparison of type 20 and type 25 individuals indicate that for the 
commercial and service relating jobs, there is no significant difference in the mean 
wage gap between state-owned enterprises and private-owned enterprises in the 
developed coastal provinces. 
To sum up, our results indicate that significant wage gaps remain even after 
controlling for the individual observable characteristics. Focusing on specific persons, 
our analysis shows that female rural migrants are more likely to be disadvantaged 
compared to male rural migrants. Migrants working in developed regions face larger 
unexplained wage gap. Similarly, older migrants face larger ‘discrimination’.  On the 
contrary, after controlling for observable characteristics, the mean wage gap tends to 
be much smaller for young rural migrants. Education appears to have a minimal role 
on widening the wage gap between rural migrant and urban workers. We also observe 
a larger wage gap in the state sector and office-based jobs. 
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Figure 4.3: Confidence intervals for the unexplained wage gap by gender 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Confidence intervals for the unexplained wage gap by marital status 
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Figure 4.5: Confidence intervals for the unexplained wage gap by age 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Confidence intervals for the unexplained wage gap by development level 
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Figure 4.7: Confidence intervals for the unexplained wage gap by education level 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Confidence intervals for the unexplained wage gap by job tenure 
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Figure 4.9: Confidence intervals for the unexplained wage gap by firm ownership 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Confidence intervals for the unexplained wage gap by occupation 
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Table 4.8: Unexplained wage gap by some personal human capital characteristics 
  
Absolute wage gap 
Relative wage gap 
(in % of migrant 
wage) 
No. of obs 
By human capital:       
type 1 age 18-24, secondary education, male 
   0.05 0.03 402 
type 2 age 25-34, secondary education, male 
   0.18 0.09 313 
type 3 age 35-49, secondary education, male 
   0.36 0.18 517 
type 4 age more than 50, secondary education, male 
   0.5 0.30 92 
type 5 age 18-24, secondary education, female 
   -0.12 -0.07 181 
type 6 age 25-34, secondary education, female 
   0.15 0.08 209 
type 7 age 35-49, secondary education,  female 
   0.26 0.16 317 
type 8 age more than 50, secondary education, female 
   0.33 0.22 20 
type 9 age 35-49, primary education,  male 
   0.14 0.08 28 
type 10 age 35-49, tertiary education, male 
   0.2 0.07 14 
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Table 4.9: Unexplained wage gap by some personal job-related characteristics 
    
Absolute wage 
gap 
Relative wage 
gap (in % of 
migrant wage) 
No. of obs 
By job-related characteristics: 
type 11 state-owned, developed regions   
   0.49 0.23 211 
type 12 collective-owned, developed regions   
   0.3 0.15 33 
type 13 private-owned, developed regions   
   0.46 0.22 866 
type 14 self-employed, developed regions   
   0.14 0.07 117 
type 15 state-owned, developing regions   
   0.39 0.20 161 
type 16 collective-owned, developing regions   
   0.23 0.13 19 
type 17 private-owned, developing regions   
   0.21 0.12 847 
type 18 self-employed, developing regions   
   -0.09 -0.05 412 
type 19 Clerk, private-owned, developed regions  
   0.46 0.21 53 
type 20 Commercial and service,  private-owned, developed regions 
   0.3 0.15 540 
type 21 Manufacturing and transport, private-owned, developed regions 
   0.2 0.09 260 
type 22 Clerk, private-owned, developing regions  
   0.36 0.19 54 
type 23 Commercial and service,  private-owned, developing regions 
   0.2 0.11 562 
type 24 Manufacturing and transport, private-owned, developing regions 
   0.07 0.04 216 
type 25 Commercial and service,  state-owned, developed regions  
    0.22 0.11 123 
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  4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter uses the 2009 RUMiC dataset to study the wage gap between rural 
migrants and urban workers in the China’s urban labour market. We employ a 
matching approach developed by Nopo (2008) to tackle the common support problem. 
The common support problem needs to be tackled because those rural migrants should 
be compared with comparable urban workers. In the China’s urban labor market, urban 
workers are more likely to have combinations of individual characteristics that rural 
migrants don’t have and be paid a higher wage. In this study, our results show that 
after controlling for only individual demographic characteristics, about 98.6% of rural 
migrants can be matched with urban workers, but only 91.4% of urban workers can be 
matched with rural migrants. In addition, the cumulative distribution functions of 
those in and out of the common support indicate that those urban workers out of 
common support earn more than those within common support along the wage 
distribution.   
The common support problem is often ignored in traditional wage decomposition 
analysis. It results in an overestimation of the unexplainable part of the wage gap. In 
this study, compared with 21.7% out of 27.2% by the Oaxaca-Blinder approach, the 
matching approach shows that the unexplained wage gap between rural migrants and 
urban workers is only 10.8% to the average wage of migrant workers after controlling 
all demographic characteristics. The figures can be further reduced when we include 
more control variables in the matching process.  
Our results show that the unexplained wage gap is larger at higher percentiles of 
wage distribution. We look at the distribution of the unexplained wage gap by 
individual characteristics. There is clear evidence that the unexplained wage gap is 
larger among male workers than female workers, and is larger among workers in 
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developed coastal provinces than workers in central and western areas. If we control 
for sector segregation and distributions of other characteristics are equal between rural 
and urban groups, almost all of the unexplained wage gap is from the state-sector. It 
indicates that state-sector plays a key part in generating the unobserved wage gap 
within the urban labour market. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion to the thesis 
The thesis considers the economic consequences of the recent reform of labour laws 
and the reform of the household registration system in China. The labour laws reform 
aims to enhance the labour regulations in the China’s labour market and increase the 
job security of workers. As EPL are governmental interventions to the free labour 
market, they are associated with possible unintended effects such as the 
informalization of labour force and rising unemployment. The household registration 
system reform aims to break the rural urban barriers to places of residence, reduce the 
discrimination against rural migrants and ensure the equal access to social benefits. 
One typical question with the reform is that to what extent the incomes of rural 
migrants will increase if they are treated equally as their urban counterparts. I explore 
these two topics in the thesis. In this chapter, I will provide a summary of each chapter 
of the thesis, the discussion of the findings, contributions and limitations, and the 
challenges for future research. 
  5.1 Summary of the findings 
    The second chapter studies the effects of EPL on labour market outcomes in a job 
search and matching model. This model is featured with an informal sector. The 
informal sector is assumed to be a marginal and competitive sector. Workers in the 
sector can find a job instantaneously and earn their marginal products. The informal 
sector is also assumed to be beyond the ambit of EPL. In contrast, the formal sector is 
characterized by search frictions and is subject to EPL. In terms of the linkage between 
the formal and informal sectors, one crucial assumption in this study is that workers 
in the informal sector cannot find jobs directly in the formal sector. Rather, they need 
to be unemployed in the formal sector in order to find a formal job.  
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    The comparative statics indicate that rising costs of laying off workers 
unambiguously decrease the labour market’s tightness and a firm’s reservation 
productivity. Both job creation and job destruction are eschewed. The model also 
predicts that given a Cobb–Douglas-form job matching function, there is a U-shaped 
relationship between layoff costs and the size of the informal sector, and an inverse 
U-shaped relationship between layoff costs and the wage rate in the formal and 
informal sectors. When layoff costs are low, rising lay-off costs increase the wage rate 
in the formal and informal sectors. However, it makes the prospect of working in the 
formal sector better than that in the informal sector. There is a movement of workers 
from the informal sector to the formal sector. As layoff costs pass a certain threshold, 
both formal and informal wages fall with rising layoff costs. In addition, as layoff costs 
increase, workers who are seeking jobs in the formal sector would find it more 
profitable to work in the informal sector. Consequently, there is a movement of 
workers from the formal sector to the informal sector. A numerical study is also 
conducted in this chapter. The calibration results are generally consistent with the 
model predictions.  
    The third chapter empirically examine the effect of 2008 CLCL on the formal–
informal divide in the context of China’s urban labour market. In this study, instead 
of using an indicator for EPL strictness, we use a range of indicators for the 
enforcement of EPL and the judiciary orientation in China’s urban labour market. 
These indicators include the labour inspection rate, the incidence of labour dispute, 
the court efficiency, and the share of pro-worker resolutions by labour dispute 
arbitration agencies. Panel data discrete choice models are estimated to predict 
individuals’ probabilities of being in each employment status. The results show that 
there is weak evidence for an association between EPL enforcement and the judiciary 
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orientation indicators and labour force participation, and for the association between 
these indicators and employment status choices. The results indicate that workers from 
provinces with high incidence of labour disputes are associated with higher probability 
of formal employment and lower probability of informal employment. 
The fourth chapter considers another important issue of the China’s urban labour 
market: the wage gap between urban workers and rural-to-urban migrants. The chapter 
is conducted in the setting that there is persistent wage gap between rural migrant and 
urban workers in China’s urban labour market. In this chapter, we deal with the 
common support problem. The main argument of the empirical strategy we employ is 
that the comparison of wages between two groups of workers should only be within 
the common support (i.e. compare those comparable).  The decomposition results 
show that the size of the unexplained wage gap compared with the mean wage gap 
between urban workers and rural migrants decreases significantly from nearly 50% to 
29.7% if we compare comparable individuals. In addition, results indicate that labour 
market segmentation also contributes to the unexplained wage gap between urban 
workers and urban migrant workers in China. The size of the unexplained wage gap 
as a share of the mean wage of rural migrant workers decreases from 10.8% to 9.4% 
when we control for occupation in the matching process. We also see a reduction in 
the size of the unexplained wage gap from 10.8% to 9.2% when we control for firm 
ownership. It suggests that both occupation segregation and sector segregation 
contribute to the observed wage gap between rural and urban workers. In addition, the 
results on the distribution of the unexplained wage gap show that male migrants face 
a larger unexplained wage gap than female migrants. Male migrants are more 
disadvantageous than female migrants. Last, migrants are also more disadvantaged in 
state-owned enterprises than they are in the private sector.  
 147 
 
  5.2 Discussion of the findings, contributions and 
limitations  
The informal sector, especially in the developing countries, is often associated with 
unskilled jobs, bad work conditions and unregulated activities. It is in the interests of 
governments to reduce its size in their economies. Although the net effect is 
ambiguous, the theoretical model developed in the first chapter indicates that in an 
economy with segmented labour markets, the labour regulations targeting at the formal 
sector could also have effects on the informal sector. If the EPL in formal sector 
becomes stricter, the enhanced job security in the formal sector attracts more informal 
sector workers. On the other hand, workers may find it more profitable to work in the 
informal sector as firms become more cautious in job hiring. The EPL, in this sense, 
is a double-edged sword. Governmental interventions in the labour market should 
consider the possible unintended effects of the interventions. It is likely that policies 
aiming at reducing informality may finally increase it. 
The main contribution of this study is that we develop a more tractable model to 
study the effects of EPL on the mobility of workers between formal sector and 
informal sector. The model is also associated with limitations. Firstly, only one type 
of policy (EPL) is considered. It ignores the interactions between EPL and other labour 
market regulations such as minimum wage policies. The labour market outcomes are 
a result of joint effects of all labour regulations. The partial analysis of the policy may 
not be consistent with the empirical findings. Another limitation of the study is that it 
fails to take the informal employment in the formal sector into considerations. 
Informal employment in the formal sector contributes a large proportion to the 
informality in the labour market. A model of informality should consider all sources 
of it.  
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In chapter 3, we contribute to the literature by examining the effects of the CLCL 
on the formal-informal divide in China’s urban labour market. As we are unable to 
extricate the pure effects of EPL change from other unobserved factors, we employ a 
strategy by looking at the effects of the EPL enforcement and the judiciary orientation. 
The empirical findings provide weak evidence to the hypothesis of an association 
between the enforcement of the CLCL, the judiciary orientation and decisions on 
labour market participation and employment status choices. The research is associated 
with some limitations. First, the indicators used in this study lacks variation. Due to 
the data availability, we aggregate the indicators at the provincial level. There are only 
9 provinces in the dataset, so we only have 36 variations (4 waves) across more than 
10,000 observations.   Second, the data used in this study covers a short time span 
from 2004 to 2011. The changes in the variation of EPL enforcement and the judiciary 
orientation may take longer period of time to take effects. Third, there is possible 
endogeneity within the indicators. Higher rate of labour inspection could be a result 
of lower level of compliance in that province, so there may be a problem of reversed 
causality. 
The results from chapter 4 show that the observed wage gap between rural migrants 
and urban workers can largely be reduced if we compare those comparable individuals. 
The previous studies over the wage gap tend to overestimate the discrimination effects. 
Nevertheless, there is clear evidence that rural migrant workers are not equally paid 
as urban workers in the China’s urban labor market. Since rural and urban workers are 
classified by hukou system, the results emphasize the need to reform the hukou system 
in China. In addition, policies should also target the entry barriers and inequality in 
specific sectors such as state-owned enterprises. Compared with urban workers, rural 
migrants are less likely to be employed by state-owned enterprises. Even if the entry 
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barrier vanishes, they still have the largest unexplained wage gap with their urban 
counterparts in comparison to working in other sectors. The unexplained wage gap 
can largely be reduced if equal employment and equal pay are ensured in the state 
sector. 
The main contribution of the chapter 4 is that we use a non-parametric matching 
method to explore the wage gap between rural migrants and urban workers. It not only 
deals with the common support problem and specification problem but also enables us 
to see the distribution of unexplained wage gap. The main limitation of the study is 
the dimensionality problem. As we match the two samples with more characteristics, 
the matched sample size reduces significantly. 
  5.3 Challenges for future research 
The model developed in chapter 2 provides us with a starting point for further 
research. Several elements can be added into the model. First, workers in our model 
are assumed to be ex-ante identical. Future research can introduce heterogeneous 
groups of workers in the model. For example, if a group of workers is discriminated 
against the other group in terms of wage, it is interesting to examine the effects of EPL 
on the employment probability of the discriminated workers in the formal sector. 
Second, other policy parameters (such as unemployment benefits, minimum wages, 
and tax) can be introduced into the model to see the interactions between these policy 
parameters. This is of great policy implications as labour market outcomes are affected 
by various policies. A thorough understanding of the dynamics of labour market 
should take it into consideration. 
Although we have found weak evidence of an association between CLCL 
enforcement, the judiciary orientation and individual’s employment decisions, this 
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chapter provides us an angle for further research.  Future research can explore the 
effects of the enforcement of labour regulations or the judiciary orientation on labour 
market outcomes with provincial aggregate data that covers consecutive years. Efforts 
can also be devoted to find better indicators that are not correlated to the compliance 
of labour regulations.  
The findings from chapter 4 indicate that rural migrant workers are treated 
unequally in the China’s urban labour market. Together with the labour laws reform, 
the current reform on the hukou system offer us an opportunity to see how these 
reforms affect the labour market situations of rural migrants.   
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Appendix A 
𝑊𝑓(𝑥) and 𝑊𝑓(𝑥) are monotonically increasing in x. To see this, recall that joint 
surplus from a job match is: 
 𝑆𝑓(𝑥) = J𝑓(𝑥) + 𝑊𝑓(𝑥) − 𝑉 + 𝐹 − 𝑈.                                                                (A.1) 
Wage bargaining solution gives us: 
 𝑊𝑓(𝑥) − 𝑈= 𝛽𝑆𝑓(𝑥)                                                                                             (A.2) 
J𝑓(𝑥) − 𝑉 + 𝐹 = (1 − 𝛽)𝑆𝑓(𝑥)                                                                            (A.3) 
With equations (2.2) (2.3) (2.4):  
𝑟J𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑥 − 𝑤𝑓(𝑥) + 𝜆 ∫ 𝑚𝑎𝑥[J𝑓(𝑠), 𝑉 − 𝐹]𝑑𝐺(𝑠) − 𝜆J𝑓(𝑥)
1
0
                           (2.2) 
𝑟𝑈 = 𝑏 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)[𝑊𝑓(1) − 𝑈]                                                                                (2.3) 
𝑟𝑊𝑓(𝑥) =  𝑤𝑓(𝑥) + 𝜆∫0
1
𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝑊𝑓(𝑠), 𝑈]𝑑𝐺(𝑠) − 𝜆𝑊𝑓(𝑥)                                   (2.4) 
We add up equations (2) and (4) and then subtract equation (3). We have: 
r[J𝑓(𝑥) + 𝑊𝑓(𝑥) − 𝑉 + 𝐹 − 𝑈] = 𝑥 + 𝑏 + 𝑟𝐹 + 𝜆 ∫ 𝑚𝑎𝑥[J𝑓(𝑠), 𝑉 − 𝐹]𝑑𝐺(𝑠) −
1
0
𝜆[J𝑓(𝑥) + 𝑊𝑓(𝑥)] + 𝜆∫0
1
𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝑊𝑓(𝑠), 𝑈]𝑑𝐺(𝑠) + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)[𝑊𝑓(1) − 𝑈]               (A.4) 
(A.4) can be rewritten as: 
(𝑟 + 𝜆)𝑆𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑥 − 𝑏 + 𝑟𝐹 + 𝜆 ∫ 𝑚𝑎𝑥[J𝑓(𝑠) − 𝑉 + 𝐹, 0]𝑑𝐺(𝑠)
1
0
+
𝜆 ∫ 𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝑊𝑓(𝑠) −  𝑈, 0]𝑑𝐺(𝑠)
1
0
+ 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽𝑆𝑓(1)= 𝑥 − 𝑏 + 𝑟𝐹 +
 𝜆 ∫ 𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝑆𝑓(𝑠), 0]𝑑𝐺(𝑠)
1
0
+ 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽𝑆𝑓(1)                                                            (A.5) 
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It is easy to see from (A.5) that 𝑆𝑓(𝑥) is monotonically increasing in x. According to 
(A.2) and (A.3), both 𝑊𝑓(𝑥) and J𝑓(𝑥) are increasing in x. 
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